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1 
Introduction 
At least since the Greek empire, around 500 BC, reigning authorities reportedly have been 
making efforts to tackle the environmental problem of waste, because it caused nuisance, smell 
and disease. Other environmental problems were added to the list later, especially in the 20th 
century, including air pollution, biodiversity loss, water pollution, deforestation, acidification, 
the ozone layer and more recently the global concern for climate change, which has grown out 
to be the most serious global environmental concern. Throughout history, legal instruments 
such as standards and permits have dominated environmental policy-making. It was not until 
1920 that an academic first suggested the use of taxation as a regulatory instrument to tackle 
environmental problems, also called environmental externalities (Pigou, 1920). And although 
some countries introduced a tax on petrol as early as in the 1930s, only in the 1970s the first 
taxes with an explicit environmental goal were launched.
1
 Even if their use has increased 
considerably since then (Jordan et al., 2003), the tax instrument is nowadays still used less than 
command-and-control policy instruments (Oh & Svendsen, 2015). That observation is 
interesting, considering the strong support environmental taxes receive in (particularly 
economic) studies, both from academics and international institutions such as the OECD and the 
European Commission.  
This paradox is the starting point for this PhD study on the use of taxation as a regulatory 
instrument in environmental policy. Several perspectives on this instrument will be investigated, 
including the position of taxation within different typologies of policy instruments and decision-
making models, the comparison of environmental taxes with related instruments such as 
tradable permits, their use in policy mixes, their measurement, their side effects such as 
competitiveness and regressivity, their potential contribution to sustainability transitions, and 
their public support.  
The PhD is a publication-based PhD, which means that four academic publications (paper 1, 2, 3 
and 4) constitute the core of the dissertation, supplemented with an introductory chapter and 
a concluding chapter.
2
 This introductory chapter describes the scope of the PhD study and lays 
out how the four publications contribute to answering the research questions of the PhD. The 
 
1  For example, petrol taxes were introduced in Norway in 1931; the first regulatory tax with an environmental goal 
was the sulphur tax in 1971 (Sollund, 2007).  
2  Note that the four papers are included in this dissertation ad verbatim, as they have been published in the books 
or journals. The consequence is that some style, spelling or layout differences may exist between chapters. For 
example, some elements of the journal’s layout may be kept and the use of commas, capital letters of other style 
elements may not be fully coherent in the dissertation. This is largely the result of journal or editor style rules.  
  
2 
concluding chapter presents the main horizontal findings and the answers to the research 
questions.  
In the first section of this introductory chapter, I formulate the problem definition and the 
objectives and research questions of the PhD. The second section provides an overview and 
definition of the concepts that are recurrently used in this dissertation. The third section 
elaborates the theoretical framework and analytical concepts of the PhD. Four theoretical 
strands will be discussed: instrument theory, Pigouvian taxation (including the analytical 
concepts of competitiveness and regressivity impacts), sustainability transition theories and 
theories on public support for environmental taxation. In the fourth section the methodological 
and empirical approach of the PhD study is reviewed. The fifth part describes the four papers 
that constitute the core of this thesis: 
- Paper 1: comparison of a tax instrument and an emissions trading scheme in the context 
of climate change policy, including a case study on China. 
- Paper 2: evaluation of the existing indicators for measuring the greening of a tax system 
and development of a new type of aggregated indicator, based on index theory. 
- Paper 3: confrontation of the theory of environmental taxation with the theory of 
sustainable transitions thinking.  
- Paper 4: theoretical and empirical study on public support for environmental taxation, 
including an empirical part based on a survey in Flanders. 
Figure 1 shows a flowchart of the structure of the PhD thesis. 
 
Figure 1. Visualisation of the structure of the PhD thesis 
PMM = policy-making models; ET = environmental taxation; ETR = environmental tax reform; P1 = paper 1, 
etc. 
The place of ET and ETR in the literature of policy-making models is discussed in this introductory 
chapter (3.2.1 and 3.2.2) and in the conclusions of this PhD. Taxonomies of environmental policy 
instruments are presented in section 3.2.3, instrument choice is discussed in section 3.2.4, and 
policy mixes in section 3.2.5. Environmental tax design is considered as a cross-cutting issue, 
which returns in all four papers of the PhD. The conclusions of the PhD dissertation will cover all 
topics treated in the introduction and in the four PhD papers.  
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1 |  Problem definition and research questions 
Three levels of research questions are distinguished to encompass the scope of this PhD study: 
one central (level 1) question, three underlying (level 2) questions and eight operational (level 3) 
questions. The central (level 1) research question of this PhD study is  
“How can the use of ET as a regulatory policy instrument be explained, measured and 
optimized?” 
This central question harbours three underlying (level 2) questions, which have arisen from 
observed gaps in the literature, and which can be further subdivided into eight more operational 
(level 3) questions. For each of these level 3 questions, a reference to the chapter where it is 
discussed, is added.  
1. Which mechanisms explain how policy decisions, including instrument choice, are 
made?  
→ Related subquestions:  
 [Q1] How can the choice for ET be explained using theoretical policy-
making models? (introduction) 
 [Q2] How does ET compare to other policy instruments? (introduction, 
paper 1) 
 [Q3] How can the (under)use of ET in practice be explained? 
(introduction, paper 3, paper 4)  
2. How can the use of ET, or the greening of a tax system, be measured? 
→ Related subquestions: 
 [Q4] How can different types of indicators for measuring the greening 
of a tax system be evaluated? (Paper 2) 
 [Q5] Which alternative aggregate indicator(s) can be developed to 
improve the existing set of indicators? (Paper 2) 
3. How can the use of ET be optimized? 
→ Related subquestions: 
 [Q6] Which policy instrument is the optimal climate mitigation policy 
instrument for the case of China, a carbon tax or an emissions trading 
scheme? (introduction, paper 1) 
 [Q7] What is the potential of environmental taxation as a policy 
instrument for fostering sustainability transitions? (paper 3) 
 [Q8] What are the factors determining public support for environmental 
tax reform and how can this support be increased? (paper 4) 
Rather than addressing a specific gap in the literature, the first level 2 research question refers 
to the state-of-the-art of the literature on the topic of environmental taxation. The state-of-the-
art is the main topic of this introductory chapter. ET is discussed using the literature on 
instrument choice and policy-making models (Q1). The use (or underuse) of ET as a policy 
instrument is explained using these frameworks (Q3), as is the relation between ET and other 
policy instruments (Q2).   
The second level 2 research question arises from an important gap in the literature. The 
predominantly used revenue-based indicators to measure and compare national governments’ 
use of environmental taxation suffer from serious validity problems. As the indicators are mainly 
  
4 
used in the policy arena (e.g. European Commission & Eurostat, 2016), the academic community 
has up to now hardly taken notice of the validity problems, even though scholars recurrently 
make use of the common indicators (e.g. Hsu, 2009). There was a strong need for the 
development of alternative indicators in the academic field. This observation led to level 3 
subquestions Q4 and Q5 which this PhD aims to answer: “how can different types of indicators 
for measuring the greening of a tax system be evaluated, and which alternative aggregate 
indicator(s) can be developed to improve the existing indicator set?” (paper 2). 
The third level 2 research question of this PhD study concerns the optimization of environmental 
taxation as a policy instrument. In Q6, the undecided debate, both in academic and policy fields, 
comparing taxation and tradable permits, is addressed. Taxes may be in use for longer than 
emissions trading, but as soon as the trading instrument appeared, economists and policy 
analysts alike have been debating which one of them is ‘the best’ instrument for resolving 
environmental problems. As is often the case, there is no clear-cut answer to this question, since 
the specific design of the instrument, the market structure and the context within which the 
instrument is used, need to be taken into consideration. As the policy debate in China on the 
choice between these two market-based instruments was at its height in 2013, I chose to 
contribute to that discussion by applying the instrument choice decision both in theory and in 
practice to the case of China. This focus led to subquestion Q6 of this PhD study: “Which policy 
instrument is the optimal climate mitigation policy instrument for the case of China, a carbon tax 
or an emissions trading scheme?” (paper 1). Second, a gap in the literature was found in the 
emerging field of sustainability transitions. Based on other theoretical bodies, sustainability 
transitions scholars created a new theoretical school related to the analysis of and the solutions 
to persistent environmental problems. Only few scholars in this new field made the link between 
persistent environmental problems on a socio-technical system level and economic instruments 
as potential solutions. Consequently, there was room for subquestion Q7, which is “what is the 
potential of environmental taxation as a policy instrument for fostering sustainability 
transitions?” (paper 3). Third, yet another gap in the literature relates to the importance of 
public support as a criterion for instrument choice. A lot of literature can be found discussing 
public support for several policy instruments, including taxation, but only a very small part has 
a specific focus on regulatory environmental taxation. This conclusion led to subquestion Q8: 
“what are the factors determining public support for environmental tax reform and how can this 
support be increased?” (paper 4). 
In the concluding chapter of this thesis, the research results are integrated and the research 
questions are answered in a systematic way. Transversal conclusions are formulated, next to 
reflections on questions for future research. 
2 |  Conceptual framework 
In the field of environmental taxation, many terms are in use, some of which are similar to each 
other, but with subtle differences that can be important. In this section, I present the most 
important concepts used in this dissertation.  
  
5 
The term ‘policy instrument’ is so common and (seemingly) trivial that not many scholars spend 
time defining it.
3
 Yet, many different interpretations of the term can be found in literature, 
ranging from a narrow to a very broad concept of a policy instrument. Several authors prefer 
the term ‘tools’ over instruments, as this has a broader scope (Hood, 1983; Peters & van Nispen, 
1998). The topic of this PhD is the use of the instrument of taxation as a tool to push people’s 
and companies’ behaviour in a direction that benefits the environment. Given that behavioural 
focus, we choose to use a definition based on van den Heuvel (2005)
4
: “a tool that a government 
actor uses to achieve a certain impact on the behaviour of the target group”.  
Two closely related terms are environmentally related tax and environmental tax. The former 
is defined by the OECD (2001, p. 15: 16)  as “any compulsory, unrequited payment to general 
government levied on tax-bases deemed to be of particular environmental relevance”. This 
definition contains the compulsory and unrequited characteristic of any tax, and the 
environmental component is defined by the tax base, for instance the volume of natural gas 
used for heating a home. The choice to use the tax base is important, as it creates a difference 
between an ‘environmentally related tax’ and an ‘environmental tax’. Bruvoll (2009) relates the 
environmental component of an environmental tax to the objective of the tax: a tax can only be 
an environmental tax if it has an environmental objective. This interpretation of an 
environmental tax ties closely with the concept of the Pigouvian tax (see 3.3.1), which is a tax 
that aims at tackling environmental externalities. We also call this sort of tax a regulatory tax
5
, 
since government aims to regulate or influence citizens’, consumers’ and companies’ behaviour 
with it. Ekins (1999) calls this tax an incentive tax and Owen (2004) refers to it as an externality 
tax.  
At first sight, Bruvoll’s definition of an environmental tax seems to fit best with the focus of this 
PhD study, which is environmental taxation as an instrument for environmental policy. However, 
the OECD term has the advantage of being more straightforward: it is possible to determine 
objectively whether a tax has a tax base that is relevant to the environment, but it is much harder 
to identify the policy makers’ precise objectives when they introduced the tax. For example, 
excise taxes on diesel and gasoline were introduced in Belgium as a revenue-raising tax in 1971, 
arguably with no environmental objective at the time. Since then, the tax has undergone 
multiple reforms (Bachus, 2016), after which one can argue that environmental concerns are at 
least part of its objectives. Moreover, most scholars in the field of environmental taxation do 
not take sides in this discussion, and use Bruvoll’s narrow term ‘environmental tax’ in the 
broader OECD sense, thus avoiding discussions about the objective of the tax. Although Bruvoll 
makes a valuable point, which is also acknowledged by the European Commission and Eurostat 
(2013), I will follow the large community of scholars and use the term ‘environmental taxation’ 
in the broad sense, meaning that the tax can be introduced for other than environmental 
reasons. Yet, when I will be dealing with measuring the greening of tax system (paper 2), I will 
 
3  Hood (1983, p. 2) does not give a definition but he sees policy instruments as the “administrative tools that 
government uses at the point where it comes into contact with ‘us’, the world outside”; and he compares them 
with tools for other purposes, such as for carpentry or gardening. Howlett and Ramesh (2003, p. 114) do give a 
definition: “the actual means or devices that governments make use of in implementing policies”. A similar broad 
definition is found in Fenger and Klok (2003, p. 189): “a policy instrument is what is used or can be used by an 
actor to attain a certain goal” (translated from Dutch by the author) 
4  Modified and translated from Dutch by the author.   
5  In this PhD, the term ‘regulatory’ will be used in the broad sense, following Meier’s (American school) definition: 
“Regulation is any attempt by the government  to control the behavior of citizens” (Meier, 1985). In the standard 
English school, this term is defined more narrowly as all prohibitions and obligations imposed by government 
(Vedung, 1998).  
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use the term ‘environmentally related taxes’ to refer to the OECD definition based on the tax 
basis.  
 
A typology of environmental taxation can be based on different distinguishing factors: 
 
1. Objective: aimed at improving the environment (regulatory tax, Pigouvian tax), or at 
raising government revenue (revenue-raising tax, fiscal tax);  
2. Sector or tax base: Eurostat distinguishes four areas: energy taxes, transport taxes, 
pollution taxes and resource taxes. Bachus (2016) uses an adapted framework to include 
the Belgian reality of shared competencies between the federal and the regional 
governments: energy taxes, transport taxes, Flemish environmental levies (including 
resource taxes) and federal product taxes;  
3. Point of taxation: an environmentally related tax can be levied on input (e.g. energy 
consumption), emissions, products, processes, activities, waste generation, purchase, 
ownership, car registration or company profits (Verbruggen, 2007) 
4. Taxation unit: a lump sum tax, an ad valorem tax (e.g. VAT), a specific tax (e.g. euro per 
litre of diesel purchased), a tax per unit of pollution or emission. 
5. Level of differentiation in the tax level: a uniform tax or differentiated; for example: in 
most countries taxes on energy products are differentiated based on their use: diesel 
used as a transport fuel is taxed at a much higher level than the same energy product 
used for heating purposes.  
6. Target group: citizens, consumers, companies or more narrowly specified groups. 
7. Destination of the tax revenues: 
- Covering the cost of a system to cope with a related environmental issue, e.g. a tax 
(or charge) on water consumption to cover the cost of a wastewater treatment 
system;  
- General government budget; 
- The revenues are spent on other government objectives (‘earmarked’ or 
‘hypothecated’ tax), which may or may not be related to the environment. For 
example, part of the revenue from a pollution tax that is spent on a subsidy 
programme for environment innovation R & D. Another example is the revenue of 
a new environmental tax used for lowering social security contributions, which can 
be labelled as an environmental tax reform (infra). 
- The revenues are used for compensating the target group of the environmental tax. 
- A mix of the above options. 
A tax expenditure (or tax incentive) is any preferential rate on the benchmark level of a tax 
(Hoge Raad Van Financiën, 2002).
6
 For example, excise tax rates on transport fuels in Belgium 
are 61 eurocent per litre for unleaded petrol, and 50 eurocent for diesel.
7
 Whichever of those 
two (or the average) is considered as ‘the benchmark level’, it is clear that the zero excise tax 
level for air transport fuel (kerosene) is a tax expenditure (Bachus, 2016).  
An environmental tax reform (ETR), or green tax reform, is the process of shifting the tax burden 
from employment, income and investment, to pollution, resource depletion and waste (OECD, 
1997). If the reform shifts not only taxes but also subsidies towards more environmentally 
friendliness, it is often called an environmental fiscal reform or a green fiscal reform (Clinch et 
al., 2006). 
 
6  Free translation by the author  
7  Source: www.petrolfed.be, accessed 28 October 2016. 
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An environmental tax reform has two sides: an increase in environmental taxation and recycling 
of the government revenues elsewhere. The revenue spending can be done through lump-sum 
repayment, earmarking
8
 for environmental purposes (see 3.5) or by removing other 
distortionary taxation such as labour and capital taxation. In policy circles the debate is often 
focused on a ‘revenue-neutral’ tax reform, in which case the tax reform aims at a balance 
between revenues and spending, with no impact on the total government budget. Earmarking 
or hypothecation is “the term used to describe the process of assigning tax revenues to a specific 
end, or - in certain cases - ensuring that they are not spent on one particular end” (House of 
Commons, 2011, p. 1)  
As no definition of the concept of ‘greening of a tax system’ is available in the literature, it is 
defined in paper 2 as ‘an increasing emphasis on the environment in the tax system’. This 
definition implicitly refers to the OECD term ‘environmentally related taxes’ (supra), which has 
a focus on the tax base, not on the policy objectives. This choice is consistent with the scope of 
paper 2. An alternative definition for the greening of a tax system may be based on Bruvoll’s 
concept of ‘environmental taxation’. That definition would then be ‘the inclusion of 
environmental objectives in the tax system’. 
A (pure) public good is a good that exhibits neither rivalry nor excludability, meaning that one 
agent’s consumption is not at the expense of another’s, and no-one can be excluded from 
consuming (Perman et al., 2003). A property right is “a bundle of characteristics that convey 
certain powers to the owner of the right” (Hartwick & Olewiler, 1986). An externality is “any 
valued impact (positive or negative) resulting from any action (whether related to production of 
consumption) that affects someone who did not fully consent to it through participation in 
voluntary exchange” (Weimer & Vining, 2017, p. 93). A (policy) side effect can be defined as 
unintended policy effects that may occur in or outside the field of the environment (Gysen et 
al., 2006). The difference with an externality is that a side effect may or may not have been 
compensated for, whereas an externality, by definition, has not been (fully) compensated. In 
other words: all externalities are side effects but not all sided effects are externalities.  
Marginal abatement costs are a firm or industry’s marginal costs to reduce pollution by one unit 
(McKitrick, 2015). In a similar vein, marginal damage costs are the marginal costs due to a one-
unit increase in emissions (Tol, 2009).  
A transition is a structural societal change resulting from mutually reinforcing developments in 
the economy, culture, technology, institutions, and environment (Rotmans, 2003)
9
. Socio-
technical systems are “the linkages between elements necessary to fulfil societal functions (e.g. 
transport, communication, nutrition)” (Geels, 2004). Crucial elements to fulfil those functions 
include technology, culture, practices and structure (Geels, 2011).  
 
8  Although both earmarking and hypothecation refer to the designation of the revenues from a certain tax to any 
specific way of funding, we will use both terms in this PhD study only to refer to explicit environmental spending, 
such as environmental investments or environmental subsidies. In other words, we will use the terms ‘earmarking’ 
and ‘environmental earmarking’ as synonyms.  
9  Translated from Dutch by the author  
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3 |  State-of-the-art 
3.1 Introduction 
The use of theory is an important tool for answering the research questions of this PhD study. 
Blaikie (2005) sees five ways in which theory can be used in research, in increasing order of 
complexity (levels): 
1. Ad hoc classificatory systems, used to summarize data; 
2. Categorical systems or taxonomies: mainly descriptive, but some “patterns of 
relationships” are indicated;  
3. Conceptual frameworks: fully focused on explaining “patterns of relationships” and 
involving some causal connections; 
4. Theoretical systems or “explanatory schemes”: aim to explain certain phenomena.  
5. Empirical-theoretical systems: Empirical testing of the theoretical ideas. 
Theoretical systems (level 4) will be used in this PhD to explain how and why environmental 
taxation is used by policy makers (Q1 and Q3 of section 1), and to understand how 
environmental taxation can foster sustainability transitions (Q7). Theories on public support for 
ETR are empirically tested (level 5) in paper 4 (Q8), and the same is done with indicator theory 
and measurement theory in paper 2 (Q5). In most cases, Blaikie’s level 2 and 3 of theory use are 
useful in supporting the higher levels. The taxonomies discussed in section 3.2.3 (Q2) and the 
conceptual framework of section 2 illustrate this. For example, a clear understanding of the 
concepts externalities, property rights, side effects and Pigouvian taxes are indispensable for 
explaining the use (or non-use) of environmental taxation as a policy instrument.  
The third level of theory, conceptual frameworks, includes the issue of ‘operationalization’
10
, 
which is the main topic of paper 2 (Q4 and Q5), where abstract theoretical constructs are 
translated into more operational ones and into indicators. 
Conceptualization and operationalization are clearly intimately linked (Babbie, 2013), but I see 
them as equally important. Consequently, I believe operationalization, including measurement 
and indicator development, deserves to be called a sixth level of theory, to be placed after 
‘conceptual frameworks’ and before ‘explanatory schemes’. 
Besides the five (or six in my version) uses and levels provided by Blaikie, a sixth (or seventh) use 
of theory can be added, which is prediction (Gilbert, 2003; Swanborn, 2015). The combination 
of explaining, establishing causal links and predicting the effects of the use of environmental 
taxation in China paved the way for paper 1 (Q6), and for the exploration of the impact of 
environmental taxation on sustainability transitions (Q7). Finally, theory can provide a strong 
basis for policy recommendations (Dooley, 2001), which is relevant for most parts and research 
questions of this PhD study, and specifically for the conclusions chapter, which includes policy 
recommendations.  
There is no single theoretical framework of ‘the use of environmental taxation as a policy 
instrument’. The study of the topic draws from various underlying theoretical bodies. In total 
four theoretical strands from both economic and political and social sciences will be studied and 
used in this PhD research.  
 
10  Operationalization is “the development of specific research procedures (operations) that will result in empirical 
observations representing abstract concepts in the real world” (Babbie, 2013, p. 177) 
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Instrument theory is the first theoretical body, which aims at explaining why and how policy 
decisions are made. We will discuss government policy-making models, typologies of policy 
instruments, and criteria for instrument selection.  
The second theoretical strand is the theory of Pigouvian taxation, which fits into the theoretical 
school of neoclassical economics. Pigou’s work can be regarded as the mother of all theories 
relating to environmental taxation, as it addresses the raison d’être for this instrument, namely 
the effect on the environment. Several other neoclassical scholars have further advanced 
Pigou’s theory. Concomitant with the theory of Pigouvian taxation, the analytical concept of side 
effects of taxation as an environmental policy instrument is discussed. The two most studied 
side effects of environmental taxation, competitiveness impact and social impact (regressivity), 
will be discussed.  
The third theoretical strand is transition theory, which originates from a multitude of underlying 
theoretical bodies (see 3.4) and has then evolved into an independent theoretical school with 
its own theoretical models such as the multi-level perspective (MLP) and the multi-phase 
perspective (MPP). 
The fourth theoretical literature strand pertains to explaining public support for the use of 
environmental taxation by government. It addresses such questions as ‘what determines 
whether certain policy interventions (such as the use of environmental taxation) get the support 
from the public?’, and ‘what impact does public support have on government decisions 
regarding the use of policy instruments (such as environmental taxation)? Theories used to 
address these questions stem from behavioural economics, instrument theory and psychology.  
As explained higher in this section, this PhD study aims to use all types and levels of theory. 
Furthermore, it aims to distinguish itself from other studies by combining the four theoretical 
schools mentioned above, and by applying them to the research questions of the study. The 
objectives of combining the theories are twofold. First, I aim to explore (explain and predict) the 
potential of environmental taxation in several unexplored fields, such as transitions. Second, I 
aim to increase understanding on other fields, such as instrument choice, indicator development 
and public support. And third, I aim to provide (partial) answers to a broader, normative 
question, which is “why, when, how, in what situations and circumstances is it legitimate to use 
taxation as an instrument in environmental policy” (Bauböck, 2008)?   
In the next section, the four theoretical bodies and analytical concepts are discussed.  
3.2 Framing environmental taxation in instrument choice theory 
Public policy-making is a complex process with many actors, interests, institutions, values, 
context factors, instruments, practices and cultures at work. All these elements combine in one 
way or another into a policy process, with instruments and other outcomes. Various analytical 
frameworks have been developed over time, aiming to better understand the policy process. 
Providing the full overview of these frameworks and their interactions exceeds the objectives of 
this PhD study on environmental taxation. However, understanding some of the dynamics of the 
policy process may contribute to understanding the reasons why environmental taxation has (or 
has not) been a much-applied solution in environmentally-related policy processes (research 
questions Q1 and Q3 of this PhD). As a corollary, one model explaining the stages in the policy 
process is explained (the ‘stagist model’ or ‘the policy cycle’) in section 3.2.1, and four models 
that offer insights on how the decisions in the policy process are taken by the actors involved 
are discussed in section 3.2.2. This type of models are often called ‘decision-making models’ 
(Howlett et al., 2009), but to avoid confusion with the ‘policy decision’ stage of the stagist model 
(see figure 2), I choose to call them ‘policy-making models’, as – in my view – they do not relate 
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to one stage of the policy process, but to the policy process as a whole. In the next subsections, 
the study zooms in on one (sub)part of the policy process, which is instrument choice. In the 
third subsection, some of the existing typologies of policy instruments are discussed, and in the 
fourth part I delve deeper into the question on which criteria governments base their 
instruments choice. In the fifth part, I introduce the notion of policy mixes, which will repeatedly 
be addressed in this PhD study, and in the sixth part I dwell on the policy relevance of instrument 
choice theories and instrument typologies. The seventh subsection is devoted to the important 
role of tax design in the context of the implementation of environmental taxation. 
3.2.1 The stagist model 
The policy cycle model, also known as the stagist model, was developed between 1950 and 1990 
by various subsequent authors. It eventually became (and probably still is) the dominant 
heuristic for understanding the policy process (Howlett et al., 2017). As the name suggests, the 
stagist approach depicts the policy process as a cycle, and divides it into a number of successive 
phases or stages. Although many variants have occurred containing between three and seven 
stages, we choose the one presented in figure 2. 
 
 
Figure 2.  The policy cycle 
Source: own presentation, based on Hupe and Hill (2006) 
The most relevant stage for this PhD study is the instrument choice phase, which is situated in 
both the policy formulation stage and the policy decision stage. According to Howlett et al. 
(2009, p. 110), “policy formulation involves […] exploring the various options or alternative 
courses of action available for addressing a problem. […] The range of available options 
considered at this stage is always narrowed down to those that policy makers could accept 
before these alternatives move on to the formal deliberations of decision-makers.” In other 
words, in the policy formulation stage a limited number of options (instruments of instrument 
mixes) are offered to the (political) decision-making stage, where the options are further 
narrowed down to one.  
The main merit of the policy cycle model is that it provides a simple and seemingly logical 
framework for the inherently complex policy process. In addition, it can be applied to all levels 
of government, from local to international. It also clarifies the role of all actors involved in policy-
making.  
However, the model has been heavily criticized by many scholars for being too simplistic, a 
heuristic, and not a causal model; for being inaccurate and for having a top-down and legalistic 
focus (Sabatier & Brasher, 1993; Hupe & Hill, 2006). It suggests that policy-making is an orderly 
and systematic process, which is not the case in reality (Howlett et al., 2009).  
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In spite of the criticisms to the model, the stagist model is still used by many public policy 
scholars, albeit mostly as a way to structure policy analysis handbooks rather than as a useful 
descriptive model for policy processes (e.g. Howlett & Ramesh, 2003; Hupe & Hill, 2012; Hill, 
2013). 
3.2.2 Policy-making models 
While the stages model is often called a heuristic, useful for policy analysis but not good at 
describing how policy is actually made (Hill, 2013), many other models exist with higher (but 
varying) descriptive potential. In this section, four models that aim to explain how policy comes 
about are discussed: the rational model, the incremental model, the garbage can model and the 
mixed-scanning model. The analysis in this section is aimed at helping to answer level 3 research 
question 1 (Q1) of section 1. 
The rational (or rationalistic) model depicts policy-making as a means-end relationship (Dror, 
1964);  the policy maker weighs the benefits of any decision with its expected costs. In this 
model, means and ends can be clearly distinguished and the policy maker has (or thinks to have) 
the cognitive capacities to estimate them both in an accurate way. The rational model shares 
the same assumptions with neoclassical economics, which is the framework within which the 
theory of Pigouvian (environmental) taxation was developed (see 3.3). Economic agents, 
including policy makers, act in a rational way according to their individual preferences in such a 
way that their utility is maximized. The policy maker has all the relevant information regarding 
costs and benefits that is needed to choose the optimal instrument in each situation. In this 
rational model, which assumes a first-best world with full information and rational policy makers 
without cognitive limitations, environmental taxation will come out as the optimal instrument 
in many cases.  
The rational model is interesting to study as a theoretical ideal type, but it is heavily criticized 
for not being realistic (Hood, 1983; Tarter & Hoy, 1998; Howlett & Ramesh, 2003). According to 
Simon (1955), the policy maker does not maximize (benefits over costs), but his rationality is 
bounded, and his aim is to satisfice, or to aim for ‘good enough’. Policy makers still seek 
rationality, but their rationality is bounded by limitations in appropriate and reliable 
information, cognitive capacities and decision-making time (Simon, 1955; Kahneman, 2003). 
Policy makers have no choice but to resort to unavoidable simplification (heuristics) to reduce 
complexity and keep matters manageable. In the incremental model policy decisions are the 
result of “bargaining and compromises among self-interested decision-makers” (Howlett & 
Ramesh, 2003, p. 141). Political feasibility and simplification are the dominant decision criteria 
in this model. Lindblom (1959) calls incremental decision-making ‘the science of muddling’ 
through. In his view, decision-making is a continuous process of taking new small and 
incremental steps based on limited comparisons with the incremental steps that were taken in 
the past. Only a few alternatives are considered, and only small number of potential impacts are 
evaluated. Policy-making is not so much aimed at long-term social targets but rather at 
alleviating present short-term imperfections (Lindblom, 1959). The incremental model of policy-
making was equally criticized, for overestimating the lack of goal orientation and for being too 
conservative (Howlett & Ramesh, 2003). Its focus on the short run and on past policies neglects 
the possibility of societal innovation, and it demonstrates a disparaging and too passive view on 
public policy makers. Finally, the incremental model promotes short-sighted decisions that may 
have adverse impacts in the long run, which makes the model undesirable on a normative level 
(Lustick, 1980). 
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Like many other authors, Etzioni (1967) judged that the rational model is too megalomaniac and 
the incremental model is too modest. He developed the mixed-scanning model, which shows 
elements of the two earlier models. It is more flexible and combines high-order fundamental 
policy processes with more incremental ones. The level of detail of the ‘scanning’ of instrument 
options depends on the cost of the scanning, and on the cost of missing important variables due 
to a more superficial examination. Etzioni’s view on policy-making is more realistic than the 
rationalistic approach, and more capable of capturing radically changing environments and 
introducing a strategic view than the incremental model. It also leaves options for ‘smart’ agency 
by policy makers, for example by choosing an option that may go counter the final objective in 
the short-run, but will serve the long-run strategic objective (Etzioni, 1967). The mixed-scanning 
model smooths off the sharp edges from the two other models which seem unrealistic on a 
descriptive level and undesirable on a normative level (supra).  
The fourth policy-making model is the garbage can model, which is a radical policy model that 
denies any rationality, and that therefore can be considered as the opposite of the rational 
model of the previous section. Organizations are pictured as anarchical loose collections of 
ideas, which do not act according to preferences, but discover their preferences through action. 
Solutions look for problems instead of vice versa (Parsons, 1999). In this model, policy-making 
becomes a highly ad-hoc, irrational and unpredictable process (March et al., 1976). Solutions 
and problems are linked together ad random and coincidence will determine whether the link is 
justified or inappropriate (Parsons, 1999). The garbage can model is a chaotic model which is 
contradicted empirically by the observation that policy seems to solve environmental issues at 
some occasions very well. For example, the international agreement on the protection of the 
ozone layer
11
 (Oberthür, 1999) and the sharp fall of dioxin emissions into the air in Flanders
12
 
resulting from stricter norms for industry. Many more examples demonstrate that mere 
coincidence is not a sufficient explanation for the fitting of problems and solutions.   
Based on the above arguments, I conclude that the mixed-scanning model offers the most 
realistic view on policy-making. Therefore, the remainder of this PhD study will be based on the 
views of the mixed-scanning model regarding the role, the capacities and the agency of policy 
makers. This choice contributes to the answer of Q1 of the PhD study. The assumptions of the 
rational model, in which government agencies and officials have full information on the cost 
curves and the preferences of the target groups, are unrealistic. On the other hand, the 
incremental model has a derogatory representation of a policy maker with no capacities to look 
further ahead than the next day. Surely, policy makers’ rationality is bounded, but in my view, 
they often go for more than just ‘satisficing’, and they will try to optimize, albeit within the limits 
of their bounded rationality.  
  
 
11  The 1985 ‘Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer’, supplemented with the 1987 ‘Montreal 
Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer’. 
12 Statistics from http://milieurapport.be/nl/feitencijfers/milieuthemas/verspreiding-van-persistente-organische-
polluenten-pops/emissie-van-pops-naar-lucht/emissie-van-dioxines-naar-lucht/, accessed 28 August 2017. 
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3.2.3 Taxonomies of policy instruments 
In the past half a century, numerous attempts have been undertaken by scholars to develop 
typologies to classify policy instruments in a limited number of groups, depending on different 
criteria. Although more can be found, I see five main characteristics of policy instruments 
allowing to classify them: 
1. Control model and regulatory mechanism; 
2. Scale from voluntary to coercion; 
3. General versus individual / specific; 
4. Negative versus positive or constraining versus affirmative; 
5. Substantive versus procedural. 
The discussion on the various policy instrument taxonomies contributes to answering Q1 and 
Q2 of this dissertation (see section 1). 
Before delving deeper into the five typologies, I want to mention a type of instrument that is not 
always included in existing typologies and that can be considered as an instrument ‘sui generis’. 
Part of the literature on policy instruments starts from the question in what way governments 
can ‘steer’ actors into behaviour that contributes to reaching policy goals, such as the reduction 
of pollution. By taking this starting point, these studies overlook a rather obvious policy 
instrument, which is direct provision (Howlett & Ramesh, 2003). Direct provision means that a 
government performs a task itself instead of waiting for other actors to do it. Direct provision is 
part of what Hood (1983) calls ‘organization’, which is the stock of the land, buildings, 
equipment, and civil servants including their skills. 
In many cases, substantial (financial) government investments are involved in direct provision, 
but it is not limited to the mere injection of funds. The most well-known example is 
infrastructure provision (e.g. roads and railways), but other means and activities, such as the 
deployment of personnel, the organization of education, healthcare or childcare, cleaning of 
public places, waste collection and other activities are part of the complex array of activities 
fitting under direct provision.
13
  
Policy-making can be divided into direct provision and indirect regulation. The latter concept 
means that government uses policy instruments to try to steer societal actors into behaviour 
that contributes to the policy goals it has set.  
All the taxonomies of policy instruments discussed in the next sections are of the indirect type. 
The most important classification basis presented is the control method, therefore it will be 
discussed more thoroughly than the other typologies. 
Although the focus in this section is valid for any policy field, we will choose examples in the field 
of the environment, as that is the most relevant focus of the research.  
Taxonomies based on the control method 
Governments use policy instruments as tools to influence the behaviour of citizens, consumers, 
companies, organisations and lower government levels. To understand and classify policy 
instruments, it is useful to take a step back and look at ways with which people try to control 
other people’s behaviour. Starting from theories from behavioural science, Lindblom (1977) puts 
forward three main ‘control methods’, or mechanisms that may influence behaviour: authority, 
 
13  Other common examples are the national security, the military, diplomatic relations, firefighting etc. (Howlett & 
Ramesh, 2003) 
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exchange and persuasion. Hood (1983) distinguishes the same three mechanisms, calling them 
authority, treasure and nodality.
14
 Van der Doelen (1989) follows this typology, but he makes 
the link with policy instruments more explicit, thus proposing the typology of policy instruments 
that is still used in most text books on instrument theory today. Van der Doelen distinguishes 
three groups of policy instruments
15
, which he calls the legal control model, the economic 
control model and the communicative control model. Vedung (1998) refers to the three control 
models behind the policy instruments with a metaphor: the stick, the carrot and the sermon.  
Legal policy instruments are sometimes called authority-based instruments or command-and-
control (CAC) instruments. The underlying control mechanism used by government is coercion, 
which is applied through issuing prescriptions and prohibitions to which target groups must 
comply (Howlett & Ramesh, 2003). The rules are enforced by government agencies and a whole 
system of penalties is available in case of non-compliance, including warnings, fines, temporary 
or final shut-down and imprisonment. Examples of authority-based instruments in 
environmental policy include emission standards, individual standards through environmental 
permits, a ban on burning waste in the garden and an obligation to sort household waste. In 
some cases, when the penalty system does not lead to the desired level of compliance, the 
government will make more direct interventions, often to prevent certain behaviour from a 
target group. For example, a road obstruction at the entrance of a natural park to prevent noise 
pollution from cars entering the national park. We do not regard this type of physical obstruction 
measures as part of the group of legal policy instruments, but we regard them as ‘direct 
provision’ (infra). 
Economic policy instruments are also called financial instruments, market-based instruments, 
treasure-based instruments or chequebook government (Hood, 1983). The underlying control 
mechanism is exchange. Government installs a system of conditional flows of (mostly financial) 
resources from government to a private actor
16
 or vice versa. Environmental taxes are clearly 
part of this group, along with subsidies and trading schemes such as emissions trading
17
, which 
have gained a lot of ground in the past twenty years. The difference between marketable 
permits and (environmental) taxes is that the latter interfere with the price, while the (pollution) 
quantity is left to the market to determine, whereas in the former the quantity (the cap) is fixed 
by the regulator, while the market determines the price. In the end, however, they both put a 
price on pollution, which is why both instruments are often collectively referred to as ‘pricing 
instruments’ (Goulder & Parry, 2008). An environmental tax is sometimes called a ‘price 
instrument’, while ETS is referred to as a ‘quantity instrument’ (Baumol & Oates, 1988). 
Other examples of economic policy instruments include deposit-refund schemes, feed-in tariffs 
and concessional loans. Note that our focus on taxes in this study is limited to regulatory taxes, 
meaning that taxes serving the two other main goals of taxation, revenue-raising and 
redistribution (Avi-Yonah, 2007), are not considered. The scope of the analysis of this PhD study 
is restricted to the field of environmental policy. 
 
14  Hood adds a fourth mechanism, organization, which is treated in the previous section. His fourfold model is known 
as the ‘NATO schem’, an acronym that stands for nodality, authority, treasure and organization. 
15  Other terms that can be found in literature as synonyms for ‘groups of policy instruments’ are ‘control methods’ 
‘regulatory models’ and ‘steering models’ (as a translation of the Dutch term ‘sturingsmodellen’, although that last 
term seems to be used almost exclusively by Dutch-speaking scholars. 
16  Although the target group can also be a local government. 
17  Other terms we will use in this PhD study as synonyms include cap-and-trade systems, marketable permits, 
tradable allowances and tradable permits. When applied to carbon, a common term is carbon trading  
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Communicative policy instruments are also called information instruments, moral suasion or 
exhortation (Vedung, 1998). The underlying control mechanism are information and persuasion. 
Government tries to convince the target groups to behave in the desired way by informing that 
complying is in people’s own interest, or by persuading them to do it as a moral duty. 
Information, communication and sensitising campaigns, labelling and voluntary agreements are 
examples of instruments in this model. Voluntary agreements are mostly the result of co-
regulation, which we also classify in under the persuasion-based control method. In co-
regulation, government and another actor, in most cases an industrial sector, large company or 
a local government, set targets and decide on instruments together, while leaving lots of 
freedom to the other actor to realize the – often voluntary – ambitions (Jordan et al., 2003). In 
practice, voluntary and information instruments are often used in policy mixes, which will be 
illustrated by an example on extended producer responsibility (EPR) in section 3.2.5. In some 
cases, the voluntary character of the action undertaken is bounded by a ‘stick behind the door’, 
legislation or (the threat of) a tax that will be implemented if no agreement is reached on the 
voluntary actions of compliance is lacking (Bachus & Franchois, 2007). 
In the past 25 years, various taxonomies of policy instruments have been developed that follow 
this threefold scheme.  
Other typologies 
In this section, I will briefly touch upon the four remaining classification models or taxonomies 
for policy instruments. The first taxonomy distinguishes between positive, affirmative 
instruments making options more attractive, and negative or constraining instruments, which 
make some options less attractive (Hood, 1983; van der Doelen, 1989; Bressers, 1993). Examples 
of such opposite instruments include: 
- For legal policy instruments: prescriptions and prohibitions versus legalization; 
- For economic instruments: taxes versus subsidies; 
- For communicative instruments: naming and faming versus naming and shaming.  
This distinction is relevant for the topic of public support for policy instruments. Section 3.5 and 
paper 4 will demonstrate that constraining instruments, such as regulatory taxation, suffer from 
public resistance, while positive instruments, such as subsidies, are much more acceptable to 
the public.  
The second model classifies policy instruments based on the degree of government 
involvement. Howlett & Ramesh (2003) claim that this model was brought under the attention 
by political scientist as early as around 1940, when they argued government can only use two 
strategies to regulate, and that is in a coercive or in a non-coercive way. Linder and Peters use 
the term government intrusiveness instead of coercion (Linder & Peters, 1989), and Vedung 
(1998) calls it authoritative force. Several authors see a continuum scale, which positions policy 
instruments anywhere on the continuous scale of coercion from voluntary to compulsory (C. W. 
Anderson, 1977; Howlett & Ramesh, 2003)
18
. Note that both the control method typology and 
the positive/negative typology show similarities with this model, as the legal, economic, 
communicative, positive and negative instrument types can be positioned on the coercion axis. 
Legal instruments, whether obliging or forbidding, are highly coercive. Suasion instruments are 
all near the ‘voluntary’ end of the continuous coercion scale. Economic instruments can be on 
both ends on the scale: ‘positive’ economic instruments (subsidies) have a low score on 
 
18  In Vedung (1998) 
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coerciveness, while ‘negative’ economic instruments (taxes) can be regarded as highly coercive 
(see table 1).  
The third typology is based on the distinction between general measures (for a large target 
group) and individual or specific measures (van der Doelen, 1989; Fenger & Klok, 2003). An 
example of a general measure is the ban on the sale of leaded petrol. A typical individual 
instrument is a permit with a specific emission standard for a specific air pollutant for a specific 
company.  
The fourth typology distinguishes between substantive and procedural instruments (Howlett & 
Ramesh, 2003). The former are aimed directly at the target group and can further be classified, 
for instance into legal, economic and communicative instruments (supra). The latter refer to 
government provisions and tools that are not directly aimed at the target group, but contribute 
to the implementation or design of a programme from within government. Peters and van 
Nispen (1998) call these ‘internal instruments’, as opposed to ‘external instruments’ which are 
equivalent to substantive instruments. A parliamentary commission, monitoring, indicator 
development, accountability checks by an audit office, recruiting civil servants, regulatory 
impact assessment (RIA) or internal policy evaluations are examples of procedural (or internal) 
instruments. In this PhD study, attention will primarily be devoted to substantive instruments, 
since environmental taxation is a substantive instrument. However, paper 2 is devoted to 
monitoring and indicator development, which belongs to the group of procedural instruments. 
As a corollary, level 2 research questions 1 and 3 of this PhD concern substantive instruments, 
while research question 2 (Q4 and Q5) is dedicated to procedural instruments (see section 1). 
Overview  
The presentation of existing typologies would be incomplete without providing an overview of 
the instruments fitting in them. In this section, we provide a summarizing table containing the 
most important environmental policy instruments. For readability, only two of the above 
presented typologies are integrated in the table. The first is the distinction based on the control 
method, between legal, economic and information instruments, who have different colour 
codes in the table. The second is the distinction between positive and negative or constraining 
instruments.   
Explanatory notes are added below the table. An extended table containing subtypes of 
instruments and practical examples is provided in appendix 1.  
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Table 1. Overview of policy instruments 
negative positive 
Environmental permit/ licence Legalization 
Performance standard Low-regulation space 
Emission standard Labelling 
Fuel efficiency standard Awareness/information/ Dissuasion campaign 
Energy efficiency standard Sensitisation campaign 
Quota Voluntary agreement (co-regulation) 
Ban or prohibition Naming and faming 
Prescription or obligation Early warning system 
National emission target  Voluntary code 
Education attainment targets Voluntary environmental standard 
Technology standard Recommendation 
Litigation facilitation Leading by example 
Naming and shaming Nudging1 
Tax (charge, fee) Subsidy 
Tradable permits system2  Government guarantee/insurance 
Removal of EHS Tax expenditure 
Liability scheme3 Tax compensation 
Performance bond4 Feed-in tariff, green certificates scheme 
White certificates scheme5 Concessional loans scheme 
 Prize  
Deposit-refund scheme 
Bonus-malus scheme 
Sources: compilation by the author based on Bennear and Stavins (2007), Fischer (2001), Perman 
et al. (2003), Sorrell et al. (2009), UNDESA (2012), UNEP (2004) and Steuwer (2013) 
Colour codes: 
  = legal instrument; 
  = economic instrument; 
  = information instrument. 
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Notes: 
1. Nudging is information provision aimed at behavioural change that is not trying to make 
people more aware, but instead focuses on changing the environment in which a 
consumer decision is made, which may influence the choices made by people’s 
‘automatic minds’. For example, changing the default option for electricity supply to a 
family in a form to ‘renewable energy’; only few people will take the effort to change 
the default option (Ölander & Thøgersen, 2014).  
2. One of the subtypes of this instrument is the tradable performance standard scheme, 
with the government setting the benchmark, often based on (and more ambitious than) 
the average environmental performance of the products or companies. One example is 
the 1982 lead phase out programme in the US, which set an inter-refinery average (a 
‘cap’) on importers and refineries; trading between underperforming and 
overperforming firms was allowed (Fischer, 2001). 
3. Obligation to set-up a financial mechanism (compensation fund) in case of 
environmental damage or negligence in clean-up (in case of resource extraction), usually 
from the beginning of an activity.  
4. The only difference between a performance bond and a liability scheme, is that the 
latter is a fund that is set-up by the company, while in the former case the company 
needs to pay the fee to the government, in which case it is comparable to a deposit-
refund scheme. Stavins (2001) regards a performance bond as a type of insurance 
premium tax. Both instruments are regularly used in the context of mining activities (R. 
C. Anderson, 2002).  
5. White certificates are certificates to certify energy savings by energy suppliers (Sorrell 
et al., 2009; Steuwer, 2013). 
Deposit-refund schemes and bonus-malus schemes both have monetary streams in both 
directions, which is why they are labelled as mixed positive and negative instruments. In fact, a 
bonus-malus system can be considered as a combination of a tax and a subsidy, making it a 
policy mix (see 3.2.5). Other policy mixes have not been included in the table, as the combination 
list is sheer endless. Interesting examples of policy mixes include: 
- ETR: a mix of an environmental tax and a reduction of other taxation, e.g. on labour; 
- Earmarked taxes with revenues spent on environmental subsidies; 
- An ETS with a price floor, which can be considered as a combination of a tax and an 
ETS; 
- Any complex environmental policy instrument will be accompanied by an intensive 
information campaign by the government; 
- Energy efficiency standards for new buildings combined with subsidies for additional 
environmental investments and with an energy efficiency certificate (labelling) 
scheme.  
- A voluntary agreement between the government and an industrial sector combined 
with subsidies, but equally with the threat of a future tax if the sector 
underperforms. 
- Tradable fishing quota in combination with zoning regulations, fish net standards 
and fish size limits (Bennear & Stavins, 2007). 
The combination of the two typologies used in table 1 illustrates that legal instruments are 
mostly negative (coercive), while information or suasion instruments are often positive 
instruments. However, economic instruments cannot be uniformly classified on one side, as the 
positive and negative instruments in that category balance each other out.    
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3.2.4 Instrument choice 
After explaining theoretical policy-making models and classification systems, we now turn to the 
question what makes governments choose a certain policy instrument in a given situation, both 
in theory and in practice. 
According to Hood (1983), policy instruments are – ideally - chosen in a rational way, after due 
consideration of the most important alternatives and their merits and deficiencies. However, in 
section 3.2.2, the limitations of this rational model for describing how policy is actually made in 
practice were clearly indicated. This analysis led to the conclusion that bounded rationality 
needs to be taken into account when studying instrument choice in practice (Simon, 1955; 
Howlett & Ramesh, 2003).  
The typical (rational) criteria that dominate the theoretical literature are effectiveness and 
efficiency (Hood, 1983). Legality, democracy, legitimacy, and fairness are also commonly named 
(Hood, 1983; Bemelmans-Videc, 1998), as are resources and constraints, both referring to (a lack 
of) money and information. Studies emphasizing these rational criteria are often made by 
scholars with an economic background, and Howlett and Ramesh (2003) call them ‘technical 
models of instrument choice’. Political scientists tend to focus on ‘political models’, which 
extend the list of criteria with political factors, such as political support and opposition (see 
section 3.5) and past policy choices (McDonnell & Elmore, 1987). Political criteria are likely to be 
important when important lobby groups oppose to political proposals (Vandoninck et al., 2016). 
Furthermore, citizens are also voters, and according to the median voter model, the optimal 
election strategy for politicians is to take a policy position regarding government expenditure 
and taxation that represents the position of the median voter (Romer & Rosenthal, 1979). 
Although the median voter model has been criticized for unrealistic assumptions (Peters, 1991), 
the broader message that policy makers will take public opinion into account when deciding 
their instrument choice position, is accepted by many scholars (Luttbeg, 1981; Monroe, 1998; 
Caplan, 2001; Soroka, 2002; Burstein, 2003; Howlett & Ramesh, 2003).  
Perman et al. (2003, p. 203) offer a list of nine instrument choice criteria from the perspective 
of environmental economics: cost-effectiveness, long-run effects, dynamic efficiency, ancillary 
benefits, equity, dependability, flexibility, costs under uncertainty and information 
requirements. In an empirical study focused on several policy departments of the Flemish 
government, Vandoninck et al. (2016) conclude that two instrument choice criteria are more 
important than others: the degree to which the instrument meets the targets and expectations 
put forward by the minister’s office, and the support for the instrument by the interest groups 
that are concerned by the program. Other factors Vandoninck et al. (2016) found to play a role 
are time constraints, personal background of the officials involved
19
, the European context and 
EU legal framework, the Belgian division of powers, the cost of the policy and the availability of 
budgets, administrative feasibility and history and earlier choices (path dependency). Many of 
these empirically observed criteria can be brought back to the importance of policy subsystems 
in the policy formulation phase. Howlett and Ramesh (2003, p. 53) define a policy subsystem as 
“a space with actors from government and society where policy issues and their solutions are 
discussed and bargained”. Linder and Peters (1989) further refined the importance of 
subsystems by shaping a set of eight criteria that matter for instrument choice: resource 
intensiveness, targeting, political risk, constraints on state activity, policy style and political 
culture, organisational culture, context of the problem situation and the decision makers’ 
subjective preferences. 
 
19  McDonnel and Elmore (1987) refer to the importance of the values of the policy makers. 
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Lastly, lobbying by interest groups is an important factor. According to Vandoninck et al. (2016), 
lobbying has much greater influence on instrument choice than formal advisory bodies. 
Kallbekken and Saelen (2011) specify that business and special interest groups have a lot of 
influence, and Olson (1965) adds that small interest groups with much at stake are most likely 
to influence policy choices. However, to date neither theoretical nor empirical studies have led 
to a consensus view on the importance of lobbying (Gullberg, 2008). 
Two of the discussed instrument choice criteria receive a prominent position in this PhD study. 
Effectiveness and efficiency of environmental taxation are first treated in section 3.3.2 of this 
introductory chapter. They are also addressed in paper 1 (Q2 and Q6 of section 1) where the 
efficiency of carbon taxation and carbon emissions trading in different situations is compared. 
Furthermore, in paper 3 (Q7 of section 1), answering the efficiency question contributes 
significantly to the answer of the central research question on the potential of environmental 
taxation to foster sustainability transitions. Finally, in paper 4 (Q3 and Q8 of section 1), 
(perceived) effectiveness appears as an important determinant of (lack of) public support for 
environmental taxation.  
Finally, the political instrument choice criterion of public acceptability (Q8 of section 1) is treated 
in section 3.5 of this introductory chapter. It is also the central topic of paper 4. 
3.2.5 The use of policy mixes 
Although a discussion on all the merits and deficiencies of each of the instrument taxonomies 
exceeds the scope of this PhD study, a few general comments are appropriate. First, in most 
contexts, policy instruments and actions are not monolithic but will be used in a mix of different 
types of instruments (Bressers, 1993). Environmental problems are often complex, requiring 
combinations of instruments. Instrument and policy mixes have recently re-emerged as a 
prominent topic in environmental literature, which can be explained by the increasingly complex 
nature of environmental problems, such as climate change (Bennear & Stavins, 2007; Rogge & 
Reichardt, 2016). Moreover, government has more objectives than just protecting the 
environment, which also creates the need for policy mixes.  
A policy mix is a broader term than an instrument mix, as it not only encompasses a mix of 
instruments, but also “includes the processes by which such instruments emerge and interact” 
(Rogge & Reichardt, 2016, p. 1621).  The policy mix literature emphasizes that three additional 
criteria should be considered in the quest for the ‘optimal’ policy mix (Howlett & Rayner, 2013). 
First, multiple instruments should be consistent and aligned with each other, so they can 
reinforce rather than undermine each other. Second, policy goals should be coherent and not 
counteracting each other. Third, policy mixes should be congruent with government modes and 
styles, which refers to the fact that policy actors from different jurisdictions and with different 
styles and cultures will need to cooperate, which requires a high level of policy coordination.  
A good example of a policy mix is an environmental tax reform (ETR), which consists of an 
increase of environmental taxation and a reduction of other taxes, such as on labour. In the case 
of earmarking, the tax is accompanied by a subsidy or environmental investments by 
government. Because of difficult public acceptability (see paper 4 and Q8), an ETR should also 
be accompanied by a substantive information and sensitizing campaign. A second example of a 
policy mix involving environmental taxation is extended producer responsibility (EPR) as an 
instrument applied in Flanders for fostering eco-design and recycling. The EPR framework stems 
from EU legislation. In Flanders, this instrument is operationalized through a voluntary 
agreement between producers (and importers) and government, which is a non-coercive 
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communicative instrument. However, the voluntary character is limited, because the stick of 
legislation or a general levy is imminent if no agreement is reached between the two actors. The 
government actively uses this threat during the negotiations of the voluntary agreement 
(Bachus & Franchois, 2007). The policy mix also contains an economic instrument, as consumers 
pay a recycling charge when they buy the product. Moreover, most EPR applications are backed 
by legally enforced standards on a member state level (e.g. minimum recycling percentages for 
certain products or types of packaging). Finally, in the implementation phase, a lot of 
information and awareness-raising instruments are applied to persuade the consumer to 
dispose of the product in a correct way in the end-of-life phase.  
The insights from the policy mix literature is important for the understanding of the optimal use 
of environmental taxation. In the quest for effective and efficient policies, policy coherence and 
consistency should be pursued both passively and actively. Actively, solutions for complex 
(environmental) problems should from the outset be thought of in a context of instrument and 
policy mixes, as one instrument is unlikely to be optimal in a realistic, second-best world 
(Howlett & Rio, 2015)(see section 3.3.2). And passively, when implementing new policies, a 
systematic screening should be done to make sure no other existing policies counteract the new 
one. A typical example is a tax on fossil fuels for environmental reasons, which co-exists with 
numerous tax credits and subsidies for the same fossil fuels for economic reasons.  
Policy mixes occupy an important position throughout this dissertation. First, as stated above, 
environmental tax reform, is an example of a policy mix. Second, undesirable competitiveness 
effects of an ETR can be countered by combining the ETR in a policy mix with sector-specific 
repayments (see 3.3.3). Third, likewise, regressive effects of an ETR may be avoided by applying 
a ‘smart’ policy mix, e.g. by giving low-income families an additional tax credit (see 3.3.4). 
Fourth, in the instrument choice debate between a carbon tax and an ETS in the context of 
climate mitigation policy, a good choice may be a combination of the two, in the form of an ETS 
with a price floor, which now exists in the UK (paper 1). Fifth, since it measures only taxation, 
even the best indicators for measuring the greening of a tax system will be incomplete indicators 
for the environmental emphasis in policy-making overall (paper 2). An ideal indicator would be 
capable of measuring the environmental focus of all environmental policy instruments. The 
recently developed indicator Effective Carbon Rate (ECR) is the first indicator that measures the 
environmental emphasis of a policy mix, albeit limited to taxes and emissions trading.
20
 Sixth, 
the potential of environmental taxation as an instrument to foster sustainability transitions 
seems to be highest when a tax is applied in a policy mix (paper 3). Seventh, public acceptability 
of an ETR is highest when it is implemented as a well-designed policy mix which includes 
subsidies for the poorest households and most of the tax revenues being recycled by 
environmental subsidies or environmental investments (earmarking, paper 4). 
3.2.6 The usefulness of instrument taxonomies for the policy maker 
One may wonder why policy makers should be aware of the fact that their instrument is 
classified in this or that group. Academics may be fond of taxonomies, but is it also useful for 
policy makers? Here, the link should be made between types and features of instruments on the 
one hand, and policy-relevant decision criteria used by policy makers, which are treated in 
 
20  Note that ECR is not treated in paper 2, as the indicator was developed by the OECD (2016) after online publication 
of the paper in Ecological Indicators. 
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section 3.2.4 of this introductory chapter. Knowledge on policy instrument groups can indeed 
be relevant for policy makers when opting for a certain instrument: 
- Constraining (coercive) instruments such as taxes are likely to face opposition by the 
target groups and their lobbies, whether they are citizens or companies; positive 
instruments such as subsidies have more support (see 3.5 and paper 4).  
- There is relative (academic) consensus that constraining economic instruments 
(taxes) are more efficient than affirmative economic instruments in many situations 
(Bachus, 2011). 
- The two claims above combine into the conclusion that there is a trade-off between 
efficiency and acceptability, which may have a strong influence on instrument 
choice. This trade-off is analysed in paper 4 and in the concluding chapter of this 
PhD study. 
- Many empirical studies conclude that communicative instruments such as 
information and awareness raising campaigns suffer from low effectiveness 
compared to legal and economic instruments (Vedung, 1998; Syme et al., 2000). 
However, they may be useful as a complement to other (more constraining) 
instruments and in policy mixes (Gunningham & Sinclair, 1999).  
- Some instruments are cheaper than others: subsidies put a large burden on 
government resources, while taxes raise revenue; most other instruments’ costs are 
in between those two economic instruments. depending on the budget situation 
and debt burden of a country, this is important information. 
- It is important for policy makers to know the regulatory costs and the administrative 
efficiency of policy instruments. For instance, in the choice between a carbon tax 
and an ETS in climate mitigation policy (paper 1), tradable permits require the 
creation of a new market, which is a very complex operation. Conversely, a carbon 
tax may be relatively easy to process, especially when it can build on the framework 
of existing taxes, such as energy taxes, and be coordinated by existing implementing 
tax agencies.  
3.2.7 The importance of tax design 
Despite the importance of the instrument choice question in discussions on the use of 
environmental taxation, it is important to acknowledge the importance of the design of the 
instrument, which can sometimes be more important than the instrument choice itself (see 
paper 1). A tax with a high tax rate may be more constraining than a prohibition that is hardly 
enforced. 
Some relevant design elements for environmental taxes include the tax base, the tax rate, the 
timing of the implementation and the exemptions and rebates granted. In addition to design 
elements, accompanying measures, such as information and awareness campaigns or 
compensating measures such as subsidies can influence both the impact and the acceptability 
of the instrument chosen.  
In paper 1 we compare the instruments of a tax and an ETS for the case of Chinese climate 
mitigation policy. Although the instruments show some differences and the context can give rise 
to diverging instrument choice recommendations, the underlying mechanisms are comparable. 
The efficiency of the chosen instrument will depend on the price level that the instruments 
imposes on carbon emissions, and that price level will be determined by design choices. A tax 
with a very low tax rate will always be less effective than an auctioned ETS with a tight cap. 
Conversely, an ETS with grandfathered (=free) instead of auctioned allowances or with a 
conservative cap will be less effective than a tax with a significant tax level.  
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Besides effectiveness and efficiency, instrument design will also influence the acceptability of a 
chosen instrument. In paper 4, this topic is analysed in-depth. The initial low public support for 
an ETR can be improved by smart design choices and accompanying measures, such as: 
- implementing an ETR instead of just an ET (policy mix); 
- using earmarking as the main revenue recycling mechanism, supplemented with 
measures to relieve low-income families from a regressive impact; 
- organizing an information and awareness campaign along with the ETR; 
- make smart use of identified determinants of support, such as salience, the metric 
effect and the endowment effect (see 3.5).  
Strong empirical evidence for the claim regarding the importance of instrument design is found 
in the EU ETS, which is a strong instrument in theory, but design choices lacking ambition have 
led to structural over-allocation of emission allowances, which entailed a trading price that is 
too low to have a strong mitigating effect (around €5/tonne CO2 emission in spring 2017) 
(Ellerman & Buchner, 2008).   
3.3 Environmental and Pigouvian taxation 
3.3.1 Impact of environmental taxation: the theory of Pigouvian taxation 
Taxes and levies as regulatory instruments to address environmental problems have been 
studied by economists for about one hundred years. Their use is linked to the existence of 
‘market failures’, a term introduced by Bator (1958) to indicate a situation where the idealized 
market system is not capable of creating or maintaining a socially optimal or desirable situation. 
One example of such market failures is the existence of environmental externalities (Perman et 
al., 2003). Externalities are “benefits or costs generated as an unintended by-product of an 
economic
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 activity that do not accrue to the parties involved in the activity and where no 
compensation takes place.” (Owen, 2004, p. 129).   
The definition shows that externalities can be positive or negative. However, in most cases, and 
in the context of our study, they will be undesired effects. Therefore, the terms externalities and 
external costs will be used interchangeably in this PhD dissertation. 
Examples of environmental externalities include increased health cost because of air pollution, 
loss of biodiversity due to deforestation and climate change. The reason why environmental 
external costs are not accounted for is that most environmental goods, such a clean air, are 
public goods (Brookshire et al., 1982), and markets are not capable of providing public goods 
(Perman et al., 2003).  
To resolve this market failure, government can create property rights for ‘an unpolluted 
environment’ or for ‘clean air’ and give them to citizens. Alternatively, the property rights can 
be vested in the polluter instead of the victim. The polluter then receives a ‘license to pollute’ a 
certain amount. Following the Coase theorem (Coase, 1960), this situation will lead to an equally 
efficient outcome as compared to victim property rights. However, from an equity point of view, 
the two solutions generate entirely different outcomes, as in the one case it is the polluter who 
pays, and in the other it is the victim (Perman et al., 2003). In theory, the polluter and the victims 
could bargain and agree on a compensation for the damage based on the victim’s property rights 
 
21  Although non-economic activities can also create externalities, for example vandalism (negative) and using a bike 
for transportation instead of a car (positive).   
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(Coase, 1960). In practice, however, the large number of victims and polluters and the costs of 
bargaining often prevent an optimal outcome of private bargaining. In that case, government 
regulation, through the use of command-and-control instruments, economic instruments or 
suasion, is needed (Perman et al., 2003). 
Pigou (1920) was the first academic to link environmental externalities to the instrument of 
taxation. He is therefore considered as the father of the ‘Pigouvian taxation school’. The theory 
says that levies or taxes can be used to internalize external costs, which means that 
environmental problems, in the form of marginal damage costs, become part of the market 
model, and economic actors will take these internalities into account when making their 
consumption and investment decisions. 
The optimal tax rate is found in the situation where it equals the marginal external cost of the 
pollution, which is also called the damage cost, as is shown in figure 3. If the tax is T, then the 
optimal level of pollution is Q*, because that level of pollution minimizes the total social cost 
(the area OSQ1 in figure 3), which is the sum of the total damage costs (OSQ*) and the total 
abatement costs (Q*SQ1).  
 
MAC = marginal abatement cost 
MDC = marginal damage cost 
 
Source: Farmer et al. (2001) 
Figure 3. The optimal environmental tax level  
3.3.2 Effectiveness and efficiency 
According to Pigou’s theory, in a first-best world without uncertainty, the regulatory tax is 
effective in reducing the pollution to the optimal level (see figure 3) if the optimal tax rate is 
applied (Bosquet, 2000; Bachus, 2011). Environmental taxes are also efficient instruments, 
which means that they tackle the pollution with minimal costs for society, hence with minimal 
welfare loss. Regulatory environmental taxes have high static efficiency, because an emission 
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tax equalizes the marginal abatement costs between polluters. Firms with lower marginal 
abatement costs can choose to cut back emissions more, while firms that face higher costs are 
likely to abate less and pay more taxes. This way, still in a first-best world without uncertainty, 
the overall environmental benefit is realized at minimal societal cost (OECD, 2001; Proost & 
Rousseau, 2007). Taxes are also dynamically efficient as they add a long run incentive to reduce 
pollution abatement costs, and for consumers to change their behaviour and avoid the tax 
(OECD, 2001; Verbruggen, 2007). Based on this first-best world analysis, the use of taxation in 
environmental policy has many benefits, which explains why it is used (Q3 of this PhD study, see 
section 1) and preferred over other policy instruments (Q2 of this PhD study) by policy makers 
in some cases. 
However, the assumption of a first-best world, which implies that environmental externalities 
are the only market failure and that all markets are in the situation of perfect competition and 
full information, is hardly ever met. In welfare economics, the ‘second-best theorem’ implies 
that incomplete information, institutional or political constraints, technology spillovers or fiscal 
interactions may co-exist with environmental externalities. In this case, correcting just one of 
those market failures (e.g. by implementing an environmental tax) will not necessarily improve 
overall welfare (Perman et al., 2003). In such complex situations, a combination of multiple 
policy instruments, a policy mix (see 3.2.5), may yield the best results in terms of overall welfare 
(Bennear & Stavins, 2007). For example, in paper 3 of this PhD, I explore the potential of 
environmental taxation in overcoming technological market failures. While the answer provided 
in the paper is cautiously positive, the impact on environmentally-friendly technology 
development is expected to be limited, and a combination of the tax with subsidies to promote 
environmental technology development may be the welfare-maximising policy mix.  
In second-best situations, an in-depth analysis of the multiple deviations from the ideal-type 
situation is required to bring about the optimal equilibrium. More specifically, when there is 
uncertainty about the marginal abatement cost curves of polluting firms or about the monetary 
value of the marginal damage, the efficiency of environmental taxes, as compared to the more 
used command-and-control (CAC) instruments is not that straightforward. When the (absolute 
value of the) slope of the marginal abatement cost curve is greater than the slope of the marginal 
damage curve, taxes remain superior to CAC instruments (Weitzman, 1974). However, when the 
marginal abatement cost curve is less steep than the marginal damage curve, CAC instruments 
are to be preferred to taxes because the efficiency losses are smaller (Baumol & Oates, 1988; 
Perman et al., 2003).
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Moreover, in order for a tax to be effective, two conditions should be fulfilled. The first relates 
to the tax base, which should be as closely related to the emission itself or at least to the 
economic factor causing the emission (Oates, 1995; Edenhofer et al., 2010). A tax on the 
emissions can raise welfare up to twice as much as a tax on the output of the polluting industry 
(Carraro & Metcalf, 2001). However, this recommendation is often difficult to implement in 
practice, because of policy makers’ limited awareness and because of the complexity, 
sometimes impossibility, of measuring actual emissions. In that case, government has no choice 
but to resort to taxation of proxies for emissions, such as final products (output), inputs (such as 
energy use), industrial processes, activities, waste generation, purchase, ownership, car 
registration, distance travelled or company profits. It should be noted that taxing proxies as 
opposed to emissions will inevitably entail efficiency losses, and it should therefore be restricted 
 
22 We refer to Perman et al. (2003, pp. 254-255) for an in-depth graphical treatment and explanation of this 
phenomenon. 
  
26 
to situations in which direct taxation of emissions or pollution is not possible or faces 
insurmountable obstacles (Perman et al., 2003). Applied to the case of pollution caused by 
transport, the ideal tax base would be the exact emissions of CO2, NOX, NMVOS, PM and noise, 
but as those emissions vary according to various factors and are very difficult to measure, several 
proxy-based taxes are in use. Taxation on gasoline and diesel purchase are good proxies, 
because they show a strong correlation with emissions, but taxes on the ownership of a car or 
car purchase are imperfect predictors for the emissions a car will produce. Consequently, these 
tax bases are less suitable if reducing car emissions is the objective.  
The second condition for effective environmental taxation pertains to the elasticity of the 
demand of the taxed good. Ramsey (1927) found that the optimal tax rate is inversely 
proportional to the price elasticity of the tax base. In other words: in case of an inelastic demand, 
the tax rate should be higher. In that way the distortion created by the tax (the ‘deadweight 
loss’) is minimized (Bruvoll, 2009). Sandmo (1975) and Bruvoll (2009) added that the optimal tax 
rate for the externality-creating commodity is a weighted average of that computed under the 
Ramsey inverse elasticity rule and the Pigouvian marginal social damage. Ramsey’s theory is 
important for policy makers, since it tells them on which commodities they can use (revenue-
raising) taxes with the least distortions to the economy. Combining Pigou’s and Ramsey’s 
theories, one can conclude that the highest taxes should be levied on commodities with both 
high externalities and low price elasticity for demand. The best example of this kind of 
commodity is diesel and gasoline, which in practice indeed have much higher tax rates than any 
other comparable (energy) product.  
Notwithstanding the stated conditions and assumptions, most studies conclude that economic 
instruments, including taxes and tradable permits, are more effective and efficient instruments 
in environmental policy than standards and individual permits in most situations (Hahn & 
Stavins, 1992; Perman et al., 2003)
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. Within the group of economic instruments, there is more 
debate about the comparative evaluation of taxes and tradable permits. In theory, with optimal 
design and fully auctioned permits, the two instruments should have the same impact (Newell 
& Pizer, 2003; Hepburn, 2006; Edenhofer et al., 2010). However, when uncertainty is introduced, 
the discussions get less straightforward. According to Weitzman (1974), a tax is more efficient if 
the marginal benefit curve of the environmental good is flatter than the marginal cost curve and 
vice versa (Keohane et al., 1997). In this PhD study, we aim at contributing to the discussion on 
the benefits and weaknesses of a carbon tax and an emissions trading scheme as a climate 
change mitigation instrument. A more detailed analysis of this comparison is carried out in 
paper 1. This analysis will contribute to answering this PhD study’s research questions Q2 and 
Q3 (see section 1). 
3.3.3 Side effects: competitiveness 
The potential negative impact of environmental taxation on the (international) competitiveness 
of firms is a highly-debated phenomenon, both in the policy world and among academics. An 
environmental tax may affect the firm’s costs, and hence the price at which it can sell its output 
on the international market (S. Smith, 2003). Competitiveness concerns are most serious in 
energy-intensive sectors with significant international trade, where the ‘leakage’ may be 
 
23  This conclusion is only valid for the constraining economic instruments (taxes and tradable permits). Subsidies 
suffer from several inefficiencies which makes them much less effective and efficient than (properly designed) 
taxes and permit trading (Bachus, 2011).  
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strongest (OECD, 2001), meaning that firms shift their production to countries with lower 
environmental taxation. As the threat of delocalisation, whether legitimate or not, of industrial 
companies is a cause for concern for political governments, it offers an important explanation 
for the underuse of taxation in environmental taxation up to now (Q3 of this PhD study) (Oh & 
Svendsen, 2015).  
Revenue recycling through reduction of other distortionary taxation such as labour taxation 
mitigates a negative competitiveness impact (Bachus, 2011). According to some studies, the 
overall impact of the reform on GDP and (especially) employment is even positive. In that case, 
a so-called ‘double dividend’ arises (Pierce, 1991): the reform creates a win-win situation as a 
dividend is realized on both the environmental and the employment side. From a policy 
perspective, this sounds like a miracle solution. However, in the academic world, there is a lot 
of scepticism regarding the existence of the double dividend. Some authors reject the double 
dividend thesis based on theoretical arguments. They claim an ETR entails two effects: a revenue 
recycling effect and a tax interaction effect (Goulder et al., 1996). The first is the welfare gain 
resulting from the reduction in labour or other distortionary taxes, while the latter refers to the 
fact that the environmental tax increases consumption prices, thus lowering the purchasing 
power and the real household wages. The two effects have an opposite effect on employment. 
The question which one of the two effects is the largest determines whether a double dividend 
is within reach or not. Some scholars conclude that the tax interaction effect dominates the 
revenue recycling effect, thus rejecting the double dividend thesis (Bovenberg & de Mooij, 
1994), while other come to opposite conclusions. Various empirical studies have concluded that 
a revenue-neutral ETR with revenues going to labour or capital tax reduction has a positive 
impact on employment and no or only a slight (positive or negative) impact on a country’s GDP 
(Denis & Koopman, 1995; Carraro et al., 1996; Ekins & Speck, 1999; OECD, 2001; Bossier et al., 
2002; M.S. Andersen et al., 2007; Saveyn et al., 2011). However, some sectors may face some 
output losses. The cement, ferrous metals and energy producing sectors are named most often 
(Bossier & Vanhorebeek, 2003; M.S. Andersen et al., 2007).   
Bovenberg and Goulder (Bovenberg & Goulder, 2001) have modelled a solution for this 
remaining efficiency loss: exempting key industries for just a small fraction of their emissions 
from the tax would mitigate the losses in those industries to such a level that the environmental 
benefit can be realized without any loss of profits in key industries. This type of tax is also called 
a threshold tax. Besides reducing negative competitiveness impacts, a threshold tax may also 
have the benefit of being more acceptable to the public than a ‘pure’ environmental tax (see 
paper 4) (Pezzey, 2006). 
3.3.4 Side effects: distributional impact
24
 
As it is their aim to change consumption and production patterns, many environmental taxes 
inevitably face the risk of being income regressive (Kriström, 2006; Blobel et al., 2011), which 
means that “poorer households pay a disproportionate share of their income in these taxes 
relative to richer households”(OECD, 2001). Various empirical studies confirm this thesis 
(Brännlund & Nordström, 2004; Bork, 2006). This is clearly an undesired side effect of some 
environmental taxes.  
 
24  Alternative terms to refer to this problem include equity, tax incidence, distributional effects, regressive vs. 
progressive impact, social impact. 
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In case of a comprehensive ETR, the revenue recycling creates both risks and opportunities for 
equity. The revenue recycling by reducing taxes on labour will reduce unemployment which 
arguably has a positive effect on combating poverty. However, this positive effect is probably 
more than fully offset by the fact that lowering labour taxes tends to favour the poor less 
because they are less represented in the workforce than average (Bork, 2006).  
Distributional impacts of ETR with a reduction of labour taxation depend on whose labour taxes 
are reduced. Most academics focus on the option of a reduction of the employers’ social security 
contributions as they allegedly maximize the economy’s welfare and employment gains (Bachus, 
2010). However, governments wishing to put more emphasis on avoiding regressive impacts 
may consider to divide the tax cut between employers’ and employees’ contributions, which 
may slightly lower overall welfare, but at the same time entail lower regressivity (Blobel et al., 
2011).
25
 This 50-50 division was chosen in the 1999 to 2003 ETR in Germany (Bach et al., 2002). 
Additional measures can be taken to improve the equity impact of an ETR. A part of the revenue 
recycled may be reserved for moderating regressive effects. Compensation measures are in this 
context to be preferred over mitigation measures, meaning that compensations that keep the 
environmental tax intact (such as higher social benefits or lump-sum repayment for low-income 
households) are less distorting than exempting low-income families from the environmental tax, 
as this option erodes the environmental impact and the concomitant welfare gains (OECD, 
2001). 
According to Ekins et al. (2011), one of the most equitable ways to recycle the revenues in an 
ETR is an equal lump-sum payment, or eco-bonus, to all households, as the lump-sum is a higher 
percentage of income for the financially deprived households. The downside of this recycling 
option is obviously that the employment gains from lump sum payments are much lower than 
from labour tax cuts. This issue clearly illustrates the trade-off between the efficiency and the 
distributional impacts of an ETR (Ian W. H.  Parry & Williams, 2010).  
It should be noted that ‘regressivity’ is a relative term. In the modelling work of Ekins et al. (2011) 
all households gain from an ETR, but if low-income households gain less than others, we still 
label the impact as regressive. In this case, it does not necessarily lead to policy advice against 
the ETR. Finally, we note that an ETR that is (perceived to be) regressive may suffer from lower 
public support (see paper 4). 
3.4 Sustainability transitions 
In the past twenty years, an increasing number of academics have started to describe some of 
the contemporary environmental problems as long-term and persistent, and associate them 
with industrialized societal systems (Geels et al., 2004; Lenton et al., 2008; Foxon et al., 2009; 
Avelino et al., 2016). Natural resources depletion, including energy, and climate change are two 
examples of such long-run problems. According to Loorbach (2007), current institutions and 
organisations are not equipped to solve such complex problems, and a systemic approach – as 
an alternative to the dominant incremental approach -  is needed to deal with those problems 
in the long run. In other words, a sustainability transition is needed. 
 
25  Another reason that this option may appeal to governments is that it increases the chances of an ETR receiving 
support from the trade unions, which is relatively important in some countries. For example, in the 2003 ETR in 
Germany, the labour tax cut was split 50-50 between employers’ and employees’ contributions (Bachus, 2010). In 
Sweden, income taxation was reduced along with employers’ social contributions (Blobel et al., 2011).  
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Transition theory has its roots in many other literature strands: it contains elements from 
science & technology studies, evolutionary economics, structuration theory and neo-
institutional theory (Grin et al., 2010), system approaches, complexity theory and co-evolution 
theory (Geels, 2005). The integration of this multitude of approaches can be considered to have 
developed into a new theoretical body, called the school of sustainability transitions.  
In this PhD study, two theoretical models from transitions thinking, the multi-level perspective 
(MLP) and the multi-phase perspective (MPP), are used and combined (in paper 3) with the 
theory of environmental taxation to provide an answer to Q7 of this PhD study. The multi-level 
perspective (MLP) distinguishes between three levels (Geels, 2004; Verbong & Geels, 2007). At 
the macro level, the landscape represents the external environment of the system, which 
influences the socio-technical system but which is very difficult to change (Markard & Truffer, 
2008). At the meso level, the regime, which can be a dominant technology, institution, policy, 
practice or culture, is the dominant form of functioning in the socio-technical system (Avelino & 
Rotmans, 2009). At the micro level, niches present alternative (sustainable) technologies, 
institutions, policies, practices or cultures that may disrupt the functioning of the socio-technical 
system. Niches can eventually overtake the role of the regime and install a new dynamic balance 
in the socio-technical system (Kemp & Loorbach, 2006; Loorbach & Wijsman, 2013). 
An important question within the sustainability transition literature is the question whether it is 
possible to find policies or steering mechanisms to direct transitions in a (more) sustainable 
direction. Most transitions scholars see an active role for government, but not as the top-down 
commander who can steer at will using its instrument toolbox (Paredis, 2013). Rather, 
government is seen as just one group of actors (Geels et al., 2004), who are part of the regime. 
Government actors can exert influence on the functioning of the socio-technical system as they 
often are at the helm of various regime functions (A. Smith et al., 2005). Rotmans (2003) 
introduced the model of transition management, a term that clearly suggests that it is possible 
to manage, and steer, a transition. Loorbach (2007) partly agrees, claiming that it is possible to 
at least influence a transition using insights from transition theory. Other authors are not so 
affirmative: Shove and Walker (2007), for example, warn against a too simplistic view on the 
politics related to transitions governance, and against overlooking the various interests at play. 
In this PhD study, this question will be discussed in more detail, with a focus on the structure 
(mainly technology) and practices elements of societal systems. In this PhD study (paper 3), we 
explore if environmental taxation can play a role and contribute to a sustainability transition. 
We use the technology life cycle model (TLC) and compare its S-curve with the S-curve from 
transition theory. The aim is to investigate in which phase of a transitions an environmental tax 
can make a contribution. On the side of practices, Shove and Walker (2010) are rather sceptical 
about the potential of common governance approaches and instruments for changing practices. 
Shove (2012) claims that the impact of government interventions is unstable and unpredictable. 
Impact is only possible by trying to change the conditions for (un)sustainable practices. Public 
authorities can bring about strategically important changes that may influence the reproduction 
of practices (A. Smith et al., 2005). While pursuing this, policy makers may use similar 
instruments to the ones in place today (Shove, 2012), which include regulatory taxation, albeit 
selectively. 
Most studies on the governance of sustainability transitions focus on the development and 
upscaling of niches. Consequently, they largely ignore that the destabilization of incumbent 
regimes can equally be a valuable strategy, because this could speed up the upscaling of niche 
technologies (Kivimaa & Kern, 2016). In this PhD research (paper 3), we explore the potential of 
environmental taxation for fostering sustainability transitions (Q7 of section 1). The MLP and 
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the MPP will be used to explore the impact of environmental taxes on the structure (technology) 
and the practices and cultures of socio-technical systems. The impact on practices and cultures 
will be discussed using the social practices theory, which argues for a contextual approach to 
consumption, giving equal weight to the role of agency and to the social structure in which 
people act (Spaargaren, 2003). Finally, the impact of the use of policy mixes containing 
environmental taxation will be explored, which will link this paper with section 3.2.5 of the 
introduction.  
Paper 3 will offer a critical view on some of the presented theories. First, it will challenge the 
deterministic view in transition literature on the (limited) role of public policy. We consider the 
role of policy and policy instruments to be underexplored. Second, we will not take the idea for 
granted that systems change can only come from the bottom-up dynamic of developing niches, 
as many transitions scholars explicitly or implicitly claim. We will complement this view by 
adding a strong focus on regime destabilization. Third, we will challenge the basic assumptions 
of neo-classical economics, including rational choice theory and the assumption that 
preferences are fixed.  
3.5 Public support for environmental taxation 
In section 3.2.4 we analysed on what basis policy makers choose which instrument to deploy for 
tackling policy challenges. We saw that political feasibility is important, both in theory and in 
practice (McDonnell & Elmore, 1987). While the concept of political feasibility is debated to 
greater depth in political theory and political philosophy literature (Gilabert & Lawford-Smith, 
2012), it is also discussed in environmental policy-oriented literature. The two most important 
factors related to political feasibility in that literature are the support of industry pressure 
groups and public support (Räikkä, 1998).  
Public acceptability is an important factor explaining the relative underutilisation of regulatory 
taxation for environmental purposes. The policy maker is likely to consider the acceptability of 
a policy instrument for voters (Peters, 1991; McAusland, 2003; List & Sturm, 2006). According 
to the median voter theorem, the optimal election strategy for politicians is to take a policy 
position regarding government expenditure and taxation that represents the position of the 
median voter (Romer & Rosenthal, 1979). Although the median voter model has been criticized 
for its unrealistic assumptions (Peters, 1991), there is no doubt that there is an important link 
between public acceptability and policy instrument choice.  
The question how support for certain policy instruments or decisions is explained or determined 
is a complex matter. The environment is a societal (and policy) issue that has gained a lot of 
support throughout the last decades. People today are much more aware of and concerned 
about environmental problems. (Blake, 1999). The increased awareness opens the door for 
more stringent policy choices to tackle environmental problems. However, it appears that 
support for the objective is not a guarantee for support for the instrument. According to Hood 
(1983) “the instrument commonly is far more contentious than the aim itself”. And the 
instrument of environmental taxation does suffer from a severe lack of popularity. One possible 
explanation is linked to one of the taxonomies of policy instruments we presented in 
section 3.2.3: according to Cherry et al. (2012) and Baron and Jurney (1993) people are more 
inclined to object to a policy instrument when they view it as more coercive. McCaffery and 
Baron (2003a) call this phenomenon ‘penalty aversion’. Subsidies are a voluntary instrument, 
whereas taxation and command-and-control instruments “restrict people's freedom of choice 
and force people to change their own behavior” (Steg et al., 2006, p. 94). To Stern et al. (1993), 
this coerciveness aversion is a simple expression of the fact that people act out of self-interest. 
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Hard regulations provoke a negative psychological reaction and people see the coercive policies 
as a loss of freedom (Attari et al., 2009, p. 1702). 
However, penalty aversion can only partly explain the poor acceptance of regulatory taxation. 
Apparently, taxes face even stronger opposition than that other coercive instrument, command-
and-control. According to Clinch et al. (2006, p. 968), taxes have “particularly negative 
connotations”. Nordhaus (2007) even claims that for many people a tax is “almost a four letter 
word”. One explanation for this low acceptance of taxation is probably linked with the long 
history of the use of taxation, and the fact that it has been used so often for revenue raising, 
one of the three goals of taxation (see introduction) (Avi-Yonah, 2007). The lack of support 
seems to be an even bigger problem for environmental taxes than for taxes in general: people 
tend to dislike environmental taxes even more than other taxes (Green Fiscal Commission 2009). 
A simple and rational explanation for this phenomenon is self-interest: environmental taxes 
generally increase the prices of certain goods or services, and people do not like to see 
reductions in their purchasing power (Stern et al., 1993). However, this rational explanation 
seems to be insufficient, as sometimes people even object to a tax reform that is to their own 
benefit (Kallbekken et al., 2010). This phenomenon is called tax aversion (Sussman & Olivola, 
2011).  
Other phenomena explaining low acceptability of environmental taxes are offered by the field 
of behavioural economics. This field builds further on the assumption of bounded rationality, as 
stated by Simon (1955). In section 3.2.2, bounded rationality was found to play a role in policy 
decisions, but consumers too aim to satisfice, or aim for ‘good enough’, instead of aiming to 
optimize. The consumer still seeks rationality, but his or her rationality is bounded because of a 
lack of appropriate and reliable information, limited cognitive capacities and limited decision-
making time (Simon, 1955; Kahneman, 2003). Bounded rationality makes citizens resort to 
unavoidable simplification and heuristics to reduce complexity and keep matters manageable. 
Bounded rationality untangles various biases that help to explain why support for environmental 
taxation and environmental tax reform is so limited. These biases, including the fiscal illusion, 
the role of salience, the isolation effect, the aggregation effect, wishful thinking, the endowment 
effect, the metric effect and the role of framing will be examined in paper 4 of this PhD study, 
which aims to answer research question Q8 of this PhD study (see section 1). Additionally, the 
paper will examine which determinants or predictors can be found for (lack of) support for ET 
and ETR. Some of the potential determinants are people’s education level, income, owning a 
car, trust in government, environmental concern, political ideology, perceived effectiveness and 
regressivity of the ETR, specificity of the question, labelling and framing, earmarking and 
information provision.  
In addition to the state-of-the-art of the literature, paper 4 will provide empirical evidence 
explaining low support for environmental taxation and environmental tax reform. The empirical 
evidence will be based on a large-scale quantitative survey held in Flanders. Ordinary least 
square and other types of regression analysis will enable us to estimate the strength of the 
determinants and the support for different ways of revenue recycling in case of an ETR. 
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4 |  Methodology and empirical theory testing 
In this section, a horizontal overview of the methodologies and the empirical theory testing used 
in the PhD study is presented. Three methodologies are highlighted: policy evaluation 
methodologies, indicator development (including index theory) and statistical methods.  
4.1 Policy evaluation methodologies 
This PhD contains exercises of policy evaluation in each of the four publications. The comparison 
between environmental taxes and emissions trading in paper 1 can be considered as an 
evaluation using evaluation criteria such as effectiveness, efficiency, competitiveness impact, 
distributional impact and equity and political feasibility. This type of evaluation contains 
elements of both theoretical and empirical evaluation.  
In paper 2 I will go a step further, by designing a new evaluation framework, aimed at evaluating 
existing indicators for measuring the greening of a tax system. In this paper, evaluation is used 
as a way to develop state-of-the-art indicators for measuring the theoretical concept of the 
greening of a tax system. The evaluation criteria used in this exercise are content validity, 
comprehensiveness, data availability, temporal comparability, international comparability and 
availability of aggregation options. I make a comparative evaluation of four types of indicators 
by using an ordinal scale. The evaluation gives rise to conclusions on the preferred instruments 
for measuring the greening of the tax system.  
Paper 3 is a theoretical evaluation of the applicability of sustainability transition theory to 
environmental taxation, or – in other words – an exploration of the potential of environmental 
taxation as a policy instrument to contribute to long-term sustainability transitions. Insights 
from environmental economics, transitions thinking, the multi-level perspective and the social 
practices approach are combined, leading to the comprehensive conclusion on the potential of 
taxation to contribute to long-term sustainability transitions.  
In paper 4 we carry out an empirical evaluation of the public support for an environmental tax 
reform. The level of public support for environmental taxation is not only an interesting 
academic empirical study object as such; it is also an important explanatory factor for the use of 
taxation as a regulatory policy instrument. In that perspective, the evaluation criterion of public 
support will take an important position in most policy advising and evaluation studies on 
environmental taxation. 
4.2 Indicator development and index theory 
The main goal of paper 2 is to answer research questions Q3 and Q4 of this PhD study (see 
section 1), regarding the evaluation of existing indicators the development of alternative 
indicators for measuring the greening of a tax system. After concluding that the dominantly used 
revenue-raising indicators perform poorly on validity criteria, I develop a new type of indicator, 
which is based on tax levels instead of government revenues. As the aim of the indicators is the 
use on an aggregated (national) level, it is necessary to give it the shape of an index number. A 
composite or aggregate index number ‘aggregates detailed information on prices and quantities 
into scalar measures of price and quantity levels or their growth’ (Diewert, 2008). The indicator 
that is developed in paper 2 is of the type of the Consumer Price Index (CPI), which is used to 
measure inflation. While the CPI uses variable baskets of goods and services to follow the 
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evolution of their prices, my ‘National Environmental Taxation Index’ uses variable baskets of 
environmentally related taxes to monitor the evolution of its tax rates.   
For maximal validity, a weighted index number is preferred over an unweighted one (ILO et al., 
2004). In the past century, a vast body of literature has developed on index numbers and the 
weighting issue. The most general - and most commonly used - type of index number is the Lowe 
index, which can use any type of quantity weight from any period. That feature is also its 
advantage, as the evolution of tax rates can be measured using the tax revenues from one, two 
or more years in the past. However, a more valid index number would be the one that uses the 
revenues from the current year. That type of index number is called the ‘Laspeyres’ index 
number, which is more valid but has the drawback that its weights can in most cases only be 
used two years in the past, which is a major deficiency for policy-making. In sum, the Laspeyres 
index is the most valid one, but also the most difficult in terms of data gathering. The Lowe index 
has a slightly lower validity, but is more pragmatic in terms of data gathering.  
Below the formula for both types of index numbers is shown. 
 
 
 
 
Lowe: 
 
 
 
 
Laspeyres: 
 
In paper 2 I develop a new type of indicator using both these index numbers, putting forward 
the hypothesis that the two approaches will differ only slightly in practice. If that hypothesis is 
confirmed, the Lowe index can be used as a good proxy for the Laspeyres index.  
In the search for indicators for measuring the greening of a tax system, we distinguish between 
four types of indicators: revenue-based indicators, single tax rates, aggregate tax-rate based 
indicators and the implicit tax rate on energy. Each of these types of indicators will be analysed, 
and a conclusion will be drawn on which is/are the best for use by policy makers.  
4.3 Statistical methodologies 
This PhD study contains an empirical study on public support for environmental taxation 
(paper 4), which aims at answering Q8 of this PhD study. We carried out a survey in Flanders, 
aiming to reveal the explanatory factors of public acceptability of environmental taxation and 
environmental tax reform. Ordinary least square regression and an ordinal logit model were 
applied to identify the determinants for public support and willingness-to-pay for environmental 
taxation. Additionally, the following statistical analysis tools are used in the paper (Warner, 
2008): 
- the Wilcoxon Rank test, which is used to compare two sets of scores that come from the 
same participants; 
- the Bonferonni post hoc test, which makes pairwise comparisons of averages. 
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4.4 Empirical theory testing  
Many scientific theories seem to hold water intuitively, but it is important to challenge and test 
them by adding perspectives from empirical research (Roth & Van Der Velde, 1991). At least on 
three occasions we put the theory to the empirical test. In paper 1 the existing theory on the 
features and the explaining factors for success or failure of the policy instruments of taxes and 
emissions trading is applied to the case of China. This empirical analysis contributes to insights 
on the features and success factors of the policy instrument of taxation applied in the field of 
the environment. Relevant observations include the limited government capacity in China to 
create, regulate and monitor a new market of emissions trading and the comparatively low risk 
in China for a carbon tax to be regressive if revenue recycling is included in the policy package.  
In paper 2 the theories on indicator development and index numbers are applied to Flemish 
data. The data are obtained from a 2013 study on the greening of the tax system in Flanders 
(Bachus, 2013). The database allowed for comparison of the chained Lowe and Laspeyres 
indexes for Flemish environmentally related taxes we developed for measuring the greening of 
the tax system.  
Paper 4 contains an important empirical part. A survey is carried out to test some of the 
hypotheses put forward in the theoretical part of the paper. The survey allows us to draw 
conclusions on public support for environmental tax reform, the determinants explaining the 
degree of support, the conditions to which support is (not) obtained, the importance of the 
specificity of the instrument, and the importance of the chosen method of tax revenue recycling 
(ETR).  
5 |  Overview of the four PhD papers  
In section 1, the link between my research questions and the four academic publications that 
will constitute the backbone of my PhD thesis was explained. In this section, an abstract is 
provided for each of these four publications. 
5.1 Paper 1: Cap or tax? Exploring the potential for a carbon tax or emissions 
trading in China 
Full reference: 
Bachus Kris and Cao Jing (2013), Cap or tax? Exploring the Potential for a Carbon Tax or Emissions 
Trading in China, in: Bruyninckx Hans, Qi Ye, Nguyen Quan Thuan and Belis David, EU-Asia 
Climate Relations: Evidence from China and Vietnam as Key Emerging Economies, Edward Elgar, 
Cheltenham. 
Abstract: 
In this paper, we discuss the choice for a carbon tax versus an emissions trading scheme as the 
instrument for climate change mitigation policy for China. The central research question of this 
paper is “Given its policy context and comparing with the EU, is a carbon tax or an emissions 
trading scheme the best climate mitigation policy instrument for China?” 
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We first set out a theoretical discussion on the instrument choice question. The paper zooms in 
on market-based instruments and makes a comparative evaluation of the economic instruments 
of a carbon tax and an emissions trading scheme. Both instruments put a price on carbon, a tax 
does this by fixing the price, leaving the resulting quantity emitted undetermined. Emissions 
trading does exactly the opposite: the quantity is fixed by the policymaker and the price is left 
to be determined by the market. 
Subsequently, we describe China’s current domestic climate policies and measures adopted by 
China’s government for GHG emissions reductions. We assess the arguments for both 
instrument groups based on China’s particular situation and provide a number of design 
recommendations, before drawing the main conclusions for the Chinese case. The paper 
concludes that a carbon tax has a slight edge on an emissions trading scheme, but the outcome 
depends on many factors outside of the choice of the policy instrument. An emissions trading 
scheme can only achieve its theoretical potential if design elements, such as the emissions cap 
and the ratio between grandfathered and auctioned permits, are chosen well. Furthermore, the 
critical conditions of a sound administration, reliable emissions data and a well-functioning 
market, need to be fulfilled. In the near future, those conditions will be difficult to fulfil in China.  
A good solution for China may be the use of a hybrid instrument, combining emissions trading 
with features of a tax. In practical terms, a floor price and a ceiling price may be added to the 
scheme, protecting against both undesirably high and low permit prices. 
5.2 Paper 2: How to tell green from grey? Towards a methodological framework for 
evaluating the greening of national tax systems 
Full reference: 
Bachus, Kris (2016), How to tell green from grey? Towards a methodological framework for 
evaluating the greening of national tax systems, Ecological Indicators, 71: 229-238, DOI 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ecolind.2016.04.009 (2016 IF: 3,898). 
Abstract: 
In this paper, we evaluate four types of indicators that can be used for measuring the greening 
of a tax system: revenue-based indicators, single tax rates, aggregate tax-rate based indicators 
and the implicit tax rate on energy. The central research question is “How can we evaluate 
different types of indicators for measuring the greening of a tax system, and which alternative 
aggregate indicator(s) can we develop to improve the existing indicator set?” 
We develop an evaluation framework, introducing two principal evaluation criteria: content 
validity and comprehensiveness, and four statistical criteria: data availability, comparison over 
time, international comparability and ease of aggregation. Additional analysis regarding the 
issue of weighting is carried out for the aggregate tax-rate based indicator, by using insights from 
index theory to develop a new aggregate indicator for measuring the greening of the tax system. 
A Lowe and Laspeyres index are selected to test the hypothesis that they are both suitable for 
the monitoring purposes I have designed them for.  
The theoretical and methodological evaluation is supplemented and validated empirically using 
data on the Belgian and the Flemish tax system. Finally, conclusions are drawn with regard to 
the strengths and the weaknesses of the four types of indicators and recommendations are 
made for further research. 
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5.3 Paper 3: The use of regulatory taxation as a policy instrument for sustainability 
transitions: old wine in new bottles or unexplored potential? 
Full reference: 
Bachus, Kris & Vanswijgenhoven, Frederic (2017), The use of regulatory taxation as a policy 
instrument for sustainability transitions: old wine in new bottles or unexplored potential?, 
Journal of Environmental Planning and Management, DOI 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09640568.2017.1358155 (2016 Impact Factor: 1.560). 
Abstract: 
This paper examines the role environmental taxation can play in fostering sustainability 
transitions. The central research question is “What is the potential of environmental taxation as 
a policy instrument for fostering sustainability transitions?” 
This article combines the literature strands on environmental taxation and on sustainability 
transitions from a theoretical perspective. We make use of the multi-level perspective (MLP) 
and the multi-phase perspective (MPP) as heuristic frameworks to examine the potential effects 
of regulatory taxes on different levels and in different phases of a transition. The potential of 
regulatory taxes for accelerating the diffusion process of technological innovation is explored by 
combining technology life cycle theories with the multi-phase model from transition theory.  
The focus of the theoretical exploration subsequently shifts from technology to practices, by 
focusing on the social practices model. We look for answers to the question whether social 
practices can be changed with policy instruments; this discussion also touches on the issue of 
(bounded) rationality in policy-making (see section 3.2.2 of this introductory chapter). 
Furthermore, the robustness of the theoretical implications is tested through an exploratory 
analysis of the Belgian energy system as a case study. Finally, the paper concludes that the 
potential of environmental taxation primarily lies in the acceleration and the maturity phases of 
the multi-phase model, and a policy mix will be needed for enhancing the transition in the other 
phases.  
5.4 Paper 4: “I’ll accept it if you earmark it”: towards an improved understanding of 
the acceptability of environmental tax reform 
Full reference: 
Bachus Kris, Verhofstadt Elsy & Van Ootegem Luc, I’ll accept it if you earmark it”: towards an 
improved understanding of the acceptability of environmental tax reform, in review, submitted 
to Ecological Economics on 19/04/2017 (2016 IF: 2,965). 
Abstract: 
The central research question of this paper is “what are the factors determining public support 
for environmental tax reform and how can this support be increased?” 
The first aim of this paper is to review the theoretical and empirical state of the art on public 
support and willingness to pay for environmental taxation. Starting from the discussions on 
instrument choice and policy-making models (see 3.2.1 and 3.2.3), we subsequently shift the 
focus specifically to the tax instrument, which suffers a lot from a lack of popularity with the 
public. The phenomenon of tax aversion explains why some people object to an environmental 
tax reform, even if it is in their own benefit. The factors determining and explaining the support 
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for environmental tax reforms are discussed, and we explore strategies that governments can 
follow to increase support for certain tax reforms.  
The second aim of the paper is to test a number of theoretical and empirical conclusions put 
forward by previous studies, by analysing the results of an extensive survey (the LEVO survey) 
we carried out in Flanders, Belgium. One example of a hypothesis is the fact that people tend to 
object environmental taxation more if it is described as a specific and concrete measure, 
compared to a more general presentation.    
The paper draws conclusions on the most important parameters explaining support for green 
tax reforms, and develops recommendations for deciding such a reform with more support from 
the public. 
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Paper 1 
 
Cap or tax? Exploring the potential for a 
carbon tax or emissions trading in China 
Full reference:  
Bachus Kris and Cao Jing (2013), Cap or tax? Exploring the Potential for a Carbon Tax or Emissions 
Trading in China, in: Bruyninckx Hans, Qi Ye, Nguyen Quan Thuan and Belis David, EU-Asia 
Climate Relations: Evidence from China and Vietnam as Key Emerging Economies, Edward Elgar, 
Cheltenham. 
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 Cap or tax? Exploring the potential for a carbon tax or 
emissions trading in China 
Kris Bachus and Cao Jing 
 
1 |  Introduction 
China is often blamed for slowing down or even obstructing progress in global climate 
negotiations, as was shown in the Conference of the Parties (COP) 15 in Copenhagen in 
December 2009 (Lütken 2010). Most developing and emerging economies find it hard to accept 
an absolute target for their greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, viewing it as a potential restriction 
of their economic development (Cooper 2008). However this observation does not imply that 
China is not taking any action with regard to climate change mitigation. On the contrary, China 
has initiated many ambitious policies, such as technology mandates and small-plant shut-down 
policies in the power sector; vehicle emissions standards; a 1000-firm energy saving programme 
in the 11th Five-Year Plan and now a 10 000-firm energy saving programme for the 12th Five-
Year Plan; feed-in-tariffs and renewable quotas to support renewable energy technologies. 
Most of the recent policies are command-and-control policies. However, domestically, the 
instrument choice debate to curb GHG emissions is very lively. As in other countries or regions, 
the debate largely comes down to the choice between two market-based policy instruments: a 
carbon tax or an emissions trading scheme. 
In this chapter we first analyse the recent and ongoing cap or tax debate in China. We set out 
theoretical discussions on the instrument choice question. Then, we describe China’s current 
domestic climate policies and measures adopted by China’s government for GHG emissions 
reductions. We assess the arguments for both instrument groups based on China’s particular 
situation and provide a number of design recommendations, before drawing the main 
conclusions for the Chinese case. 
2 |  Cap or tax 
Although environmental policy science traditionally proposes command-and-control, market-
based instruments and voluntary approaches as the three main instrument groups (Arimura et 
al. 2008), the core of climate mitigation policy can be narrowed down to a choice between two 
market- based instruments: a carbon tax and a cap-and-trade system (Hepburn 2006). Both 
instruments put a price on carbon. A tax does this by fixing the price, leaving the resulting 
emitted quantity undetermined. Emissions trading does exactly the opposite: the quantity is 
fixed by the policymaker and the price is left to be determined by the market. Apart from these 
differences, the two instruments have a number of similarities. They both (1) internalize 
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environmental externalities; (2) can raise government revenues1 which can be recycled into the 
economy by reducing other distortionary taxes (Parry 2001); (3) face the risk of ‘dilution’ 
because of exemptions and preferential treatment for certain sectors, obtained by lobbying 
(Edenhofer et al. 2010); (4) require thorough examination of the costs and benefits to determine 
the appropriate tax rate or the number of allowances (Hepburn 2006); and (5) require specific 
regulation for implementation, compliance, penalties for non- compliance and a monitoring and 
enforcement scheme. 
The question arises as to which instrument is ‘the best’ for substantially reducing GHG 
emissions, taking into account all the relevant decision-making criteria, such as effectiveness, 
efficiency, competitiveness impact, distributional impact and equity and political feasibility. In 
theory, in a deterministic world with no uncertainty, price and quantity instruments can both 
achieve a certain target level of emissions in an equally efficient way2 (Edenhofer et al. 2010; 
Newell and Pizer 2003; Hepburn 2006). However, in reality, uncertainty is omnipresent, calling 
for a more comprehensive approach. Weitzman (1974) showed that, if uncertainty is 
introduced, one of the instruments may become preferable to the other depending on the 
relative slope of the marginal benefit and marginal cost curves. He showed that a tax is more 
efficient than a cap-and-trade system if the marginal benefit curve of the environmental good 
in question is flatter than the marginal cost curve.3 Emissions trading is more efficient if the 
marginal cost curve is flatter than the marginal benefit curve. Applied to climate change, when 
the benefits of mitigation are not expected to increase quickly, but the costs of further 
mitigation (after the low-hanging fruit has been picked) are expected to rise rapidly, a price 
instrument would be the most suitable instrument (Hepburn 2006). Newell and Pizer (2003) and 
Hepburn (2006) agree that, given the characteristics of the climate change problem, a tax is 
preferable to a cap-and-trade scheme. Yet, many authors continue to conclude that the theory 
does not provide a decisive answer to this question (Fan et al. 2011). A lot depends on the 
perspective or the particular criteria that one uses for this evaluation. In the rest of this section, 
we will look at this choice issue from other perspectives. 
The first perspective, and one which is less frequently debated than the effectiveness and 
efficiency criteria, is the institutional and design side of the policy instrument. In order for a tax 
to be efficient, the tax base must be related to the emission itself or at least to the economic 
factor causing the emission (Edenhofer et al. 2010). Taxes on final consumption are less efficient 
than input taxes, since the necessary reallocation towards more carbon-friendly alternatives 
cannot be fully achieved in the case of output taxation. The best tax base is always the emission 
itself (Oates 1995). As well as the question of the tax base itself, the level of the tax is also crucial. 
This is clearly a downside of a price instrument: the risk of not achieving the mitigation target 
by choosing a tax rate that is too low or too restrictive entails suboptimal efficiency (Hepburn 
2006). The obvious advantage of permit trading is the fact that achieving the mitigation target 
(effectiveness) is guaranteed (Edenhofer et al. 2010). However Weitzman (1974) warns that 
determining the number of tradable allowances and the timing for the issuing of the licenses is 
as challenging as determining the level of any tax. Conversely, the uncertainty with regard to 
the timing of the issuing of the licenses can be passed on to the private sector, which is 
supposedly able to deal with it more efficiently (Edenhofer et al. 2010). 
According to Avi-Yonah and Uhlmann (2009), taking all arguments into account, a tax is easier 
to implement and enforce. A trading scheme requires baselines for emissions reduction targets, 
a mechanism for distributing allowances, use of offsets, effective administration, a mature legal 
system, effective monitoring and measuring, and a well-functioning sophisticated market (Fan 
et al. 2011). Consequently, such a scheme requires experience and cannot be set up rapidly, 
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whereas a price instrument can become effective in a very short timeframe (Avi-Yonah and 
Uhlmann 2009). Implementation costs for emissions trading may also be higher than for a 
carbon tax (Hepburn 2006). 
The second perspective to take into account in discussions on instrument choice is the important 
issue of political feasibility. Although economists primarily focus on efficiency when analysing 
instrument choice, political feasibility may be a more important factor in day-to-day politics 
(Hepburn 2006). Cap-and-trade systems are said to be more feasible than taxes (Edenhofer et 
al. 2010; Stavins 1998; Avi-Yonah and Uhlmann 2009). In fact, Hepburn (2006) states that 
obstructive industry lobbying can be predicted to increase according to the following order: (1) 
subsidies; (2) grandfathered licences; (3) auctioned licences; and (4) taxes. Emissions trading 
schemes are especially easier to implement in times of high energy prices and during economic 
crises (Avi-Yonah and Uhlmann 2009; Edenhofer et al. 2010).4 These conclusions are confirmed 
by the observation that in most policy processes in which the choice between a tax and a cap 
was explicitly on the table, the cap was ultimately introduced (Stavins 1998).5 The policy and 
political process behind the European Union Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS) is, in that sense, 
particularly telling.6 
A (carbon or other) tax is problematic with regard to public and political acceptability. Since 
taxes have been used on such a large scale in virtually every country and predominantly for the 
purpose of raising revenue, they are unpopular with citizens, consumers and businesses alike. 
Consequently, emissions trading may be more politically feasible than a tax simply because it is 
not labelled a tax (Avi-Yonah and Uhlmann 2009). According to Nordhaus (2007), a tax is ‘almost 
a four-letter word’. Moreover, besides their general aversion to taxes, people tend to dislike 
environmental taxes even more than other taxes (Green Fiscal Commission 2009). In this 
respect, politicians’ tendency to grant an (inefficient) free allocation within the framework of 
tradable permits, which is regarded as a weakness of the instrument, could also simultaneously 
be seen as its strength. The (inefficient) option of a free permit allocation lightens the burden 
on the powerful producer groups and offers an attractive compromise to politicians between 
the advocates of firm climate action and its opponents (Goulder and Parry 2008). Hence, in some 
cases there may be a trade- off between effectiveness or efficiency and political feasibility 
criteria for instrument choice. This is illustrated by some experts’ fear that, if the market price 
of the licences becomes too high, politicians may be pressured into relaxing the cap (Avi-Yonah 
and Uhlmann 2009) which would increase political feasibility, but jeopardize environmental 
effectiveness. Nordhaus (2007) also points to the difficulty in choosing the emissions baseline 
to use when setting the absolute cap, whereas a carbon tax is always an extra disincentive for 
energy use relative to the benchmark of a zero-carbon tax level. 
A third perspective that is relevant for instrument choice is that of public finances. In times of 
harsh fiscal consolidation, such as in Europe in 2012, support for revenue-raising instruments 
may be higher, whereas instruments with a cost, such as subsidies, become less feasible. In 
theory, a tax and a tradable permit system with full auctioning could raise government revenue 
in a similar way. However according to Hepburn (2006), in practice a price instrument such as a 
tax may raise more government revenue than emissions trading, even with fully auctioned 
permits, because auctions will not always raise the optimal amount of revenue.7 In a 
comprehensive revenue-neutral ‘environmental tax reform’ (ETR), revenues from 
environmental taxation are reinvested in the economy by lump-sum payment, reduction of 
other distortionary taxes or other recycling mechanisms (Ekins 2011). One drawback of the tax 
from this perspective is the unpredictability and unstable nature of the potential revenue. This 
uncertainty may hinder an ETR process: trade unions for instance tend to be worried that if the 
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tax base of the environmental good erodes, government will revoke the reduction in the social 
security contributions. 
A fourth relevant perspective is the robustness of both instruments with regard to market 
failures. According to Edenhofer et al. (2010), the price instrument clearly has the advantage in 
relation to this criterion. The quantity instrument may entail higher welfare losses in capital, 
permit or resources markets. Apart from severe failure or collapse, a smaller troublesome 
feature can be strong volatility in the permit price, which has been one of the undesirable 
characteristics of the EU ETS (Ekins 2009).8 One way of dealing with this complexity is to turn 
the trading scheme into a hybrid instrument, combining emissions trading with features of a 
tax. In practical terms, a floor and a ceiling may be added to the scheme, protecting against both 
undesirably high and low permit prices. In practice, this would mean that the government 
(represented by a ‘carbon bank’) would commit to buying or selling part of its own stock of 
licences when the price goes beyond the floor or ceiling level (Hepburn 2006; Ekins 2009). 
The final perspective is the impact on innovation and the diffusion of pollution abatement 
technologies. Montero (2002a) and Coria (2009) examined the incentives for adoption under 
the tax and trading regimes, assuming firms engage in imperfect competition in the output 
market. Both authors break down the policy impacts into two effects: direct effects and indirect 
strategic effects. The former suggests that, if firms compete in quantities sold, research and 
development (R&D) will allow investors to reduce the marginal cost of abatement, with the 
result that the direct effects are positive and investors’ abatement savings do not affect the 
other firms’ choice of output. Assuming imperfect competition, there is one more effect 
imposed upon this direct effect: the strategic effects would be negative for innovation and 
diffusion since investors’ decisions affect the ex post behaviour and profits of their rivals. 
Montero (2002a) argues that tradable permits offer fewer incentives than the tax if the 
regulator is myopic and does not adjust the tax rate or cap in response to the availability of new 
technologies. However Coria (2009) adopts a more dynamic approach: by assuming that the 
regulator commits to the ex post optimal environmental policy, she shows that the ranking of 
the tax and tradable permits depends on the elasticity of output demand. If output demand is 
more elastic, direct effects will be larger under the permits than under the tax and the regulator 
speeds up the entire sequence of adoption by using auctioned permits. In summary, choosing 
the optimal instrument for climate mitigation policy is a complex matter. On the one hand, a 
small majority of scholars find that, given the characteristics of the climate problem, the 
features of the different markets involved and the available knowledge with regard to multiple 
evaluation criteria, a tax may be the most efficient choice for climate change mitigation policies. 
On the other hand, the choice that policymakers have in reality is often restricted by contextual 
factors, such as political support and reliability of emissions data. We will discuss this question 
in more detail in the case of China. 
3 |  China’s domestic climate policy 
3.1 Climate Policies in China 
China has implemented various policy options in the 11th Five-Year Plan period (2006–2010), in 
order to reach its energy intensity target of 20 per cent by the end of 2010,9 compared to the 
benchmark level of 2005. Major policies include: 
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● Energy intensity target and energy saving responsibility policy: using a top-down energy 
intensity target break-down method, provincial and local governments and major firms 
are aligned with energy intensity targets at each level. Achieving the assigned target plays 
an important role in terms of government officer promotion and enterprise development. 
● Technology mandates and shutting down small-scale power plants: various building codes 
and new emissions standards were adopted in China. In the power sector, 76.8 GW of 
capacity from small-scale power plants under 100 MW has been phased out. 
● Phasing out inefficient production in cement, iron and steel and other energy intensive 
sectors: shutting down small and pollution-intensive firms in the paper, chemicals and 
textile sectors, and so on. Meanwhile, the Chinese government also grants subsidies to 
compensate for the loss. 
● Top 1000 energy consuming enterprise programme: the Chinese government has set 
specific energy saving targets for the selected 1000 highest energy consuming enterprises 
in the iron and steel, chemicals, electricity power generation, petroleum/petrochemical, 
construction materials, non-ferrous metals, coal mining, paper and textile industries. 
Progress is being monitored closely and enforcement is strong. According to a central 
government report, the top 1000 enterprises have saved roughly 150 Mtce between 2005 
and 2010, achieving 50 per cent more savings than the required target (Government of 
China 2011).10 
● Preferential tax rates for renewable energy and energy conservation technology ventures: 
the new Enterprise Income Tax Law (EIT) came into force on 1 January 2008. This law 
introduces preferential treatment for industries and projects in the areas of 
environmental protection, energy conservation, water conservation, technology transfer 
and nuclear development by reducing enterprise income tax and providing tax holidays. 
In addition to qualifying for the EIT benefits, energy service companies are also exempt 
from business tax and value added tax (Montero 2002b). 
● Tariff adjustment: the Chinese government has reduced import tariffs on resource-
efficient and advanced technology commodities but increased export tariffs and removed 
export rebate subsidies on energy-intensive, pollution- and resource-intensive 
commodities during the 11th Five-Year Period. 
● Fuel tax reform: the Chinese government launched a fuel tax reform in 2009, which set 
the petrol tax at 1.0 yuan/l and the diesel tax at 0.8 yuan/l. 
● Resource tax reform: the Chinese resource tax was reformed in October 2011. Under the 
new regime, crude oil and natural gas taxes have been shifted from a unit tax to an ad 
valorem tax, that is, the tax will be based on sales rather than on production. In addition, 
coking coal and rare earths were also subject to higher tax rates (China briefing 2011). 
● Green credit policy: launched in July 2007, the Green Credit Policy has become an 
important climate financing tool in China, with three government agencies sharing 
implementation responsibilities – the Ministry of Environmental Protection (MEP), the 
People’s Bank of China (PBoC) and the China Banking Regulatory Commission (CBRC). This 
policy implements a shift in credits from polluting and energy-intensive enterprises and 
projects towards conservation and emissions-abating projects. Under this policy, the 
share of energy saving environmental project loans has grown from 1.87 per cent of total 
loans granted by Chinese banks in 2005 to 8.93 per cent in 2009 (China banking 
Association 2012). 
● Carbon sinks: the State Forestry Administration launched three major programmes to 
increase carbon sinks in China: (1) major programmes such as the natural forest protection 
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programme, the sloping land conversion programme and the Beijing–Tianjin sand control 
programme; (2) Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) carbon sink projects; and (3) the 
voluntary afforestation programme under the China Green Carbon Foundation. 
In summary, the major policy interventions adopted by the Chinese government during the 11th 
Five-Year Plan are predominantly command-and-control policies. Although some innovations 
regarding market-based instruments have been adopted on a supplementary basis, most of 
these are adjustments to trade tariffs, banking policies and preferential tax treatments. 
In the 12th Five-Year Plan (2011–2015), the Chinese government announced a 16 per cent 
energy intensity reduction target,11 a 17 per cent carbon intensity reduction target (NDRC 2012), 
an (absolute) energy consumption target of 4.1 billion tce and a coal consumption target of 3.9 
billion tonnes.12 However these targets seem difficult to achieve, especially the coal target, since 
coal consumption has already grown to 3.8 billion tonnes in 2011 (Bloomberg 2012), meaning 
that it can only increase by 0.1 billion tonnes for the next five years. Furthermore, even given 
the condition to limit total energy use to under 4.1 billion tce, China’s fossil fuel-related carbon 
emissions would reach 8.5 billion tonnes in 2015, which would surpass United States (US) 
emissions by about 50 per cent (Montero 2002a). With the further stringent targets for the 12th 
Five-Year Plan, there is a growing understanding that the existing command-and-control policies 
will be largely insufficient. As a consequence, the importance of economic instruments in the 
climate policy debate is growing. 
3.2 Environmental Taxation in China 
The debate on environmentally related taxes in China is not a new one. In 1982, the pollution 
levy system was put in place to curb industrial pollution relating to water, air, noise and solid 
waste (Wang and Wheeler 2000). This comprehensive reform also introduced the new resource 
tax, the vehicle tax and the land use tax. One year later, the fuel tax, levied on petrol and diesel, 
was added. In 1985, the urban construction and maintenance tax followed and in 1988, a tax on 
land use was imposed. The 1994 tax reform was aimed at making the tax system more consistent 
with the needs of the market economy (Xu 2011). It reformed the resource tax and launched 
the consumption tax, which was levied on 14 types of consumer goods, including transport fuel, 
disposable chopsticks, tobacco, alcohol and cars. The consumption tax included a new vehicle 
tax, which was divided into the one- off vehicle acquisition tax at purchase and the annual 
vehicle and vessel tax. In 2003, the industrial levy was reformed and replaced by a pollution 
tax.13 Although the reform involved a significant increase in the tax rates, they were still too low 
to have the desired impact (Xu 2011). Further reforms were implemented after this, including 
the fuel tax reform in 2009, which had been under debate for 15 years before finally being 
adopted (Bachus and Cao 2011). 
In 2010, China’s environmental tax revenues accounted for 6.7 per cent of total tax revenues, 
which is slightly higher than the average for the EU27 (6.3 per cent) (European Commission and 
Eurostat 2011; National Bureau of Statistics of China 2012). However, expressed as a percentage 
of gross domestic product (GDP), these revenues are 1.2 per cent, significantly lower than the 
EU’s (2.4 per cent). This difference can be explained by the much lower general tax level in China 
(Bachus and Cao 2011). Another measure is the tax rate excluding value-added tax (VAT) on 
petrol, which was €0.11 per litre in China, compared to €0.08 in the US, €0.66 in Germany, €0.62 
in the UK and €0.61 in France (European Commission 2012; Ministry of Finance 2012). 
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Chinese environmental tax policies have been especially criticized for their low tax rates. As 
most of the revenues are used for pollution abatement, the tax rates are calculated to cover 
only the abatement costs. Experience has shown that this level is too low to be an incentive for 
companies to invest in emissions reductions, as it is cheaper to pay the tax than to abate (Bachus 
and Cao 2011). Secondly, due to China’s complex institutional structure, problems of conflicting 
interests between local and central governments frequently occur, leading to collection rates 
that are much lower than could be expected given the tax rates. Local governments are often 
zealous for local economic growth, which makes it hard to adopt and implement any 
environmental tax that may conflict with these targets (Xu 2011). The 2009 fuel tax reform may 
seem like a significant step forward, but the increase was the first one in 26 years. Other taxes, 
such as the independent environmental tax and the carbon tax, remain to be realized (Wang et 
al. 2011). 
3.3 Emissions Trading Experience in China 
Until today, China has not yet had a comprehensive system of emissions trading (Chang and 
Wang 2010). However the severe problems in China with sulphur dioxide (SO2) from coal have 
raised strong awareness, leading to a search for effective policy instruments to deal with the air 
pollution problem. SO2 emissions trading has been the focus of serious attention for the last 20 
years. As early as 1994, emissions trading pilot projects were launched in six cities (Yang and 
Schreifels 2003). In the late 1990s, China implemented a number of pilots with the help of the 
US and several international institutions (Chang and Wang 2010). This led to an upscaling in the 
early 2000s, with experiments in four provinces, three cities and one power production 
company. Different types of trading were tested during these experiments. The pilots revealed 
a number of barriers and challenges for effective implementation of emissions trading on the 
national level (Chang and Wang 2010). The first was effective emission monitoring capacity, 
which was lacking. The second was a solid legal system, which was insufficient. Thirdly, many 
institutions from local and central government need to be engaged, making the ETS a very 
complex system. Finally, compatibility with other regulations and policies needs to be addressed 
carefully. Although much has been learnt from the pilots and some local trading schemes are 
still operational today, they have not entailed a national cap-and-trade system and most authors 
consider them as having failed (Han et al. 2012). 
Carbon trading entered China in 2004, when it embarked upon the Clean Development 
Mechanism (CDM). It quickly became the world’s most dominant CDM carbon credit supplier, 
accounting for 58 per cent of global certified CDM emissions reductions at the end of 2011 
(UNEP Risø Centre 2012). Next to the CDM, carbon trading is also present in China through the 
‘carbon trade exchanges’, such as the China Beijing Environment Exchange (CBEEX) and the 
Shanghai Environment and Energy Exchange (SEEEX). Although today these initiatives only trade 
CDM and voluntary Emissions Reductions, Han et al. (2012) see them as a way of providing a 
basic infrastructure for future carbon trading on a larger scale. 
However the most important initiative recently taken with regard to carbon trading in China is 
the decision, in 2011, by the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) to launch 
pilot carbon trade projects in two provinces and five cities.14 Implementation is set to start in 
2013 and it should pave the way for a nationwide system by 2016.15 Some governments in the 
pilot areas will implement a pure cap-and-trade scheme, meaning they will launch an absolute 
cap. Other areas’ governments will opt for efficiency-based or project trading schemes due to 
their opposition to an absolute cap (Wu 2011). Chinese trading is quite different from the EU 
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ETS or the US sulphur trading regime. In fact, since the central government allows each member 
province or city to design its own trading regime, they all have their own plans and systems. For 
instance, in the case of Beijing, all firms with average annual carbon emissions of 10 000 tonnes 
and up are obliged to join the trading programme (roughly 600 firms) (China Daily 2012). The 
remaining firms can join on a voluntary basis. The cap is not an absolute carbon emissions cap, 
but a carbon intensity target of 17 per cent, which is the 12th Five-Year Plan target for Beijing. 
The quotas are distributed through grandfathering, depending on firms’ historical emissions, 
technology and the city’s industrial structure. Since trading prices may be quite volatile, the 
government may set a price floor if the trading price is too low or may provide more quotas via 
auctioning if the price is too high. The absence of an absolute cap, and the uncertainty in the 
economy, give rise to doubts as to the functioning of the pilots, but they leave room for trial and 
error adjustments. Unlike Beijing, which covers all the energy-intensive sectors, Guangdong 
plans to start with electricity, building materials and the chemical sector and expects to 
implement trading in 2014 (Lunsford and Loh 2012). As Guangdong’s 12th Five-Year Target is 
19.5 per cent, the provincial government further translates its target into a cap on the level of 
the firm, so that firms can trade to achieve their own target. 
For all pilot cases, it can be said that, since trading is limited to the city or provincial jurisdiction, 
the trading market is potentially very thin, meaning that transaction costs may be quite high. In 
the case of Beijing, only 600 firms are included and in the case of Guangdong, only three sectors 
are allowed for trading purposes, with the result that the trading volume might be too low to 
ensure efficient trading. 
4 |  Policy Choice for China 
4.1 A Chinese Cap or a Carbon Tax? 
In the previous sections we discussed the theoretical debate over the cap-and-trade and carbon 
tax and we reviewed the current experiences of China with regard to climate policy, 
environmental taxation and emissions trading. In this section, we apply these discussions to the 
Chinese perspective. 
Firstly, from the perspective of administrative efficiency, a carbon tax clearly has the edge on 
allowance trading. According to Ye and Wang (2009), a carbon tax would be relatively easy to 
implement as the tax can be collected indirectly based on the carbon content of the fuel. In this 
way, the tax could be set up by tax authorities, even without the technical support of the 
environmental department. Moreover, Ye and Wang (2009) see no major departmental 
obstacles. On the other hand, emissions trading in China requires a prodigious administrative 
framework and a transparent and accurate carbon accounting system. Notwithstanding the 
initial preparations for emissions trading described in the previous section, a sound emissions 
trading market in China is still in its infancy (Han et al. 2012). The same can be said for the pilot 
projects that have been launched recently. One field that needs solidification is the legal 
framework, particularly in the area of enforcement (Cheng and Zhang 2011). According to Han 
et al. (2012), there is a lack of reliable emissions data,16 and setting emissions caps17 and 
allocating permits would be particularly challenging. Thus, despite the efforts already made, the 
capacity to implement a large-scale carbon trading scheme is not yet present. It will take time 
for both private firms and local governments to learn from the pilot trading market and to bring 
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down the transaction costs of any new system and shift the trading market from a thin market 
to a thick market to assure trading efficiencies (Cao 2010a). 
Secondly, as in most countries, political factors are likely to be a crucial factor in the choice 
between taxing and trading. People naturally have an aversion to any tax, as China’s tax burden 
has risen sharply in the past 15 years.18 Moreover, the excessive zeal for economic growth,19 
especially at the local level, is expected to raise opposition to the introduction of a carbon tax 
(Li et al. 2011). China lacks a sound, efficient and transparent budgeting and accounting system 
for public money, which has led to a general distrust and suspicion by citizens and business that 
government would waste any new tax revenues (Xu 2011). The experience of the 2008 fuel tax 
reform, which had less impact than a carbon tax would, has taught that such tax reforms in 
China face a very long and difficult political process before implementation (Wang 2009). 
Surprisingly, a survey cited by the Asian Development bank (2007) reported that 99 per cent of 
the public support ‘collection of environmental taxes’. However Ye and Wang (2009) believe 
that taxpayers will certainly resist the carbon tax. Liang et al. (2007) estimated the impact of 
several carbon tax scenarios for China. They estimate that only a scenario involving total 
exemption for energy-intensive sectors can be expected to be politically feasible. 
As a developing economy, China is resistant to an absolute national emissions cap, as it may 
curb its economic growth (Cooper 2008). According to Wu (2011), China can benefit 
economically from domestic emissions trading, but a lack of political will for pricing carbon has 
hampered progress; moreover, an emissions ceiling reducing over time is just as politically 
unacceptable. However current practices show that the idea of an ETS has gained momentum 
in recent years and now seems the preferred option for the Chinese government, as a new 
carbon tax may lead to more resistance (Wu 2011). Similar to the EU ETS, it is likely that China 
will start from grandfathered allocation, to gradually shift to a combined grandfathered–
auctioned type of allocation. It will be interesting to see how the policy reforms will change 
power divisions within the central government. The Ministry of Finance (MoF) would prefer a 
tax if the revenue is added to the general budget, but the MoF would have a neutral attitude if 
the carbon tax revenue is fully recycled by lowering other taxes. However the NDRC would 
prefer a trading regime, since it is responsible for determining and allocating the caps. Local 
governments would support a trading regime as well, as the (local) pilot trading programme 
currently implemented in China gives them the power to design the trading regime. 
Consequently, local governments can design the policies so that they hinder local economic 
growth as little as possible. Of course, such design power will be lost in the event of a nationwide 
system. 
The third criterion in the instrument choice discussion is effectiveness. Several studies have 
been conducted on the effectiveness of different carbon tax scenarios. All studies agree that 
there is no doubt that a carbon tax would be an effective instrument for Chinese climate 
mitigation policies (Cao 2010b; Cao 2010a; Wang et al. 2009; Liang et al. 2007). An auction-
based cap-and-trade scheme is likely to achieve similar performance in emissions abatement 
since the permit price will send similar price signals. A grandfathered trading regime would 
depend on the cap-setting and the features of the trading market but is likely to yield suboptimal 
results. 
A fourth important element is the impact on the divide between rich and poor in China. The 
Chinese government aims to reduce this gap and is afraid that rising energy prices may 
exacerbate inflation and be unfavourable for the poor (Wu 2011). The distributional impact of 
a carbon tax in China has been calculated by Cao (2010b). She concludes that a carbon tax would 
indeed be regressive, but also that this effect can be fully neutralized by recycling the tax 
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revenues into the economy. In her simulations, the lump-sum recycling scheme reduces the 
regressive nature of the tax more than the option in which other distortionary taxes are 
reduced. The net effect of the tax reform can even be made positive for low-income households, 
which turns it into a progressive measure. This conclusion is supported by Brenner et al. (2006), 
who raise the idea of combining a carbon tax with a ‘sky trust’, a system of carbon charges in 
which the revenues are recycled to the public on a lump-sum basis. According to this study, such 
a tax reform will have a progressive distributional impact. 
A fifth element is the competitiveness impact. Ye and Wang (2009) and Cao (2010a) indicate 
that a carbon tax will affect energy prices, which may reduce industrial international 
competitiveness. Cao (2010a) points out that, if neither instrument is implemented in China, 
China’s exporting industry might be confronted with border taxes in the future,20 which might 
also hurt China’s competitiveness, but without the possibility of recycling the revenues. Wang 
et al. (2011) confirm that a high carbon tax (100 yuan per tonne of carbon) would necessitate 
compensation for industry. However a low rate of 10 yuan could be implemented immediately 
as a first step with hardly any competitiveness impact for any sector expected. Similarly, for the 
domestic trading scheme, cross-region competitiveness may arise as well, especially between 
trading regions and non-trading regions. However, with the pilot period, this may be a small 
issue and will be reduced in the long term when the trading regime expands to the whole 
country. A domestic carbon tax with the same tax rate across the country can avoid such risks, 
unless certain sectors are exempt or receive preferential tax rates. 
A sixth point of attention is compatibility with other existing policies. A carbon tax may interfere 
with the resource tax and the consumption tax (fuel tax). In order to avoid double taxation, a 
serious coordination effort will be required to align the new instrument and make it 
complementary to the existing measures. The same requirement can be formulated for a 
tradable permit scheme, which will also need coordination with existing environmental policy 
measures, such as the existing (unsuccessful) sulphur trading programmes.21 
A seventh element is the aforementioned trade-off between effectiveness and political 
feasibility. If the Chinese government decides to implement a comprehensive emissions trading 
scheme, free allocation of permits should be strongly advised against in order to avoid an 
erosion of effectiveness. However given China’s experiences with difficult and obstructed policy 
processes such as the energy tax (Wang 2009), the fuel tax reform (Bachus and Cao 2011) and 
the SO2-emissions trading policy process (Yang and Schreifels 2003), the government’s emphasis 
on a step-by-step approach and the use of pilot projects (Wang et al. 2011), it is not very likely 
that in a first phase such an ETS will have a large share of auctioned permits. In addition, it is 
likely that China’s ETS, if adopted, will allow for additional emissions growth, just less than in 
the business-as-usual scenario (Wu 2011). This decision to allocate free licences will be 
detrimental for carbon emissions reductions, but may – as a way of compromise – at least 
generate enough political support for this first step towards the pricing of carbon emissions in 
China. 
The eighth and final difference between cap-and-trading and taxes in China lies in their impact 
on technology innovation and diffusion. However due to the lack of empirical studies of the 
impact of the two instruments on R&D and technology innovation and diffusion in China, it is 
hard to tell which instrument will give more incentives. 
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4.2 Recommendations for the Optimal Design of a Cap or a Carbon Tax in China 
Regardless of whether emissions trading or a carbon tax (or both) is chosen, the design of the 
system will be crucial for its chances of success. In this subsection, we put forward a number of 
recommendations for designing a carbon tax or a tradable permit system. 
In the case of a carbon tax it is important to gradually increase the tax rate over time. This avoids 
the negative shock effects of a too drastic new tax and the petering out of abatement efforts 
after a certain time. Since actively raising tax rates on a regular basis is likely to bring about 
problems with public acceptance, the tax levels should be announced before the start of the 
programme. Additionally, an automatic link with inflation is advised. The tax reform should be 
combined with a comprehensive communication campaign explaining the reasons for the 
reform and transparently reporting on the (financial) impact on all groups of citizens and 
companies in China. The tax base can be the carbon content of fuels, so exact emission 
measurement is not required. 
The most important recommendation for tradable emissions rights is to maximize the amount 
of paid allocation of allowances. Auctioned allowances increase effectiveness and open the door 
for revenue recycling, which offers a solution to any undesired incidental impacts of the 
programme, such as hurting low-income groups and competitiveness issues. Fan et al. (2011) 
recommend small, frequent auctions to limit the market power of large bidders. Next, a lot of 
attention should be given to the design of the trading system, much more so than for a carbon 
tax. Although in the pilot programme different cities and provinces have designed different 
trading regimes, in the actual implementation the central government will need to implement 
only one trading regime and allow firms to trade across city or province borders. Last but not 
least, China should get its house in order regarding the reliability of emissions data before 
considering a nationwide cap-and-trade system. 
The last group of recommendations is valid for both instruments. Firstly, whichever instrument 
is chosen, the price put on carbon should be high enough in order to have a significant effect on 
investment and consumption decisions. Secondly, the revenues from the carbon tax or the 
auctioned permits should be recycled as much as possible into the economy, thus avoiding or 
at least mitigating to a large extent any undesired regressive or negative competitiveness 
impacts and simultaneously increasing public support for the reform. Thirdly, exemptions or 
rebates for individual sectors should be barred or at least kept to a minimum as this leads to 
suboptimal social welfare. Fourthly, instead of focusing too much on the upsides and downsides 
of any single policy instrument, it is better to abandon this exclusiveness approach and strive 
for a policy mix. If well-coordinated, it is feasible to combine a tax with an ETS, regulation, 
subsidy removal, voluntary approaches and other options. Indeed, implementing a carbon tax 
in China in the short run, and later on complementing it with an ETS that could gradually become 
the dominant carbon pricing instrument, is probably the most suitable solution (Fan et al. 2011). 
Alternatively, both instruments can be applied to different sectors; for instance, cap-and-trade 
could be used for the currently already monitored 10 000 energy-intensive firms, supplemented 
with the highly-regulated sectors, such as electricity, iron and steel and the cement industry. 
The other sectors and medium or small-scale firms can be regulated with a carbon tax. Such a 
‘hybrid system’ (see above) combines the advantages of both instruments and could be an 
option worthy of consideration in the case of China. 
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5 |  Conclusions and recommendations 
Taking into account all the pros and cons of a tax and an ETS, the conclusion as to the optimal 
climate change mitigation instrument for China is not entirely straightforward. However an 
emissions trading scheme will only be able to achieve its theoretical potential if the critical 
conditions of a sound administration, reliable emissions data and a well- functioning market are 
achieved. This is regarded to be highly unlikely in the short term. Therefore, a carbon tax may 
be the most feasible option, at least from an administration and implementation point of view 
(Cao 2010a; Fan et al. 2011). In the longer term, a cap-and-trade system can replace the carbon 
tax or supplement it. A hybrid system combines the advantages of both instruments, but the 
increased complexity may jeopardize implementation. Regardless of which instrument is more 
effective, efficient or administratively feasible, in practice political considerations will probably 
end up being the decisive factor. Local and central government institutions’ power and other 
policy priorities, such as safeguarding economic growth and avoiding negative distributional 
impacts, are likely to play a larger role in practice than effectiveness or efficiency. In our view, 
choosing which one of the two instruments is most appropriate is not the main challenge for 
China in the near future. The principal challenge may well be simply reaching a decision to 
implement at least one ambitious, sound and credible climate policy instrument. China’s 
domestic climate mitigation policy may well be the decisive factor determining whether global 
climate efforts will reach a turning point or continue to decline in the years to come. 
6 |  Notes 
1. For tradable permits this is only the case if the allowances are not provided for free but allocated 
against payment (for example auctioned).  
2. Again, this theoretical equivalence only stands in the case of paid allocation of permits (by auction 
or other). If the allowances are (partially) granted for free (‘grandfathered’), emissions trading is less 
efficient than a tax in any case (Parry 2003).  
3. Assuming both the marginal cost and the marginal benefit curves are linear functions, following Adar 
and Griffin (1976).  
4. However it is not hard to imagine that the same can be said for a carbon tax. For example, Ireland 
decided to impose a ‘pure’ carbon tax (without revenue recycling) as part of its crucial fiscal 
consolidation package in 2009–2010 (Bergin et al. 2010). 
5. For example the EU Emissions Trading Scheme, the Kyoto mechanism and the New Zealand ETS. One 
counterexample is the Australian carbon tax, which was introduced after a bumpy, multiple-year 
political process (Clarke and Waschik 2012). 
6. Before the ETS was adopted, a Europe-wide carbon tax had been put on the agenda by the European 
Commission as early as 1991. See, among others, Wettestad (2005), Ellerman et al. (2010) and 
Skjærseth and Wettestad (2008). The latter states that ‘the tax proposal led to some of the most 
ferocious lobby activity ever seen in Brussels’ (2008: 4). As a result of this lobbying and the unanimity 
rule, the idea of a common carbon tax was abandoned in 1994.  
7. For reasons of susceptibility to manipulation and barriers to new entrants (Hepburn 2006). The 
optimal design for an efficient ETS system is a complex matter (Woerdman and Weishaar 2010), on 
which an extensive body of literature has been published which goes beyond the scope of this 
chapter.  
8. The price of the (phase I) European allowances even fell to zero for about one year in 2007, caused 
by the transition from the first to the second trading period, among other reasons (Ekins 2009).  
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9. According to Qi (2011), the actual energy intensity reduction achieved at the end of 2010 was 19.06 
per cent. 
10. The savings mentioned are not absolute reductions, but reductions from a calculated business- as- 
usual baseline. 
11. By the end of 2015 compared to end of 2010 levels. 
12. It is the first time that China has proposed an absolute energy and coal target.  
13. Therefore, this reform is also called the ‘fee-to-tax reform’.  
14. The provinces of Guangdong and Hubei and the cities of Beijing, Shanghai, Tianjin, Chongqing and 
Shenzhen.  
15. According to Wu (2011), this is a very ambitious goal, given the number of issues that can be expected 
to have limited support: (a) opposition from within government; (b) China’s energy consumption and 
prices; (c) expected inflation and potential regressive impact; (d) uncertainty with regard to intensity 
targets; and (e) lack of experience by industry in measuring and managing emissions.  
16. This observation is confirmed by the recently published article by Guan et al. (2012) in Nature Climate 
Change, in which the authors argue that China’s official national carbon emissions and the combined 
total reported by all provinces differ by 1.4 gigatonnes, which is approximately the amount of the 
fourth-largest emitter in the world, Japan.  
17. Including converting the existing carbon intensity targets into an absolute cap. 
18. Sun (2012) calculated that the Chinese macro tax burden (that is, including social insurance revenue) 
has risen from 11.6 per cent of GDP in 1995 to 22.7 per cent in 2010. 
19. Especially at the local level. 
20. The recent inclusion of aviation in the EU ETS and the subsequent levy for international air carriers 
can be regarded as the first border tax adjustment. 
21. Sulphur trading is still operating on a local level in seven areas in China (Petherick 2012). Chongqing 
seems to have the best market; the other areas suffer from low trading volumes.  
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1 |  Introduction26 
Pigou (1920, 1960) argued that taxes should be levied to internalize negative externalities, such 
as pollution. After Pigou, a whole body of literature emerged, agreeing that taxation is an 
effective and efficient instrument to reach environmental objectives, and that environmental 
taxation currently is underused in the combat against environmental problems. Therefore, both 
academics (e.g. Avi-Yonah and Uhlmann, 2009; Baumol, 1972; Ekins, 2011) and international 
agencies such as the European Environment Agency, the European Commission and the OECD 
also consistently urge lagging member states to step up their use of environmental taxation.
27
 
A first advantage of environmental taxation is obviously an improvement of the state of the 
environment (OECD, 2006). Secondly, the additional government revenue creates room for 
reducing other, more distortionary, taxes, such as labour taxes or corporate income taxes (Speck 
and Datta, 2009). Recycling tax revenues that way may reduce negative competitiveness and 
distributional impacts (Ekins and Speck, 1999; Metcalf, 1998; Parry, 1995), and would make the 
reform more politically acceptable (Dresner et al., 2006). Such a ‘green tax reform’ aims at 
realising a so-called ‘double dividend’, combining an improvement of the state of the 
environment and a reduction of unemployment.
28 
Thirdly, the revenues from environmental 
taxation offer chances for fiscal consolidation (e.g. OECD, 2010b). Speck and Gee (2011) call 
environmental tax reforms “a valuable measure for dealing both with short term budgetary 
imbalances and spurring the transition towards a green economy”. Ireland gave environmentally 
related taxes a central place in the budgetary reforms in 2010, which may lift the country to the 
level of the frontrunners in the EU in terms of greening of the tax system (Andersen, 2010). 
Finally, like any other tax, environmentally related taxes offer the politically attractive option of 
earmarking, in which case the revenues are used for a specific (environmental or non-
environmental) goal: for instance, water pollution charges used for water purification purposes 
(Marsiliani and Renstrom, 2000). Theoretically, earmarking revenues for other environmental 
investments and expenditures is not an efficient use (Brett and Keen, 2000; Laskowska and 
Scrimgeour, 2002). In practice, however, it may increase public and (hence) political support as 
public opinion tends to prefer earmarking to revenue recycling (Oates, 1995; OECD, 2001). 
Based on the above theoretical arguments, the call for increasing the use of environmental 
taxation – or for ‘greening national tax systems’ – to combat environmental externalities is 
 
26  This paper builds on earlier work that was published in a book chapter: Bachus (2012). 
27  For example, in the Roadmap for a Resource Efficient Europe (2011), in the Annual Growth Survey for 2011 and in 
the European Council Conclusions from March 2011 (European Commission, 2011). For the case of Belgium, a 
country with a weak tradition in environmental taxation, the OECD has explicitly stated that recommendation as 
early as in its 1998 Environmental Performance Review on the country (OECD, 1998). It has repeated this plea in 
its 2007 Environmental Performance Review on Belgium (OECD, 2007). The European Commission, through the 
European Semester recommendations, has been recommending Belgium to implement a green tax shift for six 
consecutive years now, from 2011 to 2016. 
28  Some authors support the hypothesis that the (strong) double dividend can be achieved (Pierce, 1991), while other 
scholars have rejected it (Bovenberg and de Mooij, 1994) or claim it strongly depends on the structure of the 
economy (Bento and Jacobsen, 2007; Schöb, 2003). 
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justified. However, it creates the need for a framework to assess countries’ progress made 
towards the goal of greening the tax system in practice. Indicators for the greening of a tax 
system can fill in that need, especially because they fit in the trend towards more national 
reporting on indicators for environmental quality.
29
 
Up to now, the greening of a tax system is predominantly measured using two indicators: the 
revenues from environmentally related taxes as a percentage of GDP, and the revenues from 
environmentally related taxes as a percentage of the total tax revenues. Both revenue-based 
indicators have merits but also a number of drawbacks. The aim of this paper is to evaluate that 
prevailing type of indicator along with three alternative types of indicators measuring the 
greening of a tax system: single tax rates, aggregate tax-rate based indicators and the implicit 
tax rate on energy. We develop an evaluation framework, introducing two principal evaluation 
criteria: content validity and comprehensiveness (infra), and four statistical criteria: data 
availability, comparison over time, international comparability and ease of aggregation. In that 
evaluation, the aggregate tax-rate based indicator needs additional analysis, since it requires 
adequate application of index number theory, more specifically to address the issue of 
weighting. We explore if a Lowe or a Laspeyres index is the best fit for evaluating the greening 
of a tax system. After testing the theoretical findings on the index numbers, we compare the 
four types of indicators. Finally, conclusions are drawn with regard to the strengths and 
weaknesses of the four types of indicators, and recommendations are made for further research. 
2 |  Conceptual framework 
Except for the theory of Pigouvian taxation, there is no clear theoretical framework behind the 
call for ‘more’ environmental taxation. Two terms are often used in these discussions: the 
greening of the tax system and environmental tax reform (ETR).
30 The latter term is usually 
defined as “a reform of the national tax system where there is a shift of the burden of taxation 
from conventional taxes, for example on labour, to environmentally damaging activities, such as 
resource use or pollution” (European Environment Agency, 2005). The term ‘greening of a tax 
system’ is used less frequently. We define it as “an increasing emphasis on the environment in 
the tax system”. To operationalize that theoretical concept, we distinguish three ways of 
greening the tax system: an introduction of new environmentally related taxes (e.g. a newly 
introduced carbon tax), an increase in the tax rates of existing environmentally related taxes 
(e.g. increasing fuel tax rates), and an increased use of environmentally relevant clauses in the 
design of non-environmentally related taxes.
31
   
 
29  A number of environmental taxation indicators are already part of the European Environmental Accounts 
(Eurostat, 2010). 
30  Variations on this last term are ecological tax reform, green tax reform and environmental fiscal reform. The term 
‘fiscal’ usually adds subsidies to the research scope. 
31  This means including environmental factors such as energy saving potential (e.g. for real estate taxes) or carbon 
emissions (e.g. for car taxes) in the calculation. That third way of greening will be further left outside of the scope 
of this article. 
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It should be noted that the definition of the term ‘environmentally related taxes’ as put forward 
by the OECD, quickly implemented by European Commission and Eurostat (2001)
32 and followed 
by nearly all authors ever since, holds the choice for a unilateral focus on the tax base, and not 
on the goals of the policy instrument. As a result, taxes with an environmentally relevant tax 
base but no environmental goal
33
 are included in the definition.  
Bruvoll (2009) calls for a strict distinction between environmental taxation, which are only 
Pigouvian taxes with an environmental goal, and environmentally related taxes, a term which 
refers to the taxes with an environmentally relevant tax base. She calculated the tax revenues 
for both groups of taxes for Norway and found that the environmental taxation (in the strict 
sense) revenues were only one fifth of the revenues using the tax base-definition. Even if we 
consider that reflection as a useful remark, it is beyond the scope of this paper to further 
examine that thesis. As a result, the study in this paper concerns the use of environmentally 
related taxes by countries, which is not per se a good measure of the degree to which a country 
uses taxation as an instrument to achieve environmental policy goals. 
3 |  Evaluation framework 
Indicators are used “to simplify information that can help to reveal complex phenomena” 
(EEA, 2013). Indicators can be either theory-driven or data-driven. The latter attaches great 
importance to data availability
34 when developing and selecting indicators, whereas the 
former is primarily concerned with the validity of the indicator (Niemeijer and de Groot, 2008). 
Content validity refers to the degree to which the indicator chosen actually measures the 
theoretical concept that it claims to measure (Billiet and Waege, 2003). In that approach, data 
availability is merely a side condition (out of many). 
In this paper, we propose a combined approach. On the one hand, we will use content validity 
as the central evaluation criterion and treat it as a criterion for exclusion. Whether data or 
theory driven, if there is a gap between the theoretical concept and what the indicator 
measures, reliable conclusions are not within reach. However, we also support the view of 
Turnhout et al. (2007), who claim that discussions and studies on indicators often neglect the 
importance of the political context. Indicators with high content validity but poor practical, 
statistical and communication potential, are likely to suffer from low utilization. That 
observation is supported by the fact that the Statistical Guide on Environmental Taxes 
(European Commission and Eurostat, 2001) puts special emphasis on the policy-relevant 
criteria international comparability and data availability. 
Based on those arguments, we select two evaluation criteria in the ‘validity’ group, which is 
the core group, and four indicators in the ‘utilization’ group, referring to the practical usability 
for the users of the indicators, which are mainly international and national policy and 
 
32  This definition was agreed for reasons of comparability and data availability. Remark that the OECD has an even 
longer history referring to the polluter pays principle, a concept that also makes the link with the internalization 
issue. 
33  Transport fuel taxes are an example of an environmentally related tax with (in most cases) no explicit 
environmental objective. 
34  And to statistical utilization, comparability over time or place and communication potential. 
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statistical institutes. We call the latter group ‘statistical criteria’. Table 2 summarizes our 
evaluation framework.  
Table 2. An evaluation framework consisting of two core criteria and four statistical criteria 
 
Core criteria (validity group) 
Content validity 
Comprehensiveness 
 
 
Statistical criteria (utilization group) 
Data availability 
Suitability for international comparison 
Suitability for comparison over time 
Feasibility of aggregation 
Core criteria: 
1. Content validity: the indicator should actually measure the phenomenon that it claims to 
measure (Billiet and Waege, 2003); 
2. Comprehensiveness: coverage of exemptions, tax cuts and differentiated tax rates: many tax 
designs include exceptions, providing exemptions or tax reductions for part of the target 
group. A risk of erosion of the environmental tax impact then appears (Barde, 1997), which 
should be incorporated in the conclusions on the greening of a tax system. 
Although we will not quantify the difference, we will consider content validity as more important 
than comprehensiveness.  
Statistical criteria: 
1. Data availability: including ease of collection, timing of the release of the data, and link with 
existing reporting or data gathering frameworks.  
2. Suitability for international comparison: governments favour comparative statistics, 
enabling them to ‘benchmark’ themselves against neighbouring and other countries 
(Steiner-Khamsi, 2009). 
3. Suitability for comparison over time: possibility to create time series with the data. 
4. Feasibility of aggregation: governments are more interested in indicators on the whole 
national tax system than on individual taxes. 
Considering the raison d’être of indicators (see section 4), one could argue that 
‘communicability’ is a missing criterion in this list. While we acknowledge the importance of 
communicability, we choose not to take it into this evaluation framework, because elements of 
communicability are already present in the second, third and fourth statistical criteria, which 
entails the risk of overlap. 
4 |  The four types of indicators 
As in other policy fields, policy makers in the environmental field make use of indicators for both 
framing a policy problem and designing adequate policies (KEI, 2005). They facilitate 
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understanding of complex societal problems and make it easier for policy makers to 
communicate about them. 
Indicators for environmentally related taxation are examined in three divergent bodies of 
literature. First, they are studied in the field of environmental or sustainability indicators. Since 
the adoption of Agenda 21, the international action programme for sustainable development in 
1992, the number of sustainability indicators programmes has exploded (Krank et al., 2010). 
Second, they are one category studied in the field of indicators on taxation (e.g. European 
Commission and Eurostat, 2013). However, publications only rarely use the combined insights 
of the environmental indicators and taxation indicators fields.35 The third study field, 
environmental accounting, does integrate economic and environmental indicators.36 The aim of 
environmental accounting is to monitor the economic impacts on the environment and the 
environmental impacts on the economy (Havinga, 2011). Starting from 2013, EU member states 
are required to report on the indicator ‘Environmental Taxation by Economic Activity’,37 which 
is mainly used for intersectoral comparison within one country, but may also be useful for 
international comparisons. 
In this section, we elaborate four types of indicators for the greening of a tax system: revenue-
based indicators, single tax rates, aggregate tax-rate based indicators and the implicit tax rate 
on energy. We make a theoretical evaluation of the four types of indicators using the six 
evaluation criteria introduced above. Our findings are summarized in a later section (Table 4). 
4.1 Revenue-based indicators 
The ‘greening of a (national) tax system’ is usually measured using two indicators: the revenues 
from environmentally related taxes as a percentage of GDP, and the revenues from 
environmentally related taxes as a percentage of the total tax revenues for a country (European 
Commission and Eurostat, 2011).38 Both indicators are shown in Figure 4. 
 
35  One exception is: European Commission and Eurostat (2001), which is a study on environmental taxes from a 
statistical perspective. 
36 Such as the UN-led System of Environmental-Economic Accounting (SEEA) or the National Accounting Matrix 
including Environmental Accounts (NAMEA). 
37  Regulation 691/2011 on European environmental economic accounts. 
38 The ‘Environmental Taxation by Economic Activity’ mentioned above is another example of a revenue-based 
indicator. 
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Figure 4. Revenues from environmentally related taxes in per cent of GDP and in per cent of total 
taxation, EU-28, for the year 2012 
Source: European Commission and Eurostat (2014). 
Both indicators have the advantage that the required data are gathered by almost all countries 
on a yearly basis, reported to both national parliaments and international institutions such as 
the European Commission, Eurostat and the OECD. Moreover, they are easy to aggregate and 
suitable for international comparison. Another advantage to the revenue data is that they reflect 
exemptions, reductions and differentiated tax rates: if a tax has a high rate but exempts the 
majority of the target groups, the tax will not heavily influence the revenue statistics. 
Nevertheless, revenue-based indicators also have a number of important drawbacks, all of which 
are related to the validity of the operationalization of the greening of the tax system concept. 
An increase in environmental taxation revenues, whether in absolute monetary terms, in per 
cent of GDP or in per cent of total taxation does not necessarily correspond to a greening tax 
system (OECD, 2001). We distinguish four problems with that type of indicators. A first problem 
is that rising revenues can be the result of an increase in the tax base (European Commission 
and Eurostat, 2001; Laskowska and Scrimgeour, 2002), without any change in the design of the 
tax. Conversely, the design of environmentally related taxes can be made more environmentally-
friendly without increasing revenues (OECD, 2010b). The indicator may rise or fall regardless of 
government decisions towards more or less emphasis on environmental considerations in the 
tax system. A second validity problem related to revenue-based indicators is that poorly 
designed environmentally related taxes, for example tax rates that do not reflect the 
environmental damage that they cause, may raise revenues without bringing about the desired 
behaviour change (OECD, 2010b). One example is the fact that diesel is taxed lower than petrol 
in most countries, while it should be vice versa taking into account environmental externalities 
(Mayeres and Proost, 2013). A third validity-related problem is that a country that historically 
has a lot of energy-intensive industry may raise significant revenue from that industry by 
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imposing a very low energy tax. The environmentally related tax revenues may be relatively high, 
while its environmentally related tax rates are low (OECD, 2010b). An often used example for 
that problem is Luxembourg, a country that combines a low level of environmental taxes with 
high concomitant revenues (Sterner and Köhlin, 2003). The explanation is that Luxembourg’s 
low fuel taxes entail fuel tourism from all neighbouring countries, which is lucrative for 
Luxembourg’s tax revenues, but at the same time has triggered criticism from the OECD for 
environmental reasons (OECD, 2010a).
39 As a fourth and final validity issue, the denominators of 
the two prevailing indicators from Fig. 1, GDP and total taxation, may also give misleading 
information (Bruvoll, 2009). GDP and total taxation revenues can rise or fall without any change 
in the environmentally related tax system. For example: most EU-countries have reduced their 
corporate tax rates between 1995 and 2011, by 12.2% on average (European Commission and 
Eurostat, 2012). Ceteris paribus, this means that the indicator environmentally related tax 
revenue as per cent of total taxation, will go up, although there has not been any shift in the 
environmentally related tax system. 
4.2 Single tax rates 
A tax system is a policy instrument which can be changed by tax authorities in many ways. One 
way is a change in the design of taxes; tax rates are a crucial feature of tax design. As a result, 
evolutions in (environmental) tax rates may provide more valid indications for the greening of a 
tax system than tax revenues (Braathen, 2012; OECD, 2001). This is illustrated by the OECDEEA 
database on environmental taxation
40
, in which the OECD and EEA compare the diesel and 
gasoline tax rates internationally (see Figure 5). 
  
 
39  Fuel tourism accounted for 75% of total fuel consumption in Luxembourg in 2007 (OECD, 2010a, 111). 
40  http://www2.oecd.org/ecoinst/queries/, accessed April, 5, 2015.  
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Figure 5. Tax rates for unleaded petrol and diesel fuel, EU-27, situation as at 1 January 2015 (EUR/1000 
l) (VAT excluded) 
Source: European Commission (2015). 
The main advantage of single tax rates is the higher content validity for detecting greening of a 
tax system. However, it should be said that it is far from perfect. At least three validity issues 
need to be mentioned. First and foremost is the inherent weakness of this type of indicator: it 
gives an indication based on just one tax base, which makes it unsuitable for general conclusions 
about the greening of the national tax system. Second, very few environmentally relevant 
products or activities are taxed in a more or less uniform way throughout the EU or in the world, 
and even less have good and reliable data available. Consequently, international comparability 
may be a problem. Transport fuel taxes are possibly the only environmentally related taxes 
suitable for international comparison. And third, any differentiation in the tax rates, for 
environmental or other reasons, disturbs the comparability between countries. Even for the 
‘ideal’ tax-rate based indicator, transport fuel taxes, and even for the EU member states that 
have to comply with the minimum rates and the design rules of the Energy Taxation Directive,41 
most member states apply differential rates, mainly related to the octane and sulphur levels of 
the fuels. Countries implementing a lower level for a more environmentally-friendly type of the 
fuel make their tax system more environmentally-adjusted but may be ranked lower in Figure 4 
indicator as a result. 
4.3 Aggregate tax-rate based indicators 
In order to overcome the validity and aggregation weaknesses of the revenue-based indicators 
and single tax rates, we developed a new type of indicator.42 A tax-rate based indicator is 
interesting from a validity point of view as tax rates give more information on the greening 
concept than revenues do (Braathen, 2012; OECD, 2001). Moreover, aggregation of such 
 
41  Council Directive 2003/96/EC, in effect since 1 January 2004. 
42  Building further on Bachus et al. (2006) and Bachus (2012). 
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indicators using a common denominator opens the door for indicators measuring the greening 
of a tax system on a macro-level, and for international comparison. 
The aggregate tax-rate based indicators we propose take the shape of index numbers and they 
require weighting of components of the aggregated indicator. Those two elements are further 
elaborated in this section. We will further examine if a CPI-type of indicator (infra) can be used 
for our analysis. Two types of weighting methods will be explored, a Lowe and a Laspeyres index. 
Finally, the theoretical insights will be tested empirically using real data on tax rates and tax 
revenues for Flanders. With this analysis we aim to examine whether the choice of an index 
number type matters when analysing the greening of a tax system. 
4.3.1 Index numbers 
A composite or aggregate index number ‘aggregates detailed information on prices and 
quantities into scalar measures of price and quantity levels or their growth’ (Diewert, 2008). The 
Consumer Price Index (CPI; often used for measuring inflation43 (ILO et al., 2004)) is the best-
known example of a composite index number. The aggregation is done by taking the (weighted 
or unweighted44) mean of the tax rates. The simplest indexes use equal weights and arithmetic 
means (‘Dutot index’) or equal weights and geometric means (‘Jevons index’) (Silver and Heravi, 
2007). However, a weighted index number clearly is to be preferred over an unweighted one, as 
it avoids that relatively unimportant items get the same weight in the index number as 
important items (ILO et al., 2004). 
4.3.2 Weighting 
In the process of gradual development and improvement of index number theory, it was Keynes 
(1930) who pointed out that price movements should be weighted by their economic 
importance. Similarly, if tax rates are weighted according to their importance, content validity 
grows, and the aggregated indicators will be more valid indicators for the greening of a tax 
system. 
Weights (or ‘importance’ as we called it in the previous paragraph) can be chosen taking into 
account the specificities of the tax category. For example, for the tax on heating oil, the share of 
that type of oil in the energy mix can be selected as the applicable weight of that tax rate in the 
global tax-rate based index (Bachus and Defloor, 2011). Another possible weight can be the 
government revenues that are generated by the tax. That approach shows strong similarities 
with the Consumer Price Index (CPI) approach, which uses consumer expenditures to measure 
price evolutions. The CPI approach is suitable for following tax rate evolutions, using government 
expenditures as weights, since tax rate and price evolutions can be studied in a similar way. The 
CPI uses a basket of, mostly about 500–1000, consumer products. Expenditures are used as 
weights to distinguish between economically more and less important products (ILO et al., 
2004). 
 
43  Although the CPI does not include producer prices, which makes it an incomplete measure for inflation (ILO et al., 
2004). 
44  Adding no weights actually means using equal weights. 
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The CPI weighting approach can be followed for environmentally related tax rates. We will use 
government revenues45 as the weight factor distinguishing between important and unimportant 
taxes. The tax rate on petrol and diesel will then be given a much higher weight than, for 
example, a tax on plastic bags, as the latter raises very low government revenues. In that 
approach, energy taxes will heavily influence the global tax-rate based indicator, which is 
appropriate since they represent the majority of the environmentally related tax revenues: 75% 
in the EU (European Commission and Eurostat, 2014). 
4.3.3 Laspeyres and Lowe indexes 
Index number theory has a vast body of literature which has developed over the last two 
hundred years. In our analysis, we take two types of indexes and explore their use as indicators 
for the greening of the tax system. Both index numbers use the government revenues of the 
environmentally related tax as weight factors, but as it takes some time before the details of the 
tax revenues are published, we need to explore different approaches. The first one is the Lowe 
index (PLO), which is actually the type that is used in most CPIs. A Lowe index can be weighted by 
any set of quantities (ILO et al., 2004), which makes it possible to combine the tax rates of the 
current year with the government revenues of two or more years ago. The Laspeyres index (PL) 
is less flexible, since only the tax revenues of the price reference year can be used as weights 
(Hill, 2008).46 For example, taking one environmentally related tax, for which we want to 
compare the 2013 (p2013) with the 2012 (p2012) tax rates,47 knowing that the revenue for the tax 
in 2012 was p2012*q2012, p2013 should be divided by p2012 and multiplied by the weight, which is the 
share of the 2012 revenue for that tax in 2012, or p2012*q2012, divided by the total 
environmentally related tax revenue for 2012. The summation of these terms for all the 
environmentally related tax rates in the index leads to the aggregate Laspeyres index. The 
formulas of both indicators are:  
 
 
 
Lowe: 
 
 
 
 
Laspeyres: 
 
The advantage of the Laspeyres index number is that the tax rate level of a certain year is 
weighted by the revenues for that same tax in the price reference year, which makes it the most 
accurate measure of the importance of a certain tax in a certain year. However, in practice, it is 
mostly not possible to construct the index for the current year, at least not as long as the 
previous year’s detailed revenue statistics have not been published. This is a significant 
downside considering the fact that this kind of index numbers are primarily a policy tool, and 
politicians are looking for the most recent and updated information for preparing their decisions. 
 
45  Government revenues are the equivalent of the consumer expenditures in the CPI; moreover, they are easier to 
measure, as government has to report about its revenues and expenditures in great detail, while consumer 
expenditures are a diffuse source of information, which data have to be gathered by using surveys. 
46 The Laspeyres index is one special case of the (more general) Lowe index. 
47 This means that 2012 is the price reference year. 
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That is why the Lowe index comes in as a possible replacement, using the revenue data from the 
year n−2 as weight factors.48 Therefore, yielding slightly on content validity by using a Lowe index 
may be justified for policy or statistical reasons. The Lowe index can be made available for policy 
makers instantaneously, for instance, in January 2016 for reflecting the situation of January 
2016. Below, an empirical study is carried out to test the hypothesis that the difference between 
the two types of index numbers will be limited if used for measuring the greening of a tax system. 
If that hypothesis is confirmed, the Lowe index can be used for our type of analysis. If the 
hypothesis is rejected, policy makers should only use the Laspeyres index for measuring the 
greening of the tax system. 
4.3.4 Chained Laspeyres and chained Lowe 
The above described Laspeyres and Lowe indexes are fixed base indexes, which means the 
weights, once chosen, are not updated each year. That is the way most countries calculate their 
CPIs: a basket of products is selected and will last for about seven years, during which period the 
same basket (and the same expenditure data) is used as weights. After that period, a large 
update takes place, discarding certain products and adding others. This type of indicator 
becomes progressively out of date, especially when examining long time series, like in the 
empirical example we will show in the next paragraph, spanning the period from 1993 until 
2011. The solution to that problem is to work with chained Laspeyres and Lowe indexes. 
Whereas a fixed base index calculates only one index covering, for example, the whole period 
1993–2011, a chained index typically consists of the computation of (in this case) 18 subsequent 
indexes. These 18 outcomes are then multiplied with each other to get the chained index (Balk, 
2010). Although the spread between the different indexes depends on different factors such as 
the price and quantity fluctuations, according to Hill (2008), the quantity reference period 
should be updated as frequently as possible, or, in other words, the indexes need to be chained. 
In the next paragraph we will apply these theoretical and methodological insights to 
environmentally related taxes in an empirical case study. 
4.3.5 Empirical testing: creating chained Lowe and Laspeyres indexes for Flemish environmentally 
related taxes 
As shown by ILO et al. (2004), the choice of an index number may strongly influence the 
conclusions regarding the evolution of prices or tax rates. Even between two types of indexes as 
closely related as the two we study, the conclusion can be very different. Differences between 
the two indexes increase with the variance of the price relatives and with the amount of 
fluctuation in the prices or tax rates. Moreover, the choice between a chained and a fixed base 
index can also entail a spread between the results. 
For that reason, we take both types of indicators, Laspeyres and Lowe,49 both fixed base and 
chained, in our empirical analysis. We construct a new CPI-like type of index number, containing 
eight environmentally related tax rates applied in the Flemish region of Belgium.50 The main 
 
48 Or even from an earlier year if necessary; any year’s revenues can be used as weights in case of a Lowe index. 
49  We remind our earlier statement that a Laspeyres index is in fact one particular case of a Lowe index. 
50  Flanders is the most populated subnational region in Belgium, with around six million inhabitants, out of eleven 
million in Belgium. 
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objective of this exercise is to test the hypothesis mentioned above, stating that, as fluctuations 
in environmentally related tax rates are rather smooth, the spread between different indexes 
should be limited. Only if that hypothesis is rejected, the Lowe index is a fully-fledged alternative 
for the Laspeyres index when using composite tax-rate based indicators for measuring the 
greening of a tax system. 
Our test case is based on real data on a basket of eight environmentally related taxes applicable 
in the Flemish region,51 and spans the period 1993–2012.52 We selected the eight taxes based on 
two criteria. The most important selection criterion was that the selected taxes should raise 
important government revenues: the eight taxes together accounted for about 90% of the total 
environmentally related tax revenues allocated to Flanders. The second selection criterion was 
the presence of at least one tax of each major group of environmentally related taxes: energy 
taxes, transport taxes and other taxes.53 We selected the following taxes: 
 
1. Excise tax on diesel as a motor fuel; 
2. Excise tax on unleaded petrol (95 RON); 
3. Elia tax: supplementary tax on electricity consumption;
54
 
4. Yearly traffic tax; 
5. Car registration tax; 
6. Eurosticker: lump-sum yearly tax for heavy trucks; 
7. Drinks packaging levy; 
8. Flemish waste water levy.
55
 
Three of these eight (1, 2 and 7) are federal taxes; the five remaining taxes are the competence 
of the subnational regions. Four taxes (1, 2, 4 and 8) were already in place in the base year 1993; 
the other four were introduced more recently. Only one tax (3) was abolished before 2012; the 
others were still in force at the end of 2012. Taxes 1 and 2 raised the highest revenue by far: 
together they accounted for 67% of the total revenue of the eight taxes in 1993 and for 62% in 
2010. 
The indexes we computed go back to quantity data that precede 1993: the Lowe index we 
constructed uses, for both the chained and the fixed base version, data going back to one year 
before the base year, so as far as 1992. Table 3 shows the four calculated indexes for the basket 
of eight Flemish environmentally related taxes.  
  
 
51  Three of these eight are Belgian federal taxes; the five remaining taxes are the competence of the Flemish region. 
52  The year 1993 was chosen as the base year for reasons of data availability. 
53   In our 2011 study on the greening of the Flemish tax system (Bachus and Defloor, 2011), we changed this typology 
somewhat, using four groups: (1) energy taxes (2) transport taxes (3) federal ecotaxes and (4) Flemish 
environmental levies. In this article, we will stick to that typology. 
54   Adopted to compensate Flemish municipality for their losses resulting from the liberalization of the energy 
markets. 
55  Until 2005, this levy was the Flemish environmental levy with the highest revenues in this category. However, 
subsequent reforms have gradually transformed this levy into a tax-deductible fee. As a result, its revenues have 
been declining since 2005. 
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Table 3. Four types of indexes measuring the greening of the Flemish tax system using aggregate tax-
rate based indicators, 1993-2011a 
 Fixed base Chained 
 nominal real nominal real 
Laspeyres index 156,8 109,3 160,1 111,4 
Lowe index 158,0 110,0 153,5 107,2 
Source: own calculations based on Bachus and Defloor (2011), Belgian CPI used as deflator. 
a The numbers in this table should be interpreted as follows: all the index numbers started at 
the value of 100 in 1993. By 2011, the (real) Laspeyres index had risen to 109.3 (9.3% increase), 
whereas the Lowe index had risen to 110 (10% increase). 
Our hypothesis is valid, because the difference between the Laspeyres and the Lowe indexes is 
fairly small, especially compared to the example used in the ILO manual (ILO et al., 2004). This 
is not surprising since (1) according to index number theory, the spread between different 
indexes should be small in case of smooth tax rate evolutions (2) the Laspeyres index is one type 
of the more general Lowe index and (3) the Lowe index uses quantity data that is only one year 
earlier than the Laspeyres index. Our conclusion from this empirical test is that the Lowe index 
can indeed be regarded as a valid aggregate tax-rate based indicator for measuring the greening 
of a tax system. We name this new indicator the ‘National Environmental Taxation Index’. 
Our case study approach has one limitation that should be mentioned. Our chained indexes 
computed for Flanders could have been more dynamic, if we had adjusted the tax basket each 
year based on the revenue the taxes raised for that particular year. The result would have been 
that in each year, only existing, revenue-raising taxes would be in the basket. The fact that our 
sample of eight Flemish and Belgian taxes contained four taxes that were not in force yet in the 
base year 1993, may have led to an overestimation of the greening of the tax system, because 
those taxes rise from zero in the base year to a level later on that is obviously higher, which is a 
dramatic rise. 
4.3.6 Assessment of aggregated tax-rate based indicators 
The composite tax-rate based indicator type has a number of appealing features. The most 
important one is that it is based on tax rates, which is a more valid measure for the evolution of 
the tax system than government revenues. Thanks to the aggregation it becomes possible to 
integrate a large number of environmentally related taxes into one indicator, which increases 
the content validity as an indicator for a national tax system. 
However, we see five remaining challenges related to this type of indicator. The first drawback 
is related to validity: different weighting factors can lead to different conclusions on the greening 
of a tax system (Bachus et al., 2006). As Jain and Sandhu (2009) state it “Index numbers are true 
only on the average”. 
A second downside of the aggregated tax rate approach is related to the introduction of new 
taxes. If new taxes are considered to have a zero value in the years before their introduction, 
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the effect of the new introduction on the index is disproportionally high. Conversely, if the new 
tax rate in year n is introduced at the value of the index in year n−1, the newly introduced tax 
rate has no influence at all on the aggregate index. As a middle course, assigning a value between 
the two extremes can be an option, but in any case the value or method chosen will affect the 
final result. In our case study, we did not address this issue of the substitution of taxes in the 
basket by other taxes, as our case was just aimed as an illustration of the use of indexes as tax-
rate based indicators. Future research should elaborate on the issue of substitution of taxes in 
the basket, which is also a delicate and difficult point in index theory in general and CPI 
construction more in particular (see, among others, ILO et al., 2004). 
A third problem is that international comparison, although possible, is an intense exercise which 
requires in-depth knowledge on the studied tax systems beyond the easily accessible statistics. 
Data availability can thus be considered as a fourth complicating factor for the use of aggregate 
tax-rate based indicators. A fifth issue is comprehensiveness. The aggregate tax-rate based 
indexes only take into account ‘standard’ tax rates. However, many tax regimes make abundant 
use of exemptions, tax cuts and special conditions and rates.56 A high tax rate may turn out to 
be less significant if many of the tax payers are exempt from it. Moreover, tax schemes 
increasingly make use of differentiated tax rates, which is also hard to grasp with tax-rate based 
indicators. However, that problem is partially undone if environmentally related taxes revenues 
are used as weight factors. 
4.4 Implicit tax rate on energy (ITE) 
The European Commission and Eurostat (2011) define the implicit tax rate on energy as ‘the ratio 
between total energy tax revenues and final energy consumption’.57 Energy consumption is 
expressed in tonnes of oil-equivalent. Hence, the indicator measures how heavily taxed one 
tonne oil-equivalent of energy consumption is. The indicator is reported for the EU on a yearly 
basis (European Commission and Eurostat, 2014), as is shown in Figure 6. 
 
 
56  By way of illustration: the total government revenue forgone due to tax expenditures in Belgium has mounted up 
to more than 20% of total tax revenues in 2010 (Belgische Kamer van Volksvertegenwoordigers, 2011). 
57 A forerunner of this indicator was the ‘effective tax rate’, which did not refer to energy but to CO2 emissions 
(National Statistical offices in Norway, Sweden and Finland & Denmark, 2003). 
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Figure 6. Implicit tax rate on energy, EU-28 (2012), in EUR per tonnes of oil equivalent, deflated (base 
year 2000) 
Source: European Commission and Eurostat (2014). 
This indicator combines the advantages of the revenue-based indicators (easy aggregation, data 
availability, covering exemptions and comparability) and the tax-rate based index numbers 
(higher content validity). Therefore, the implicit tax rate on energy indicator has high content 
validity, but of course it only measures one of the components of environmentally related 
taxes.58 Unfortunately, ‘the implicit tax rate for environmental taxes overall’ cannot be 
constructed for lack of a common denominator.59 
4.5 Empirical comparison of the four types on indicators 
In this paper we explored four types of indicators for measuring the greening of a tax system. 
The tax-rate based indicator is an index in itself, but the other three types can be converted into 
indexes as well in order to make an empirical comparison possible. Again, we will use data for 
Flanders; the comparison is shown in Figure 7. 
  
 
58 Energy taxes, which represent 75% of total environmentally related tax revenues in the EU (supra). 
59  It is, however, possible to calculate the ‘implicit tax rate of (road) transport’, using the number of vehicle-kilometers 
as the common denominator. This exercise has recently been done for Flanders (Belgium) (Bachus, 2013). 
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The figure illustrates some of the arguments we put forward in the theoretical analysis of the 
indicator types: 
– The tax rate on diesel has a strong influence on the implicit tax rate on energy and on the 
aggregate tax-rate based indicator, in both cases due to the heavy weight of the diesel tax in 
the basket; 
– Tax-rate based indicators, both single and aggregate, have the advantage of being available in 
very recent periods, whereas the revenue-based indicators have a delay due to data 
availability. 
– The revenue-based indicator may overestimate the greening in the periods of rising fuel sales 
2002–2009 and underestimate it in periods of falling fuel sales (2011); 
 
 
Figure 7.  Empirical comparison of the four types on indicators for Flanders, 1995–2012, real indexes 
with base year 1995 
Notes: Aggregate tax-rate based indicator is the chained Laspeyres index; the single tax-rate 
based indicator is the real tax rate on diesel transport fuel. Source: own calculations, based on 
Bachus and Defloor (2011) and Bachus (2013). 
In order to separate signal from noise, policy makers using these four types of indicators should 
be aware of the potential distortions linked to each type of indicator. Energy use statistics may 
be added to the analysis to draw coherent policy conclusions. For the Flemish case study, 
interpreting the results in this way would lead to the conclusion that the revenue-based 
indicator underestimates the greening of the tax system, and the greening is more likely to have 
been slightly positive between 1995 and 2011. 
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5 |  Overview of the evaluation results 
In the previous paragraph, we presented a theoretical and qualitative assessment of the four 
types of indicators. There suitability for measuring the greening of a tax system was tested, using 
the six criteria mentioned in section 3. Table 4 summarizes the results of that exercise using an 
ordinal scale. The scores are allocated based on the qualitative arguments developed during the 
theoretical exploration and on the empirical testing60; the comparison of the scores between 
indicators should be interpreted with caution as they are subject to the author’s interpretations. 
Table 4.  Summary of the assessment of the four types of indicators 
Notes: ++ very good for this criterion; + fairly good; − fairly weak; – very weak. 
Revenue-based indicators have excellent scores for statistical criteria and for 
comprehensiveness but suffer from low content validity, which is considered to be the most 
important evaluation criterion (supra). Single tax rates have a higher score for content validity 
but the lack of aggregation options and the fact that exemptions and preferential tax rates are 
not covered are disadvantages. Aggregate tax-rate based indicators are hard to use 
(comparability, data availability), and moreover have a number of important drawbacks related 
to content validity and comprehensiveness as well. Finally, the implicit tax rate on energy has 
many advantages but provides no information on transport taxation and most environmental 
levies. 
6 |  Conclusion 
In this paper we carried out a theoretical and empirical assessment of four types of indicators 
used for measuring the greening of the tax system. We developed an evaluation framework 
 
60  The empirical testing only contributed to one score: the content validity of the aggregate tax-rate based indicator. 
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containing core evaluation criteria, such as content validity, and statistical criteria, such as data 
availability. We found that each of the four types suffers from problems related to content 
validity. Revenue-based indicators give a distorted view because they are partly based on the 
pollution quantity. Tax-rate based indicators do not have that problem, but aggregate tax-rate 
based indicators can give a distorted view depending on the methodology for choosing weights 
and on the way of introducing new taxes in the indicator. The implicit tax rate on energy has less 
aggregation issues and single tax rates have none. However, the number of taxes used in these 
indicators is limited, which erodes content validity as well. On the other hand, each of the 
indicator types also has one or more strengths. Based on statistical criteria, revenue-based 
indicators seem well fit for their purpose. However, since that type of indicator has the lowest 
content validity, policy makers should be advised against using solely those indicators for policy 
conclusions. 
The main conclusion of our analysis is that there is no single best indicator for measuring the 
greening of a tax system. The four types of indicators all have their own merits and deficiencies, 
and provide highly complementary information. The recommendation from our findings is that 
the best results are obtained by using a measurement model including all four types of 
indicators, without aggregating them. They can be used as an integrated measurement tool 
allowing for accurate (qualitative) judgement of the phenomenon of the greening of a tax 
system. Eliminating one of the indicator groups decreases the content validity to a certain 
degree. However, for practical reasons, it may be an acceptable option to limit the measurement 
tool to the three indicators that are readily available, being the revenue-based indicators, one 
or more single tax rates and the implicit tax rate on energy, as long as one is aware of and explicit 
about the potential loss of validity. 
In this paper we developed a new aggregate tax-rate based indicator for measuring the greening 
of the tax system, based on a Lowe-type of index. We named this new indicator ‘the National 
Environmental Taxation Index’. 
Future research may further enhance the application of index number theory on the 
measurement of environmentally related taxes. More specifically, a more in-depth investigation 
on the issues of weighting and introduction of new taxes in the aggregate tax rate-based 
indicator is advised for. Finally, further elaboration on the difference between environmental 
taxes and environmentally related taxes, and adding green design elements in non-
environmentally related taxes to this discussion is expected to further increase the knowledge 
of the use of the tax system as an instrument for environmental policy. 
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The use of regulatory taxation as a policy instrument for sustainability 
transitions: old wine in new bottles or unexplored potential? 
The burgeoning literature on sustainable transitions links persistent 
environmental problems to the functioning of socio-technical systems. 
Conventional policy instruments, such as environmental taxation, are often 
rejected by transitions scholars but in-depth studies on their potential are scarce. 
This paper explores the potential of the instrument of environmental taxation for 
influencing sustainability transitions. The multi-level perspective (MLP) and the 
multi-phase perspective (MPP) from transitions thinking and the social practices 
approach are combined with the environmental economics theories of Pigou and 
Coase. Our analysis shows that the highest impact of regulatory taxation will be 
realized at the end of the take-off phase and in the acceleration phase of a 
transition. Although important barriers exist and many conditions apply, 
regulatory environmental taxation, especially as part of a smart policy mix, has 
more potential for contributing to sustainability transitions than hitherto assumed. 
Keywords: sustainability transitions; environmental taxation; multi-level 
perspective; multi-phase perspective; policy mix 
1 |  Introduction  
Environmental problems are of all times. Yet, the past two decades, climate change, air 
pollution, natural resource depletion and biodiversity loss have reached the status of worldwide 
persistent threats (Foxon et al., 2009). There is increasing consensus in the literature that 
common policy responses, which are in the main incremental, will not provide structural 
solutions to those problems (Elzen & Wieczorek, 2005). Transition theory links those challenges 
to socio-technical systems, which fulfil a societal function using technical components, 
infrastructure, regulations and networks of organizations (Geels & Kemp, 2000). A transition is 
a radical and structural change with economic, cultural, ecological and institutional 
developments taking place at different levels of the socio-technical system (Rotmans & 
Loorbach, 2009).  
An important discussion in transition literature concerns the question whether transitions, 
niches and regimes can be governed, or even steered, in a (sustainable) direction. Most 
transitions scholars see an active role for government, but not in the classical way as the top-
down commander who can steer at will using its toolbox of instruments (Paredis, 2013). Rather, 
government is seen as just one group of actors (Geels et al., 2004), who are part of the regime 
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but simultaneously shape its adaptive capacity (A. Smith et al., 2005). Government actors exert 
a substantial influence on the functioning of the socio-technical system as they often maintain 
and reproduce regime functions in an intensive manner (A. Smith et al., 2005).  
To address the complexity and long-term focus (1-2 generations) of transitions, “existing policy 
instruments need to be combined with new approaches” (Elzen & Wieczorek, 2005). In addition 
to command-and-control instruments and communicative instruments, economic instruments 
are used in environmental policy (Howlett & Ramesh, 2003; Perman et al., 2003). Geels (2012) 
indicates, in the context of transport systems, that economic instruments can be used to 
enhance pressure on an unsustainable regime. Chappin (2011) applies simulation models to 
study the influence of carbon taxes on energy transitions. Although these studies point at the 
potential of taxation, the theoretical dynamics behind the impact of a tax on the transition 
process are not well understood yet, and available studies on the topic are scarce. This paper 
aims to contribute to the growing literature of transition governance by means of an exploratory 
analysis of the potential of taxation as an instrument to support sustainability transitions. We 
will do so by combining the literature on environmental taxation with the literature on 
sustainability transitions, and by identifying the conditions for a tax to have that potential. In 
our theoretical exploration, we will combine two heuristic frameworks from transitions thinking, 
the multi-level perspective (MLP) and the multi-phase perspective (MPP), with the neoclassical 
theory of Pigouvian taxation, which is the basis of environmental taxation theory. 
Our focus is exclusively on regulatory (environmental) taxes. These taxes are designed to 
influence the behaviour of citizens or companies, in contrast to more traditional taxes that are 
designed to raise government revenues or to redistribute revenues (Avi-Yonah, 2007).  
This paper is organized as follows. The multi-level perspective (MLP) and multi-phase 
perspective (MPP) are explained in section 2, along with other transition concepts. In section 3, 
an overview is provided of the theoretical foundations of regulatory taxation. Section 4 shows 
the results of the combination of the theoretical strands of transitions and environmental 
taxation. Section 5 is dedicated to the limitations and barriers to the potential of environmental 
taxation and in section 6 we draw conclusions and provide suggestions for future research.  
2 |  Transition theory: the MLP and the MPP 
The multi-level perspective (MLP) on sustainability transitions distinguishes between three levels 
(Geels, 2004; Verbong & Geels, 2007). At the macro level, the landscape represents the external 
environment of the system. Changes at the landscape level influence the socio-technical system 
(Markard & Truffer, 2008). Examples of such developments are global warming, global economic 
growth, political crises or demographic evolutions (Geels, 2002). At the meso level, the regime 
is the dominant form of functioning in the socio-technical system (Avelino & Rotmans, 2009). 
The regime can be a dominant technology, institution, policy, practice or culture. At the micro 
level, niches present alternative (sustainable) technologies, institutions, policies, practices or 
cultures that cause disruptions in the functioning of the socio-technical system. By 
experimenting and growing stronger, niches can eventually overtake the role of the regime and 
install a new dynamic balance in the socio-technical system (Kemp & Loorbach, 2006; Loorbach 
& Wijsman, 2013). For example, learning effects from experiments with niche technologies such 
as photovoltaic energy and wind power in the energy system may make those technologies 
increasingly successful. After the growing phase they may also become cheaper than regime 
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technologies such as nuclear and fossil fuel power generation. Those niches exert pressure on 
the regime, which could, in combination with other pressures from the landscape, policies, 
market developments and cultures, lead to a replacement of nuclear and fossil fuel-based power 
by renewables, ending up in a new equilibrium that will be more sustainable than the previous 
one.  
A transition presents a radical and fundamental change in the dominant structure, culture and 
practices of a socio-technical system (Loorbach & Rotmans, 2006). The structure of the system 
consists of institutional, infrastructure, legal and economic provisions that are inherent to the 
functioning of the socio-technical system (de Haan, 2010). Culture is regarded as the shared 
values, norms and perspectives, which may be cognitive, normative or ideological in nature, and 
which underlie the socio-technical system (de Haan & Rotmans, 2011). Practices are the 
routines, habits and procedures operated by the actors in the system, which interact with the 
structure and the culture of the system.  
The change that is required for a transition will not come about in a linear way. Rather, periods 
of rapid and slow (or no) change can alternate (de Haan & Rotmans, 2011). This implies that 
there are multiple phases in a transition process. Loorbach (2007) describes four phases that 
together depict an ideal-typical transition process, the MPP. In the first phase, the pre-
development phase, actors are engaged in experiments (Kemp & Loorbach, 2006). During the 
take-off phase, the second phase, the regime will show signs of destabilization and niches will 
get an opportunity to position themselves as a viable alternative (van der Brugge & Rotmans, 
2007). Rapid structural and cultural changes in the socio-technical system become visible in the 
acceleration phase (van der Brugge, 2009). In the last phase, the stabilization phase, a new 
sustainable regime is established (Avelino & Rotmans, 2009).  
Transitions are driven by various endogenous and exogenous developments. Exogenous 
developments are changes at the landscape level. Endogenous developments, on the other 
hand, are events occurring at the meso-level (regimes) and micro-level (niches). According to de 
Haan and Rotmans (2011), there are three groups of conditions for change: tensions, stress and 
pressure. Tensions are changes occurring at the landscape level threatening the position of the 
unsustainable regime. A regime that functions inadequately or inconsistently will experience 
stress, which can nurture the downfall of the regime. Regime pressure or selection pressure, 
finally, will appear when niches impose themselves on the regime’s position by becoming viable 
alternatives or by making the regime’s functioning obsolete. Regime pressure, along with the 
reactions of regime and niche actors, will create patterns of change (Frantzeskaki & de Haan, 
2009). When tensions dominate, a reconstellation pattern will appear. Stress and pressure will 
result in the patterns of, respectively, adaptation and empowerment. When certain patterns 
chain together, they create transition paths (de Haan, 2010). Choices made in the past will affect 
the path along which transitions will move. Actors are confronted with path dependencies, 
which may turn into lock-ins. For example, the choice of the authorities of some countries to 
invest in nuclear power plants has created path dependencies in the energy systems of these 
countries, which function as lock-ins that prevent a breakthrough to an energy system based on 
renewable energy.  
Two governance approaches within transitions science indicate that belief in classical policy 
solutions is limited. The two most well-known governance models in transition literature are 
transition management (Kemp & Loorbach, 2006; Loorbach, 2007; Loorbach & Rotmans, 2010) 
and strategic niche management (Hoogma, 2000). Both these governance approaches 
emphasise the difficulties in steering socio-technical change. Strategic niche management sees 
the main role of government in process management, creating room for niche experimentation, 
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making sure that the process is not dominated by certain actors, and in learning and facilitating 
other actors learning possibilities (Kemp et al., 1998). The other governance approach, transition 
management, departs from the same view, but presents a process management method for 
policy makers wishing to influence burgeoning transitions processes (Loorbach & Rotmans, 
2006). Transition management has been criticised, mainly because the term ‘management’ 
seems to suggest that it is possible to steer transitions by “deliberate intervention in pursuit of 
specific goals” in a top-down way (Shove & Walker, 2007, p. 764). Although transition 
management scholars such as Loorbach and Rotmans develop a more nuanced perspective on 
the ‘steerability’ of a transition than the name ‘management’ suggests, they do assert that ‘goal-
oriented transitions’, in which the policy goals guide the process, exist. This view is not shared 
by all transition scholars. For example, Dewulf et al. (2009) think that a multiplicity of theories 
is needed for addressing such complex issues as sustainability. Shove and Walker (2007) 
question the very starting point of transition management that it is possible to deliberately steer 
socio-technical system change in any direction.   
Both strategic niche management and transition management focus on policies that are aimed 
at the level of the niches. However, they largely ignore that the destabilization of incumbent 
regimes can equally be a valuable strategy, because this could speed up the upscaling of niche 
technologies (Kivimaa & Kern, 2016). Policies discouraging certain niche technologies or 
practices can play a role here (Turnheim & Geels, 2012). Taxation will be further examined as a 
regime destabilization instruments, as the main subject of this paper. In addition, ‘policy mixes 
for creative destruction’ will be explored in section 4.2. 
3 |  Regulatory and environmental taxation 
A basic idea in economics is that markets allocate resources in an efficient way. However, this 
thesis is only valid under the condition of the presence of well-defined and enforceable private 
property rights (Perman et al., 2003). If that condition is not met, the market is not capable of 
creating or maintaining a socially optimal or desirable situation, and market failures appear 
(Bator, 1958). One example of a market failure is the existence of external costs or 
environmental externalities (Perman et al., 2003). Externalities are “benefits or costs generated 
as an unintended by-product of an economic61 activity that do not accrue to the parties involved 
in the activity and where no compensation takes place” (Owen, 2004, p. 129). Pollution resulting 
from production activities is a typical example of a negative externality imposed on citizens, 
because the victims of the pollution have no legal rights to claim any compensation for the 
damage suffered. To resolve this market failure, government can create property rights for ‘an 
unpolluted environment’ and give them to the victims, or even to the polluter. In the latter case, 
the polluter receives a ‘license to pollute’ a certain amount. Following the Coase theorem (Coase, 
1960), depending on the specific circumstances, this situation will lead to an equally efficient 
outcome as compared to victim property rights. However, from an equity point of view, the two 
solutions generate entirely different outcomes, as in the one case it is the polluter who pays, 
and in the other it is the victim (Perman et al., 2003). In theory, the polluter and the victims 
 
61
  Although non-economic activities can also create externalities, for example vandalism (negative) and having a 
bee house in the garden (positive).   
  
86 
could bargain and agree on a compensation for the damage based on the victim’s or polluter’s 
property rights, in which case government intervention becomes redundant (Coase, 1960). In 
practice, however, the large number of victims and polluters and the costs of bargaining often 
prevent an optimal outcome of private bargaining. In that case, government regulation, through 
the use of command-and-control instruments, economic instruments or suasion, is needed 
(Perman et al., 2003). In this paper, we focus on the use of taxation as a regulatory
62
 policy 
instrument in response to existing market failures. Regulatory taxes aimed at environmental 
improvement are called environmental taxes.
63
 An alternative name is Pigouvian taxation, after 
the 20th century economist Arthur C. Pigou, who developed the idea to use taxation to tackle 
externalities (Pigou, 1920). According to Pigou, an environmental tax equal to the marginal 
damage at the efficient pollution level maximizes allocative efficiency and welfare. The theory 
of Pigouvian taxation belongs to the neoclassical economic perspective, which assumes that 
economic agents act in a rational way according to their individual preferences in such a way 
that their utility (or profit for companies) is maximized (rational choice theory). Moreover, 
neoclassical economics assumes that preferences are fixed, as an exogenous factor, which was 
the dominant assumption until the 1990s (Arnsperger & Varoufakis, 2006). Then some 
economists changed the assumption into “[preferences are] fixed in the short run, subject to 
change in the long run” (Doyle, 2004). Others completely dismissed the notion of fixed 
preferences stating that individual preferences change as a result of past outcomes, and 
sometimes even rapidly and systematically (Van Boven et al., 2003). 
In a first-best world with no uncertainty, regulatory taxes are statically efficient because the 
emission reductions are achieved while using a minimum amount of resources (Sandmo, 2000). 
They are dynamically efficient because taxpayers will be inclined to seek further reduction 
methods due to the fact that the undesirable behaviour remains taxed (Faure & Weishaar, 
2012). In this theoretically ideal situation, a tax always leads to a more efficient solution than a 
licence or other command-and-control (CAC) type of instrument. However, if complexity or 
uncertainty is introduced, many authors criticize Pigou’s theory on the optimal level of an 
externality tax. Although a complete review of this literature exceeds the scope of this paper, 
we present three of the most important critiques. First, Coase (1960) dismissed the idea that a 
tax equal to the marginal damage cost increases total welfare in all situations. When there is 
uncertainty about the marginal abatement cost curves of polluting firms, the comparison 
changes. Taxes keep the edge over CAC instruments when the (absolute value of the) slope of 
the marginal abatement cost curve is greater than the slope of the marginal damage curve. 
Conversely, when the marginal abatement cost curve is less steep than the marginal damage 
curve, CAC instruments are to be preferred to taxes (Baumol & Oates, 1988; Perman et al., 2003). 
Second, Baumol and Oates (1988) add that it is often hard to calculate the monetary value of 
the marginal damage of the polluting activity, in which case a standard may also be the 
recommended instrument choice. And third, in case of monopoly or oligopoly, the optimal tax 
rate may vary from lower to higher than the marginal damage (Ebert & von dem Hagen, 1998).  
 
62
  We use the term ‘regulatory’ tax in the broad sense, following Meier’s (American school) definition (1985): 
“Regulation is any attempt by the government to control the behavior of citizens”. In the standard English 
school, this term is defined more narrowly as all prohibitions and obligations imposed by government 
(Vedung, 1998). 
63
  As opposed to ‘environmentally related taxes’, a broader term introduced by the OECD (2001, 15), where it is 
the tax base rather than the objective that forms the definition: “any compulsory, unrequited payment to 
general government levied on tax-bases deemed to be of particular environmental relevance”  
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An important element in the discussion on the optimal tax rate is the price elasticity of demand, 
which is not static. The absolute value of demand elasticities tends to increase over time (Lipsey 
& Chrystal, 2007; Pindyck & Rubinfeld, 2009). The reason is that demand elasticity is in fact 
mainly determined by the availability of substitutes. Investment decisions are made with a long-
term perspective, and in the long run, more options are available for developing new (clean) 
technologies than in the short run (OECD, 2000). For example, Sterner (2007) estimated that the 
demand elasticity of petrol and diesel in the long run is about three times higher than in the 
short run.   
In addition to determining the correct tax rate, other tax design elements need to be decided. 
First, the tax base, which is the object that is taxed (Sandmo, 2000), needs to be chosen. This 
can be input products, output products, production factors (energy), production (processes, 
activities or techniques), consumption or emissions (Vollebergh, 2008; Weber, 2011). The most 
effective way of eliminating externalities is by choosing the externality itself (e.g. CO2 emissions) 
as the tax base (OECD, 2010). In practice, emission measuring problems often hinder direct 
taxation of emissions. Proxies, such as petrol sold as a transport fuel, then form alternative tax 
bases (Dias Soares, 2011). Second, tax rates can be differentiated (Määttä, 2006), in which case 
certain products, processes or groups of taxpayers are granted a lower tax rate or are exempt 
from the tax. Third, a tax can be implemented at one specific moment in time or in multiple 
phases whereby the tax rate is raised or reduced in each phase.  
4 |  The (in)compatibility of environmental taxation 
with transition theory 
In this section, we first analyse the compatibility of environmental taxation with transitions 
thinking theories by discussing positive and negative arguments for the use of taxation in 
sustainability transitions science (section 4.1). Next, we explore the use of environmental 
taxation in the main elements of socio-technical systems, structure (4.2), culture and practices 
(4.3). The latter two are treated together as they are intertwined. The use of the MPP and the 
MLP is integrated in the analyses of 4.2 and 4.3; for the MLP this means that the use of 
environmental taxes for niches and regimes is explored without explicit reference to the MLP. 
The landscape level is not mentioned, as this is external to the socio-technical system and cannot 
be influenced by regime or niche actors in the short run (Geels, 2011). 
4.1.  (In)compatibility arguments 
The transitions school sees public authorities as just one group of actors in a socio-technical 
system. They are an important actor, but they cannot steer a transition in a top-down way (Kemp 
et al., 2007b). Traditional policy-making models, including neoclassical economics, are mostly 
rejected based on the following four arguments. First, traditional policy-making is deemed unfit 
for dealing with high-complexity, long-term, wicked societal problems, because the knowledge 
on ecological cause-effect relations is often limited and political compromises inevitably lead to 
incrementalism as opposed to structural system change (Rotmans et al., 2005; Kemp et al., 
2007b; Mathijs, 2008). Second, existing policies are the result of outdated legislation, routines 
and institutional relations and are characterized by path dependency and technological lock-in 
(Rotmans et al., 2005). Third, the view of neoclassical economics on the preferences of 
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individuals is too static, while instead a transition would require changing preferences (Kemp et 
al., 2007b). Finally, steering a transition towards sustainability involves a subjective 
interpretation of sustainability, which “should arise from a multi-actor process, involving a 
balanced diversity of stakeholders” (van der Brugge et al., 2005). Geels (2012) describes 
transitions as co-evolutionary processes, which require the involvement of many social groups. 
Network management in policy-making would be a step forward, but even those policy networks 
are not necessarily concerned with the long term (Kemp et al., 2007b). 
Transition management is a governance approach based on transition theory, which proposes a 
bottom-up approach to steer a transition, based on multi-actor involvement. However, it does 
not offer a full-fletched alternative to traditional policy-making, as it is “not directly solution-
oriented, but explorative and design-oriented” (Rotmans et al., 2005, p. 6). Therefore, some 
transitions scholars revert to other academic fields, such as evolutionary economics to analyse 
sustainability transitions and related policy strategies. Inspired by the field of biology, this field 
focuses on three central concepts: diversity, selection and innovation. Models from evolutionary 
economics can cope with complexity; they deviate from neoclassical economic theories by 
acknowledging that economic agent behaviour is explained by bounded rationality (van den 
Bergh et al., 2006b). People’s rationality is bounded because of a lack of appropriate and reliable 
information, limited cognitive capacities and limited decision-making time (Simon, 1955; 
Kahneman, 2003). Evolutionary economics leaves more room for environmental taxation than 
most transitions studies, although it emphasises the need for a combination of policy 
instruments or policy mixes. (van den Bergh et al., 2006a). The role of policy mixes for 
sustainability transitions is further treated in section 4.2. 
So, if the neoclassical policy instrument of environmental taxation is so hard to reconcile with 
the bottom-up governance principles of transition theory, is it still worthwhile to study the 
combination? Four arguments support an affirmative answer. First, as we demonstrated in 
section 3, the impact of environmental taxation is much higher in the long run than in the short 
run, which gives this instrument an interesting appeal considering the fundamental long-term 
change transition theory describes. Second, when the economy is (threatening to get) stuck in a 
technology that is not serving the long-run transition goal, a regulatory tax on that technology 
may unlock (further) lock-in, thus avoiding an important obstacle for a sustainability transition 
(den Butter & Hofkes, 2006). Third, policy attention tends to go to supporting niches but much 
less to destabilizing the dominant regime, which is politically more difficult. However, according 
to Kivimaa and Kern (2016), niche support policies will need to go hand-in-hand with regime 
destabilization policies aimed at internalizing externalities. A tax on the dominant regime 
technology is particularly suitable for that purpose (Geels & Schot, 2007). Fourth, the bounded 
rationality concept embraced by transition theory still incorporates a level of rationality, 
implying that a price signal may still have an effect.   
We conclude that there is no consensus on the use of regulatory taxes to enhance sustainability 
transitions. Some scholars see a role for taxation, but rather as one part of a more 
comprehensive policy mix (Kemp et al., 1998; Geels, 2006; Markard & Truffer, 2008). 
4.2.  Structure 
The roots of transition theory lie in a variety of academic fields, such as evolutionary economics, 
structuration theory, neo-institutional theory and science and technology studies (Geels, 2011). 
Technology is a key component of the structure of socio-technical systems. Although not all 
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technological innovations are sustainable, they can foster sustainability transitions if they are 
steered towards sustainable goals and applications (Alkemade et al., 2011). 
Technological change can be presented visually by means of a technology life cycle model (TLC) 
developed in the literature concerning the management of technology (Gao et al., 2013). 
According to Ernst (1997), the technology life cycle is an S-curve consisting of four phases: 
research and development, growth, maturity and saturation. Sometimes a fifth phase, the decay 
phase, is added (Haupt et al., 2007). The TLC S-curve paved the way for the S-curve from the 
multi-phase perspective on transitions. Table 5 combines these two insights. 
Table 5. Combination of the technology life cycle and the multi-phase perspective on socio-technical 
transitions 
Phase Technology life cycle Transition process 
Phase 1 Research and development Pre-development 
Phase 2 Growth Take-off 
Phase 3 Maturity Acceleration 
Phase 4 Saturation Stabilization 
Phase 5 Decay phase --- 
Source: Gao et al. (2013) and Loorbach (2007) 
No mention was found in the literature on any equivalent to the decay phase in transitions, but 
according to Grin et al. (2010, p. 129), “The end point of any transition curve may be the 
beginning of the next transition curve”, which is consistent with the theory of multiple, 
successive S-curves in the technological life cycle model (Utterback, 1996).  
Regulatory taxes are implemented to reduce the price ratio between relatively cheap regime 
technologies and relatively expensive niche technologies (Bigano et al., 2000). The famous 
Porter hypothesis confirms that environmental regulation may entail innovation and this effect 
is stronger for environmental taxation than for command-and-control instruments (Mikael Skou 
Andersen & Ekins, 2009). A tax on the dominant regime technology will compensate for the low 
performance of the new technology in the early phases and for the fact that often the regime 
enjoys benefits such as enabling infrastructure and legislation. A tax levels the playing field (Kern 
& Smith, 2008), which indirectly allows the sustainable niche(s) to become more competitive, to 
grow and eventually to take over the role of the dominant regime. According to Popp (2006), a 
carbon tax in combination with R&D subsidies yield the best results for climate technology 
development. A stand-alone tax could also reach 95% of that result, while an R&D subsidy alone 
would realize only 11% of that result.  
Moreover, a tax generates revenues which can be used for favouring the preferred niche even 
more, by providing subsidies to R&D or environmental projects (OECD, 2001). Note that the 
removal of existing subsidies to the regime technology can have the same impact as taxing it. 
For reasons of policy coherence, it is advisable to remove regime subsidies before introducing 
new taxes.  
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But in which phase of a transition should regulatory taxes be introduced to destabilize the 
regime technology? In the early stages, technology development is a creative process, which 
needs stimulation (subsidies) to widen the playing field rather than restrictions from a negative 
instrument such as a tax. According to Taylor et al. (2005), regulatory taxes are most effective in 
the commercialization phase of an environmental technology. In the MPP, this period of 
commercialization corresponds to the end of the take-off phase and the acceleration phase in 
the transition process. This implies that a regulatory tax should be aimed at supporting the 
upscaling of sustainable niche technologies. This conclusion is illustrated graphically in figure 8. 
 
 
Figure 8. Regulatory taxes and technologies 
Source: Bachus and Vanswijgenhoven (2015) 
Essential for a transition to unfold is co-evolution between the aforementioned technologies, 
norms and social practices (Elzen & Wieczorek, 2005; Kemp et al., 2007a). Kemp and van Lente 
(2011) acknowledge the fact that not only technologies need to change, but also the way people 
use them. Early adopters of a new technology may want to set a new social norm by adopting, 
but this may not be followed by late adopters, who generally need more incentives to adopt the 
technology, such as a regulatory tax (Bosshardt et al., 2013). Co-evolution will not be served 
optimally by the introduction of an isolated environmental tax. Instead, smart policy mixes can 
accelerate both regime destruction (‘creative destruction’) and niche upscaling (Kivimaa & Kern, 
2016). Policy mixes contain not only a mix of instruments but also policy strategies and policy 
processes. They need to be designed taking into account criteria such as consistency, coherence, 
credibility and comprehensiveness (Rogge & Reichardt, 2016). 
In the stabilization phase, which may converge with the decay phase of unsustainable old regime 
technologies, a few actors keep on using the old technology. To accelerate the phase-out, the 
existing regulatory tax may be gradually increased or – eventually – replaced by a ban.  
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An important comment is that both evolutionary economics and transition theory are warning 
governments not to create lock-ins. Policy makers are advised not to start supporting niche 
technologies until they have sufficient indications regarding the system change potential of the 
technology (Kemp et al., 2007b). Furthermore, in the early phases, diversity should be pursued 
by supporting multiple niche technologies (Geels, 2006). The risk of creating a lock-in is much 
smaller for a tax than for a subsidy, as it is easier to know which dominant regime technology is 
undesirable in the long run (e.g. fossil fuels in the energy system), than to know which niche is 
the most desirable one for the long-term transition. However, the introduction of a regulatory 
tax equally requires careful timing. If the tax is introduced in a phase where the sustainable 
niches are not mature enough to take over the role of the regime, the system does not provide 
for sufficient substitutes, which may lead to a system breakdown (van der Brugge & Rotmans, 
2007).  
4.3.  Practices and culture 
At first sight, the link between environmental taxes and practices seems rather obvious. 
Regulatory taxes can be imposed on unsustainable regime practices, with the aim to create 
behavioural change and favour the more sustainable niche practices. According to neoclassical 
economics, this strategy will be both effective and efficient in many situations (see section 3). 
However, the neo-classical assumption that the individual makes a rational choice by comparing 
benefits and costs, is subject to much criticism. Several schools that study consumer and citizen 
behaviour point to occasions where citizens do not display the predicted behaviour. One 
explanation, according to behavioural economics, is people’s bounded rationality (see 
section 4.1).  
Explaining behaviour from an environmental perspective has long been dominated by econo-
socio-psychological models based on rational choice theory, which look at the individual agent 
and his beliefs, attitudes and values as the main determinants of behaviour. More recently, a 
new approach developed by Reckwitz (2002) and Spaargaren (2003), the social practices 
approach, building on Giddens’s (1984) structuration theory, takes a more balanced position 
between agency and structure by focusing on the daily practices, such as washing or buying 
food, instead of on the individual or his environment. Within this theoretical framework, Shove 
and Pantzar (2005) define practices as entities, which consist of three elements: materials, 
competence and meaning (Shove et al., 2012). Materials are objects, tools and infrastructures. 
Competence consists of knowledge and skills that are “embodied in people and things” (Watson 
& Shove, 2008). Both materials and competence contain similarities with the structure of a 
socio-technical system defined by transition researchers (de Haan & Rotmans, 2011). Meaning 
consists of cultural conventions, expectations and socially shared meanings (Røpke, 2009; 
Spurling et al., 2013). Although the theory of social practices does not explicitly dwell on the 
concept of culture (Ortner, 2006), the description of meaning comes close to the definition of 
culture presented by transition researchers (Frantzeskaki & de Haan, 2009).
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Rational choice-based economic and psychological models translate theory into (environmental) 
policy in a straightforward way: an economist will propose to intervene by changing relative 
prices through taxation, while a psychologist will propose to sensitize people and focus on their 
motivation and attitude. Transition theory opposes these rational choice-based approaches by 
 
64  For instance, the practice of using the car to buy groceries consists of (1) the materials used, in this case a car and 
fuel, (2) competence, the skill of driving a car and (3) meanings, we perform this action to get all our groceries in 
one haul. This practice is reproduced by a large number of individuals.  
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putting forward a heavily bounded rationality and a strongly context-determined view
65
 (Shove, 
2012), which limits the role of instruments and even of public authorities. The social practices 
model is equally critical towards the impact government can have on people’s behaviour, 
because “practices have lives of their own” (Shove, 2012), and the impact of government 
interventions will be unstable and unpredictable. Impact is possible, however, but only by trying 
to change the conditions for (un)sustainable practices, their meanings, materials and 
competences. Public authorities can bring about strategically important changes that may 
influence the reproduction of practices (A. Smith et al., 2005). While pursuing this, policy makers 
may use similar instruments to the ones in place today (Shove, 2012), which include regulatory 
taxation, albeit selectively. Regulatory taxes thus help to promote co-evolution of materials, 
competence and meaning (Shove, 2003), leading to a reduction of unsustainable practices.  
Combining transition theory with the social practices theory may be thwarted somewhat by the 
limited role transition theory sees for agency (A. Smith et al., 2005). However, Geels (2011) does 
not agree with this criticism. He claims agency is fully integrated in the MLP in the form of 
bounded rationality, which clears the way for combining the social practices model with the MLP 
(figure 9), following the example of Crivits and Paredis (2013).  
 
Figure 9. Integrated framework of social practices approach and transition theory 
Source: own interpretation of Shove and Pantzar (2005) and de Haan and Rotmans (2011). 
Figure 9 shows that taxes can be applied directly on the unsustainable practices
66
, as they are 
the central drivers of behaviour (Hargreaves, 2011). However, they can also be levied on the 
conditions for (un)sustainable practices; the materials seem the most logical tax base (such as a 
tax on fossil transport fuels or wood stoves), because materials are often priced and sold on 
markets. For competence and meanings, this is much less the case, which makes them less 
 
65  Although the specific transition governance approach called ‘transition management’ puts forward a more agent-
based perspective, it still emphasises the existence of landscape elements that can hardly be changed. 
66
  For example, the congestion charge for anyone driving a car into London during peak hours. 
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suitable as tax bases. Taxing practices and their conditions could entail co-evolution of 
technology, norms and social practices, which can drive sustainability transitions (Brown et al., 
2013).  
The concept of culture is intertwined with practices (Geels, 2004) and is therefore already largely 
included in the discussion, although cultures change more slowly than practices (Rotmans, 
2003). Cultural change will come either from outside the socio-technical system (landscape 
changes) or from changing practices. Finally, including the multi-phase perspective in our 
analysis of practices and culture, the conclusion that regulatory taxes have a much larger impact 
in the long run than in the short run, remains valid. Unsustainable regime practices can be taxed 
in any phase of a transition, but again, alternatives need to be available, which implies that 
taxation will have a higher impact in the (end of the) take-off phase and in the acceleration 
phase, which is a similar conclusion to the one in section 4.2 on structure. 
5 |  Limitations for and barriers to the potential of 
environmental taxes 
Notwithstanding the moderately positive conclusions on the potential of environmental 
taxation for enhancing transitions, we identify six barriers and limitations that should not be 
overlooked. First, public and political support for environmental taxation is limited. People 
dislike taxes in general (Avi-Yonah & Uhlmann, 2009), and environmental taxation in particular 
because they see it as an illegitimate sources of revenue for the government (Green Fiscal 
Commission, 2009a). One way of making environmental taxation and green tax reform more 
acceptable is using insights from behavioural economics. For example, to make people accept a 
budget-neutral tax reform, the value of what they receive should be higher than the value of 
what they sacrifice. This phenomenon is called the endowment effect (Kahneman et al., 1991). 
Second, an environmental tax in a socio-technical system such as the energy system will need 
to be implemented for a long period (more than ten years) before it starts living up to its 
potential, for both technology and practices. However, politically this is a long period, and the 
environmental tax reforms that survive the first political decision process, are often reversed 
when a new government takes office. This happened to the Australian carbon tax in 2013 (Carl 
& Fedor, 2016). A rare counterexample is the Swedish carbon tax, which has been in place since 
1991 (Daugbjerg & Svendsen, 2003). Third, choices made for or against a certain technology or 
practice will influence policy options in the future (path dependencies) (Rotmans, 2003). 
Misalignment of a tax with the transition vision could result in a lock-in or even system 
breakdown (van der Brugge & Rotmans, 2007; Kemp & Pontoglio, 2011), although a subsidy 
poses a larger risk of a lock-in than a tax. Fourth, the lack of sufficient, appropriate or promising 
niches is a barrier, because niches that do not perform consistently will not provide any benefits 
(Sopha et al., 2013). Fifth, environmental taxes could have some undesired side effects, such as 
a negative competitiveness impact and a regressive impact. However, those deficiencies can be 
largely redressed by careful design and compensating measures as part of a green tax reform 
(Mikael Skou Andersen & Ekins, 2009; Klenert & Mattauch, 2016). Finally, sixth, a stand-alone 
policy instrument, taxation or other, will always have a number of downsides, part of which can 
be overcome by using smart instrument and policy mixes (Oikonomou et al., 2014), such as an 
environmental tax in combination with a large communication campaign explaining the benefits 
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of the tax to citizens, and with revenue recycling, for example a subsidy, to increase public 
support. 
6 |  Conclusions and future research  
Our theoretical exploration has brought forward that, although transitions are complex and the 
impact of government policy is often unpredictable, well-designed environmental taxes can 
contribute to a certain change in a desired direction. The highest impact of regulatory taxation 
will be realized on long-term technological change and on influencing social practices and their 
underlying materials. The neoclassical economic view on taxation over-emphasizes rationality 
as a mechanism for explaining behaviour. However, the degradation of government, by 
transitions scholars, to just one actor of many, constitutes an underestimation of the impact 
government policy, including environmental taxation, can have. More specifically, 
environmental taxation can play a role in removing technology lock-ins and in creating pressure 
on the dominant regime technology or practice, particularly at the end of the take-off phase and 
in the acceleration phase of a transition. However, implementation may be considered earlier, 
as the impact will be limited in the short run and maximal in the long run. 
Although we found some potential for the instrument of taxation, significant barriers were also 
identified, such as limited public and political support, path dependencies and side effects. 
However, some of these barriers can be overcome by focusing on the design and the success 
factors of environmental taxation. First, governments should study niches and regimes 
thoroughly before deciding which niches to support and which regime technologies or practices 
to destabilize using environmental taxation. Second, taxation should be part of a policy mix with 
complementary instruments, such as suasion. Flexibility should be enabled in the policy 
arrangements to make room for co-evolution of technologies, practices and cultures. Finally, 
broad political consensus should be sought for a green tax reform to last longer than one political 
term. These three policy recommendations can be combined into a more tangible policy mix, by 
including a remark on the revenues of environmental taxes. Studies on the acceptability of 
environmental taxation show that this instrument is very unpopular with the public, which is a 
major obstacle for its broader implementation (Baranzini & Carattini, 2017). However, public 
acceptability rises considerably when (part of) the tax revenues are earmarked, which means 
they are used for supporting environmental purposes (Kallbekken & Aasen, 2010). A promising 
policy mix could therefore consist of a budget-neutral policy package, combining four elements: 
support for niche experimentation space, an environmental tax, a concomitant communication 
campaign and an overarching policy process that is characterized by participation and co-
creation with citizens.  
With this paper, we aimed to make a contribution to filling the “pressing need to improve the 
understanding of the politics and the policies of sustainability transitions” (Markard et al., 2012, 
p. 962). We feel more research is needed in the future on the distinction between practices and 
culture within the transitions thinking school, on the best policy mixes for fostering sustainability 
transitions, and on gathering empirical evidence of some of the claims made in theoretical 
studies regarding the role of government and policy instruments in the field of sustainability 
transitions. 
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Abstract: 
Although it is widely acknowledged that taxation is a powerful instrument for combating 
environmental problems, environmental taxation is still underused. Public acceptability of 
regulatory taxes appears to be low, to the extent that a trade-off between the acceptability and 
the efficiency of policy instruments can be observed. This paper examines the determinants and 
conditions for public support and willingness to pay for environmental taxation, based on survey 
data of 1308 citizens. The results show that education and environmental awareness are 
determinants for support, and that initial low support can be significantly improved by 
earmarking the tax revenues to the environment. Other ways of revenue recycling, such as an 
environmental tax reform (ETR), can be ranked based on acceptability. We call this ranking the 
‘Ladder of Acceptability of Revenue Recycling Options’ (LARRO). Well-chosen design options for 
the environmental tax reform can further improve its acceptability.  
Keywords: 
Environmental taxation; Acceptability; Public acceptance; Public support; Environmental tax 
reform; Revenue recycling. 
Highlights: 
- There is a trade-off between the acceptability and the efficiency of policy instruments. 
- We use survey data to examine the determinants for support for environmental 
taxation; 
- Earmarking is crucial for obtaining public support for environmental taxation.  
- We create the ‘Ladder of Acceptability of Revenue Recycling Options’ (LARRO) 
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1 |  Introduction  
Today it is widely accepted that taxation is a powerful instrument for combating complex 
environmental problems, such as climate change (Aidt, 2010). However, policy processes aimed 
at implementing environmental taxes often fail, for many reasons (Heres et al., 2013). The 
literature devotes quite some attention to the role of lobbying by NGOs and businesses in policy 
processes aiming at implementing environmental taxes (Cherry et al., 2014). However, another 
factor that is thought to thwart large-scale implementation of environmental (Pigouvian) 
taxation is public acceptability (Vandyck & Van Regemorter, 2014). Taxation as an instrument 
aimed at environmental behavioural change has always suffered from low acceptance with the 
public (Baranzini & Carattini, 2017). When the revenues of taxes are used for environmental 
spending or reducing other taxes, public support significantly increases but still remains limited 
(Hsu et al., 2008). Although the exact reasons for this aversion is still under study, factors found 
to have an impact include the perceived (low) effectiveness of environmental taxation, the 
coerciveness of the instrument and psychological factors such as fiscal illusion (Buchanan & 
Tullock, 1975; Baron & Jurney, 1993; Baranzini et al., 2014). 
This paper first reviews the theoretical and empirical literature on the determinants of public 
support for environmental taxes (ET) and environmental tax reform (ETR). The difference 
between these two terms is that an ETR
67
 adds how the revenues of the ET will be spent. Second, 
it draws several hypotheses from the literature to test new determinants to explain public 
support and to find more detailed evidence regarding existing claims. The data are drawn from 
a unique large scale quantitative survey on the acceptance of environmental taxation and 
environmental tax reform carried out in Flanders, Belgium. Third, the paper uses the empirical 
results to propose policy recommendations on how to overcome the acceptability barrier to 
environmental fiscal reform. This study exclusively focuses on acceptance by citizens, not by 
firms or other societal actors that may also influence policy-making. 
In this paper, support, acceptance and acceptability of environmental taxation are used 
interchangeably with ‘willingness to pay’ (WTP). The term ‘support’ is used more often in social 
acceptability studies, while WTP in environmental economics is primarily used in the context of 
willingness to pay for improved environmental quality or less pollution. WTP can be regarded as 
an indirect measure of support for pricing policy instruments such as taxation (Ivanova & 
Tranter, 2004). 
The paper first turns to the state of the art of the literature. It then proposes a number of 
hypotheses on the acceptance of environmental taxation (ET). It continues with a description of 
the survey carried out in Flanders, after which the results are presented. We end with 
conclusions, policy recommendations and ideas for future research.  
 
67  An environmental tax reform (ETR), or green tax reform, is the process of shifting the tax burden from 
employment, income and investment, to pollution, resource depletion and waste (OECD, 1997). An ETR consists 
of two components: an increase in ET, and a decrease in other taxes. Such a reform often (but not necessarily) 
aims at revenue-neutrality for the government. 
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2 |  Theoretical and empirical state of the art 
The topic of support for environmental taxation does not rely on a distinct theoretical school or 
model. Theoretical studies touching upon the issue build on various disciplines, including 
economics (neoclassical and Pigouvian theory, public choice theory, behavioural economics), 
political science (instrument choice theory) and psychology. The many empirical studies either 
draw their hypotheses from those theoretical strands or approach the topic in an ad-hoc 
manner, examining potential determinants of acceptability without clear roots in theory. A 
central concept for understanding (lack of) public support for environmental tax reform (ETR) is 
tax aversion. Because of its importance, tax aversion is treated in a separate section (2.1). In 
section 2.2, other relevant theories are elaborated and in section 2.3 we summarize the 
empirical literature on the acceptance of environmental taxation (ET).   
2.1 Tax aversion 
Several large-scale value surveys show that citizens tend to attach great value to a healthy 
environment and that they consider environmental degradation to be an important problem 
(Melis et al., 2014). Moreover, there appears to be a positive link between environmental 
concern and willingness to pay (WTP) for a clean environment (Pagiaslis & Krontalis, 2014).  
In contemporary policy-making, taxation has three goals  (Avi-Yonah, 2007). The first goal of 
taxation is to raise revenue to finance government functions, such as the provision of public 
goods. The second goal is redistribution, the transfer of part of the revenues to reduce 
inequality. The third goal of taxation is regulation of behaviour: citizens and business are 
incentivised or discouraged to behave in a certain way (Avi-Yonah, 2010). Environmental policy 
is probably the field in which regulatory taxation
68
 has gained the most ground. Pigou (1920) 
highlighted the theoretical advantages of taxation as an instrument to address market failures 
and make private actors internalise external environmental costs. More recently, scholars have 
presented a (Pigouvian) carbon tax as a potentially efficient instrument for climate change 
mitigation (Pierce, 1991; Newell & Pizer, 2003; Avi-Yonah & Uhlmann, 2009).
69
 
Notwithstanding the high efficiency, the use of regulatory taxation such as environmental taxes 
(ET) is not very widespread (Kallbekken et al., 2011; Oh & Svendsen, 2015). The alleged underuse 
is related to the low willingness to pay for the environment and the unpopularity of 
environmental taxation with the public. People are often opposed to the implementation of an 
ET, even when they support the objective behind it (Beuermann & Santarius, 2006; Kallbekken 
& Aasen, 2010).  
In general, part of the unpopularity of the tax instrument is due to the fact that coercive policy 
instruments, such as a tax or a ban, are less appealing to people than positive instruments, such 
as a subsidy or suasion instruments (Hood, 1983). McCaffery and Baron (2003a) call this 
 
68  We use the term ‘regulatory’ in the broad sense, following the American school definition: “Regulation is any 
attempt by the government  to control the behavior of citizens” (Meier, 1985). In the standard English school, the 
term is defined more narrowly as all prohibitions and obligations imposed by government (Vedung, 1998). 
69 Although in a second-best world with uncertainty, the efficiency of environmental taxes is subject to certain 
conditions, such as the slope of the marginal abatement curve and the marginal damage curve (Perman et al., 
2003). 
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phenomenon ‘penalty aversion’. Subsidies are a voluntary instrument, whereas taxation and 
command-and-control instruments “restrict people's freedom of choice and force people to 
change their own behavior” (Steg et al., 2006, p. 94). To Stern et al. (1993), this coerciveness 
aversion is a simple expression of the fact that people act out of self-interest. According to Attari 
et al. (2009, p. 1702), “hard regulations evoke psychological reactance, and individuals look for 
ways to re-establish their lost freedom”.  
However, the dislike of coercive policy instruments does not provide a conclusive explanation 
for the limited support for Pigouvian taxation. Taxation seems to arouse even more opposition 
than command-and-control instruments. Franzen and Meyer (2010) found that consumers’ 
willingness to pay higher prices for the environment was significantly higher than their 
willingness to pay higher taxes for the environment, although those two options would have 
identical implications for them in practice. According to Clinch et al. (2006, p. 968), taxes have 
“particularly negative connotations”. In the climate change related cap-or-tax debate, Avi-Yonah 
and Uhlmann (2009, p. 7) call an emissions trading scheme more politically feasible “simply 
because it is not labelled a tax”. Nordhaus (2007) takes this conclusion even one step further, 
attaching the label “almost a four letter word” to a tax. Baron and Jurney (1993) and Kallbekken 
et al. (2011) found that people would sometimes vote against a tax reform even when it is to 
their benefit, a phenomenon which is referred to as tax aversion. Insights from behavioural 
economics (see section 2.2) provide some explanations for this - seemingly irrational – citizen 
attitude. In addition, two hypotheses from the literature may add to the understanding of tax 
aversion, which tends to be even greater in the context of the environment than in other fields 
(Green Fiscal Commission, 2009a). First, contrary to what studies find, people have a tendency 
to believe that Pigouvian taxation is not effective in changing behaviour to the benefit of the 
environment, or they at least underestimate its effects (Baranzini et al., 2014). Second, people 
do not believe that government will spend the revenues from the environmental tax in an 
optimal way. These and other hypotheses explaining low acceptance of environmental taxation 
are further detailed in section 2.3. 
2.2 Other explanations for low acceptance of environmental taxation 
The theory of using taxation to internalize externalities traces back to the work of Pigou (1920) 
and has been further elaborated by many other authors, such as Baumol and Oates (1988) and 
Coase (1960). The theory of Pigouvian taxation is based on the neoclassical theory of rational 
choice, which assumes that economic agents act in a rational way according to their individual 
preferences in such a way that their utility (or profit for companies) is maximized. However, the 
assumptions of the neoclassical model have since long been under attack by a variety of 
theoretical schools, including public choice theory, for having a ‘romantic and illusory’ notion of 
how governments function (Buchanan & Tollison, 1984). Instead, Buchanan and Tullock (1975) 
and other public choice scholars claim that rational politicians let themselves be influenced by 
the preferences of the actors who are subject to the policy, and that policy makers will be wary 
of implementing policies that go against the desire of the ‘median voter’ (Peters, 1991). This 
situation would engender suboptimal (instrument) choices which can be regarded as 
government failures (Caplan, 2001). 
Public choice theory, in turn, has been criticized for making a caricature of individuals (Cullis & 
Jones, 1998). Disciplines such as economic psychology and behavioural economics explain the 
‘failures’ of individuals by arguing that people, including policy makers, are facing bounded 
rationality (Simon, 1955). Policy makers do not maximize (benefits over costs) but aim to 
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satisfice, or aim for ‘good enough’. They still seek rationality, but resort to unavoidable 
simplification to reduce complexity and keep matters manageable. More specifically, they use 
heuristics and are prone to biases when making decisions under uncertainty (Kahneman, 2003). 
Applied to environmental taxation, some of these biases contribute to explaining why support 
for environmental taxation and environmental tax reform is limited. The first of seven biases is 
fiscal illusion (Wagner, 1976): people’s cognitive skills are limited, and even modestly complex 
tax systems or reforms cause them to make systematic optimization errors (McCaffery & Baron, 
2003a; Chetty et al., 2009). For example, in case of an ETR, people clearly see and feel the 
environmental tax, but they do not (or much less) see or consider the benefits they get from the 
revenue recycling. For this reason, tax reforms with an environmental tax element and a labour 
tax element may just be too complex to grasp for most citizens. A second bias, related to the 
first, is the role of salience. People tend to dislike transparent taxes more than less visible ones
70
, 
even when they have the same value (Chetty et al., 2009). Third, the isolation effect and the 
aggregation effect refer to people’s failure to aggregate wins and losses in complex tax reforms 
and to look at the whole picture (McCaffery & Baron, 2003b, 2003a). A fourth bias is that 
people’s perceived probabilities are distorted by desires, a phenomenon which McCaffery and 
Baron (2003a) refer to as wishful thinking. This may explain why people tend to believe subsidies 
are more effective than taxes to realise environmental goals, contrary to what studies find 
(Rienstra et al., 1999). A fifth relevant bias is the endowment effect, which refers to the fact that 
people tend to attach more value to the losses related to a tax reform than to the gains (Thaler, 
1980; Daugbjerg & Svendsen, 2003). Hence, revenue-neutral reforms may not be sufficient to 
gain the public’s approval for an environmental tax reform. The sixth bias is the so-called metric 
effect, which means that expressing an environmental tax in monetary terms (e.g. in euro) 
instead of a percentage change will reduce acceptability (McCaffery & Baron, 2003b; Hsu et al., 
2008). The seventh phenomenon is the role of framing. In the context of an ETR, an example of 
positive framing or labelling would be to avoid the word ‘tax’ and replace it by ‘contribution’, 
‘fee’ or just a description. Positive framing may entail increased support for an ETR (Kahneman 
& Tversky, 1984; Brannlund & Persson, 2012).  
2.3  Empirical literature on support for ET and ETR  
Several empirical studies have searched for determinants that help explain the support for 
environmental taxation. While a detailed systematic meta-analysis is beyond the scope of this 
paper, a multi-study comparison sheds light on the likely determinants of acceptance of ET. A 
summary of the empirical literature is presented in table 6.  Each number refers to a study and 
the numbered reference list is added below the table. 
  
 
70  For example, a road toll tax with automatic payment by direct debit 
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Table 6.  Determinants of support for ET and ETR: overview of empirical literature 
factor Effect on support for ET 
Socioeconomic and demographic determinants 
Income  Pos in 24, 29, 44; neg in 27; inc in 3, 18, 38, 45, 47, 51   
Age Pos in 2, 44; neg in 24, 38, 51; inc in 3, 13, 29, 45 
Gender (F) Pos in 2; inc in 3, 29, 33, 38, 45, 51 
Education  Pos in 3, 24, 29, 44, 51; neg in 27, 38 (both on transport) 
Household size Pos in 27; incl in 45  
Unemployed Neg in 51; inc in 3, 45 
Car ownera Neg in 3, 19, 29, 51; inc in 27, 38 
Being a car commuter Neg in 19, 29, 45 
Frequent bicycle user Pos in 19, 24, 45 
Frequent public transport user Pos in 45; neg in 19, 24 
Living in city Pos in 51 
Health problem related to pollution Pos in 24 
Value-related determinants 
Trust in government Pos in 3, 5, 19, 22, 25, 33, 51  
Environmental concern Pos in 2, 3, 8, 16, 18, 24, 25, 33, 41 
Right-wing ideology Neg in 2, 25, 38, 51; inc in 3 
ETR = Infringement of freedom Neg in 2, 16, 18, 30 
Perceived domestic pollution Pos in 38 
Expecting efforts by others Pos in 3 
Perceived co-benefits of CO2 reduction Pos in 3 
Determinants related to the design of the ETR/ other determinants 
Perceived effectiveness of the ETR Pos in 4, 5, 8, 19, 28, 33, 35, 38, 41, 45, 47, 48, 50       
Perceived fairness / ETR not regressive Pos in 4, 5, 6, 10, 14, 16, 18, 23, 31, 33, 34, 35, 36, 46; neg in 14, 33  
Perceived personal cost of the ETR Pos in 3, 9, 25, 45, 47, 48 
Specific trust that government can and will 
keep promise of earmarking 
Pos in 4, 5, 9, 10, 12, 14, 19, 24, 27, 29, 36  
Already have ETR Neg in 5, 15 
Perceived negative employment effects  Inc in 3 
Level of understanding of the ETR Pos in 5, 28 
See ETR as complex Neg in 5, 19 
Labelling: not call it a ‘tax’ Pos in 6, 26, 34 
Specificity ET Pos (for low tax rates) in 39; neg in 1, 41 
RR: lump sum paymentsb Pos in 34 
RR: ETRc Pos in 1, 3, 4, 5, 17, 27, 29, 32, 38, 40, 44, 45   
RR: earmarkingd Pos in 1, 3, 4, 5, 6 11, 12, 17,  20, 21, 29, 32, 34,40, 44, 49  
Trial period Pos in 9, 52 
Threshold type of taxe Pos in 7, 9, 42, 43 
Tax base is pollution and not resources Pos in 37 
Tax base refers to local pollution, not global Pos in 37 
Providing more information Pos in 5, 32; neg in 19; inc in 34, 52  
Pos, neg = positive, negative effect on support for ET, inc = inconclusive or no effect, RR = revenue recycling 
Notes: 
a. Road pricing and local congestion taxes, such as in London or Stockholm, are included in this literature 
overview, because they qualify as ET. However, the acceptance of such local tax systems tends to show 
some specificities, such as the stronger negative effect of owning a car, and the weaker positive effect of 
education.  
b. Compared to an environmental tax with no mention of revenue recycling (for more explanation on 
revenue recycling options, see below in this section).  
c. Compared to RR with lump sum payments 
d. Compared to RR (= revenue recycling) with ETR 
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e. Compared to a regular ET. A threshold environmental tax is a tax with a zero tax rate up to a certain level 
of emissions or resource use. For example, an electricity tax with a zero tax rate for the first 3 MWh per 
household, and a positive tax rate above that threshold (Pezzey, 2006). 
References: 1. Amdur et al. (2014) 2. Attari et al. (2009) 3. Baranzini and Carattini (2017) 4. Baranzini et al. (2014) 5. 
Beuermann and Santarius (2006) 6. Brannlund and Persson (2012) 7. Bristow et al. (2010) 8. Brouwer et al. (2008) 9. 
Cherry et al. (2014) 10. Clinch et al. (2006) 11. Convery et al. (2007) 12. Deroubaix and Lévèque (2006) 13. Dietz et al. 
(1998) 14. Dresner et al. (2006) 15. Ercolano et al. (2012) 16. Eriksson et al. (2008) 17. Felder and Schleiniger (2002) 
18. Fujii et al. (2004) 19. Gaunt et al. (2007) 20. Globescan and PIPA (2007) 21. Green Fiscal Commission (2008) 22. 
Green Fiscal Commission (2009a) 23. Green Fiscal Commission (2009b) 24. Gupta (2016) 25. Hammar et al. (2008) 26. 
Hardisty et al. (2009) 27. Harrington et al. (2001) 28. Heres et al. (2013) 29. Hsu et al. (2008) 30. Jakobsson et al. 
(2000) 31. Joireman et al. (2001) 32. Kallbekken and Aasen (2010) 33. Kallbekken and Sælen (2011) 34. Kallbekken et 
al. (2011) 35. Kallbekken et al. (2013) 36. Klok et al. (2006) 37. Konisky et al. (2008) 38. Krupnick et al. (2001) 39. 
Lachapelle and Borick (2011) 40. Leiserowitz et al. (2016) 41. OECD (2006) 42. Pezzey (2006) 43. Pezzey and Jotzo 
(2013) 44. Rienstra et al. (1999) 45. Schade and Schlag (2003) 46. Schlag and Teubel (1997) 47. Schuitema et al. (2005) 
48. Schuitema et al. (2010) 49. Shaw (2009) 50. Steg et al. (2006) 51. Thalmann (2004) 52. Winslott-Hiselius et al. 
(2009) 
The study suggests the following conclusions. First, evidence that socioeconomic and 
demographic variables determine support for ET is inconclusive, with several studies finding 
contradictory results. Only education has a clear positive effect on support. Studies on the effect 
of income, age, gender, number of children and unemployment are inconclusive. Second, 
owning a car clearly influences one’s acceptance of ET. Some studies even find a proportional 
drop in support per car owned (Thalmann, 2004; Baranzini & Carattini, 2017). Third, people who 
distrust government are less likely to accept ET. In addition to this general distrust, people often 
do not trust government to keep its promise to spend the revenues from an ETR on the 
environment. Fourth, people are sceptical about the potential of Pigouvian taxation to change 
people’s behaviour in a more sustainable direction (effectiveness), and this arguably affects 
acceptability. Fifth, when an ETR is regressive in people’s perception, they are less likely to be in 
favour of ET. Sixth, public support for ET, as for other environmental policy solutions, tends to 
differ according to the depth and specificity of the question in the reviewed studies’ surveys. 
Expressed support for ‘paying an environmental tax to solve environmental problems’ is typically 
higher than for a specific tax such as higher fuel taxes. This may be explained by the fact that 
people do not think about concrete impacts or designs of environmental taxes before that 
concrete design is presented to them in a clear way with no room for misunderstanding (OECD, 
2006). Another explanation maybe the role of salience (see section 2.2). A seventh conclusion is 
that empirical studies confirm the expected effect of framing or labelling (see section 2.2). 
Finally, empirical studies find evidence for some of the other theoretical claims (see sections 2.1 
and 2.2), such as tax aversion, fiscal illusion, wishful thinking, salience, the metric effect, 
aggregation effect, framing and complexity. 
The last set of important empirical results relate to the importance of recycling the revenues 
from an ETR. According to economic theory, adding the revenues to the general budget is the 
option that maximises welfare at the societal level (Ian W. H. Parry, 1995). Government will then 
use these resources where it feels societal needs are the greatest, or – in economists’ terms – 
where the highest welfare gains can be achieved. However, adding the tax proceeds to the 
general budget makes for a very unpopular policy package. Opposition against environmental 
taxes is significantly lower when the tax proceeds are returned to the tax payers (‘revenue 
recycling’). Various ways of realising revenue recycling are available. We created a ‘Ladder of 
Acceptability of Revenue Recycling Options’ (LARRO) by putting six recycling options in declining 
order of acceptance, based on the available empirical literature: 
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(1) financing specific environmental programmes (also called earmarking or hypothecation); 
(2) reducing taxes on labour, consumption, corporate income, property or other distortionary 
taxes. Such an environmental tax reform (ETR) may reduce the distortionary impacts of the 
green taxes and even produce net employment creation (the  so-called double dividend) or 
other welfare gains; 
(3) returning the additional taxes from one sector to that same sector in a way that is not 
proportional to the emissions, pollution or resource use (sector neutrality);  
(4) eliminating or mitigating regressive effects of the ET;  
(5) lump-sum refund to the public; 
(6) reducing public debt or adding to the general budget (which is strictly speaking not 
revenue recycling). 
Several studies have revealed that the public does not prefer recycling the revenues by lowering 
taxes in other policy fields, such as labour, in a revenue-neutral way. Instead, the only recycling 
option that seems acceptable to most citizens, is the earmarking option: using the additional 
revenues for measures that clearly benefit the environment. These results point to the existence 
of a trade-off between efficiency and acceptability: the most efficient policy solutions get the 
lowest public support and vice versa (Rienstra et al., 1999; Felder & Schleiniger, 2002; Amdur et 
al., 2014).   
Economists refer to this type of preference as non-rational. Several studies have dug deeper into 
the explanations for this phenomenon. First, people find it very hard to understand the link 
between ET and labour taxation; they do not see the logic behind it and therefore they reject it 
(Thalmann, 2004; Beuermann & Santarius, 2006). Second, from studies covering countries that 
had implemented ETRs, it appeared that people tend to be aware of the environmental tax side 
of the tax reform (the cost), but unaware of the fact that their labour taxes had gone down as 
well (the benefit) (Dresner et al., 2006). Third, even when they were explained that the 
government revenue would be fully recycled through lower labour taxes, many people in the 
study did not believe it and reckoned the reform would still, at the end of the day, fill 
government’s pockets (Kallbekken et al., 2011; Cherry et al., 2014). The preference for 
earmarking is apparently related to the issue of trust (Anesi, 2006). Fourth, studies have 
reported that people’s unease with the ETR lies in the confusing terminology. The term 
‘ecological tax reform’ is problematic, as both ‘ecological’ and ‘tax’ are negatively connotated, 
and it contains no reference to labour (Dresner et al., 2006). Alternative framing and labelling 
could possibly increase support for an ETR (see section 2.2). 
3 |  Hypotheses and data 
Based on the theoretical and empirical literature study, we propose three hypotheses, which we 
test using a large-scale survey. 
Hypothesis 1. Acceptance of and willingness to pay (WTP) for environmental taxes (ET) is 
generally low, and lower for a specific tax (described in detail) than for environmental taxation 
in general (specificity hypothesis). 
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Hypothesis 2. Education and environmental concern are determinants of support for 
environmental taxes (ET), while age, gender, income, unemployment, household size, home 
ownership and being religious are not.  
Hypothesis 3. Based on the literature, we rank the revenue recycling options as follows (in 
descending order of support): 
a. Earmarking for the environment; 
b. Lowering labour taxes (equal reduction of employer and employee social 
security contributions); this is the ETR-option; 
c. Repayment to the economic sectors that face the highest risk of job losses 
owing to the ET; 
d. Lump sum repayment to the public; 
e. Lowering corporate income taxation (company profit tax) 
f. Government debt reduction/general budget 
We call this hierarchy the ‘Ladder of Acceptability of Revenue Recycling Options (LARRO)’. 
The empirical analysis in this paper is based on LEVO 2012, a survey conducted in Flanders, the 
northern part of Belgium. LEVO is the Dutch acronym for “LEvensomstandigheden in Vlaanderen 
Onderzocht” (research on living conditions in Flanders). It is an annual large-scale survey 
organised in the framework of a research seminar at the economics faculty of Ghent University. 
The fieldwork is carried out by master’s students, while the organization, supervision, controlling 
and cleaning is performed by the authors. The main subject of the survey was living conditions 
and wellbeing but several questions were added on the topic of acceptance of ET. The survey 
used quota sampling and data was gathered from 1308 respondents. The data are statistically 
weighted to obtain a sample that is representative of the Flemish population in terms of 
employment situation, gender and age.  
The data include socioeconomic and demographic characteristics such as age, gender, having a 
relationship, home ownership, health, number of children, income and being religious. For 
income, a distinction was made between objective income (in euro) and subjective income, 
which was a self-assessment scale ranging from 0 ’completely disagree’ to 10 ‘completely agree’ 
for the position “My (household) income is sufficient to live well”. 
A question on the degree to which material expectations are met (a percentage between 0 and 
100) offered an alternative wealth indicator. Finally, the survey contained questions related to 
a self-rating on twelve personality traits on a numeric 7-point scale: extrovert, altruistic, 
conscientious-dutiful, worried, hard to please, creative, optimistic, self-confident, emotional, 
progressive, jealous and having high expectations.   
Finally, the questionnaire contained two questions related to environmental concern: “Do you 
think government is doing enough to tackle environmental problems?” and “Do you see climate 
change as a problem?”. Both questions had five-point Likert response scales. 
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4 |  Results and discussion 
4.1 Support and WTP for environmental taxes 
The questionnaire contained one question on the respondents’ general acceptance of ET and 
one question on the acceptability of a specific carbon tax, levied on all energy products. The 
results are presented in table 7. 
Table 7. Support for the general principle of ET and for a specific carbon tax (%) 
 
Strongly 
opposed 
Rather    
opposed  
Rather   in 
favour 
Strongly in 
favour 
General environmental tax 14.5 36.1 42.3 7.1 
Specific carbon tax 19.2 45.6 30.7 4.5 
Nearly half of the respondents support the general idea of environmental taxation. Support 
declines to 35% when the tax is specified as a carbon tax that will raise energy prices. A Wilcoxon 
Rank test indicates that this difference is statistically significant (p=0.000). Consequently, our 
first research hypothesis, the specificity hypothesis, is confirmed. This result is important, 
because in reality the details of any announced environmental tax will be actively divulged by 
either the government or the opponents of the tax (Gaunt et al., 2007). Therefore, the survey 
result for the specific tax is a better predictor for real-life support than the general 
environmental tax result. 
A third question directly gauged people’s willingness to pay a carbon tax on energy, by asking 
which rise of the monthly energy bill people would find acceptable (table 8).  
Table 8. Willingness to pay a carbon tax on energy (€/month rise of the energy bill) 
 Max €0 Max €10 Max €20 Max €30 Max €40 Max €50 Total 
% 30.2 44.0 16.7 5.0 0.9 3.2 100,0 
The willingness to pay is low: 30% does not accept a higher energy bill, while 44% is willing to 
pay (only) €10. This result is in line with other studies and with the answers to the two support 
questions. It also confirms the existence of a trade-off between acceptability and efficiency, as 
we concluded in section 2.3. Note that in this stage, revenue recycling was not mentioned in the 
questionnaire.  
To examine the link between support and willingness to pay, we construct a high support and a 
low support group for the two support questions. People who are ‘rather in favour’ or ‘strongly 
in favour’ of the tax are classed in the ‘high support group’ for that type of tax. Those who are 
‘rather opposed’ or ‘strongly opposed’ to the tax end up in the ‘low support group’. The four 
answering possibilities are combined in table 9. A large majority (73%) is consistently in favour 
of or opposed to both taxes. A Bonferonni post hoc test indicates that all pairwise comparisons 
of averages are significantly different (p=0,000) except for the two differentiated categories (low 
support for one and high for the other). Moving from low to differentiated, the WTP doubles, 
and then from differentiated to high support for both taxes, the WTP triples compared to the 
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low support group. This result provides support for the assumption made in the introduction 
that WTP can be regarded as an indirect measure of support for environmental taxation. 
Table 9. Mean WTP in terms of acceptance of general and specific environmental taxes 
  % Mean WTP 
Low support for both 43.9 6.52 
Low support for general ET and high support for carbon tax 6.5 12.28 
High support for general ET and low support for carbon tax 20.8 11.5 
High support for both 28.8 18.00 
Total   11.24 
4.2 Determinants of WTP and support for ET 
Table 10 shows which variables are important for understanding the inter-individual variation in 
the WTP. We perform an ordinary least square (OLS) regression using the maximum amount as 
dependent variable (e.g. for those indicating they want to pay maximum €10, the WTP variable 
equals €10). The selection of variables in the OLS model is based on bivariate significance tests. 
This means that several standard socioeconomic variables are not selected for the final model 
because they are not significant: age (and age square), gender, personality, education of the 
mother, having a relation, having children, being religious and being in good health. Objective 
income (in euro) and education are both significant, but since they are strongly correlated and 
education is more important than objective income, only education (years of schooling) is 
included in the model and objective income is not. Subjective income (self-assessment, income 
is sufficient to live well) is more significant than objective income and more independent from 
education, so it is selected for the model. Furthermore, the variable ‘material expectations 
realized’, as a proxy for ‘wealth’, is added to the model. Finally, we included some variables 
related to environmental concern. We create two dummies for the opinion whether 
government is doing enough for the environment: too little effort and too much effort; the 
reference category is ‘adequate effort’. To capture the opinion of respondents on global 
warming, we add a dummy for those who consider it as a (big) problem; the reference category 
is ‘minor problem or deny the issue’. 
Table 10. Ordinary least squares (OLS) estimates for WTP an ET 
 
Unstandardized coefficients Significance 
(Constant) -8.42 .000 
Education (per year of schooling) 0.56 .000 
Income sufficient to live well (subjective income) 0.84 .000 
Material expectations realised  0.05 .006 
Government_little effort 1.90 .006 
Government_much effort -4.09 .009 
Global warming_problem 3.19 .000 
Prob>F 0.000 
R Square 0.130 
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All variables in the OLS regression model are significant, which means that they influence the 
WTP for ET. The table should be read as follows: 
- each additional year of schooling increases WTP by €0.56;  
- each point that subjective income is rated higher (on a 1 to 10 scale) increases WTP by 
€0.84; 
- each percentage point that material expectations are more met increases WTP by €0.56; 
- the WTP of respondents who think that government is not doing enough to protect the 
environment is €1.90 higher compared to those who think government is doing enough; 
- the WTP of respondents who think that government is doing too much to protect the 
environment is €4.09 lower compared to those who think government is doing enough; 
- the WTP of respondents who consider global warming as a (big) problem is €3.19 higher 
compared to those who think it is a minor problem or who deny the issue.  
The conclusion from the standardised coefficients analysis is that education is the most 
important determinant of WTP.  
Further testing using an ordinal logit model with the same variables provides similar results.
71
 
Our analysis provides evidence to confirm our second hypothesis: education, income and 
environmental concern are determinants of support or WTP for ET, whereas most other socio-
demographic variables are not. These results are in line with the findings of other studies, 
although many other studies were inconclusive on the effect of income. In this study, we found 
a small positive effect of income expressed in monetary terms and a stronger effect of the 
subjective parameter of having an income that is ‘sufficient to live well’. 
4.3 Support for Environmental Tax Reform (ETR) 
Environmental taxes are aimed at inducing behavioural responses benefiting the environment. 
However, they also generate revenue, which could be ‘recycled’ to ‘compensate’ for the taxes. 
Seven such revenue recycling options were presented to the participants of the survey. 
Table 11 shows that the highest support goes to the two earmarking options, in which the 
revenues of the environmental taxes are spent on environmental policies. The option of 
‘investments in renewable energy’ receives the highest support, closely followed by the option 
‘actions to improve the climate or the environment’. The ETR receives lower support but remains 
a popular recycling option in the eyes of the survey participants. The relatively small difference 
in acceptability between earmarking and ETR is also found by Thalmann (2004) but Baranzini 
and Carattini (2017) find a larger difference. Behind these three preferred options, acceptability 
drops sharply for public debt reduction, lump sum repayments and specific sector refunds. 
Finally, reducing corporate taxation is the least preferred option by far for the participants.  
To test whether the average support for the alternatives differs significantly, a pairwise 
comparison is performed. The p-values of the Wilcoxon rank test are provided in the last column 
of table 11, each time compared to the alternative in the line above. 
 
71 These results can be obtained from the authors on request 
  
116 
Table 11. Public support for different compensating mechanisms (%) 
 
Strongly 
opposed 
Rather 
opposed  
Rather in 
favour 
Strongly in 
favour 
p-value 
Wilcoxon 
test 
Investment in renewable energy (earmarking) 4.4 14.0 47.7 33.9 
 
Actions to improve the climate or the 
environment (earmarking) 
3.3 15.0 54.8 26.9 0.005 
Reducing labour taxes such that both employers 
and employees get half of the advantages (ETR) 
7.1 19.7 42.5 30.6 0.011 
Reducing public debt 17.0 29.9 36.0 17.1 0.000 
Refund with an equal share to all people living in 
Flanders 
20.5 27.2 35.9 16.4 0.209 
Refund to those economic sectors that are 
suffering from the carbon tax to prevent loss of 
jobs or delocalization 
15.0 35.6 39.4 10.0 0.363 
Reducing corporate taxes  23.8 39.2 25.2 11.8 0.000 
The results largely support our third hypothesis regarding the ‘Ladder of Acceptability of 
Revenue Recycling Options (LARRO)’. Only the option of reducing public debt is ranked higher 
than in most other empirical studies. A speculative explanation for this difference may lie in the 
fact that Belgium is a ‘debt-burdened’ country, with public debt exceeding 106% of GDP in 
2016.
72
 Another hypothesis is that our phrasing of this option as ‘debt reduction’, may be more 
acceptable to the public than the option ‘adding to the general budget’. Future research could 
provide a clearer answer to this question.  
5 |  Conclusion  
In this paper, we examined the determinants and the conditions of public support for 
environmental taxation and environmental tax reform. Most of the empirical insights are 
immediately policy relevant and can instantly be translated into policy recommendations. 
Therefore, the main conclusions of this paper are presented as a recommended policy package.  
This paper has shown that ET and ETR are delicate operations from the perspective of public 
acceptance. However, the trade-off between acceptability (earmarking) and efficiency (ETR) can 
significantly be abated by designing an ETR with the following six characteristics. First (and 
foremost), the majority of the tax revenues should be spent on improving the environment. 
Second, significant time and budget should be spent on communicating the ETR, with a focus on 
highlighting the benefits to the public of both the ET side (environmental improvement; 
highlighting the costs of inaction) and the revenue spending side (the ETR). Specific attention 
should be given to preparatory (independent) studies providing evidence for the environmental 
 
72 Figures from http://www.debtagency.be/nl/cijfers/nlensemble-des-pouvoirs-publics/datagovernment 
debtdebtratio , accessed March 17, 2017. 
  
117 
effectiveness of the environmental tax. This study should be communicated in a way that it 
reaches a large public, using language that is understandable to all. Third, providing specificity 
on the ET is unavoidable. Trust in the government’s good intentions with the tax reform may be 
enhanced by providing full transparency and coherence, both in the design and throughout the 
policy process of ETR. Moreover, specificity and salience on the revenue spending side should 
be a target. For example, a reduction of labour taxes could be mentioned explicitly on monthly 
salary slips and the annual tax assessment for reasons of salience. Tax increases are to be 
communicated in percentages, and tax reductions in absolute currency. Fourth, to overcome 
the endowment effect, the whole operation could be made ‘more than revenue-neutral’, i.e. 
creating a net cost for government. Fifth, spending part of the revenues to mitigate the 
regressive impact of the ETR will increase acceptability. Sixth, the possibility of a trial period and 
a ‘threshold Pigouvian tax’ instead of a regular tax should be studied and considered. At the 
same time, these additions should not increase complexity too much: the more complex the 
ETR, the less likely it will be supported by the public. 
In this study, several hypotheses were tested and variables were identified that may determine 
or explain support for a green tax reform. However, the study has also demonstrated that public 
acceptability and ETR are complex phenomena, and despite the multitude of existing studies, 
many potential determinants and design improvements have not (yet) been uncovered or fully 
understood yet. There is a need for a better understanding of the acceptability conditions of 
ETR. An experimental study on the effectiveness of measures or design choices that tackle the 
efficiency-acceptability trade-off could aim at transforming an ‘efficient but unacceptable’ ETR 
into an ‘efficient and acceptable’ one. Furthermore, future empirical studies could shed a light 
on the role of co-benefits of a carbon tax, on ways to convince the public of the effectiveness of 
environmental taxation, and on the potential of innovative policy mixes, including threshold 
taxation, trial periods and bonus-malus systems. Finally, knowledge on the Ladder of 
Acceptability of Revenue Recycling Options (LARRO) could be expanded by adding smart policy 
mixes to the recycling options. 
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Conclusions 
 
1 |  Introduction 
This concluding chapter provides an overview of the main conclusions of this PhD study. Two 
groups of conclusions are distinguished. The first group concerns transversal conclusions that 
are based on multiple parts of the PhD study and on the literature. They offer in-depth 
reflections on the use of environmental taxation in policy mixes, the observed trade-offs 
between the efficiency of an ETR on the one hand, and its acceptability and regressivity on the 
other hand, the importance of instrument design and the role of the government as a leader or 
follower of new societal trends and challenges. The second group of conclusions are directly 
aimed at answering the eight ‘level 3’ research questions that were formulated at the outset of 
the research project.  
Further sections of this chapter discuss the contributions and limitations of the PhD research. 
The chapter ends by presenting two types of recommendations. The first group of 
recommendations is aimed at future research, whereas the second group contains 
recommendations for policy makers.  
2 |  Transversal conclusions 
2.1 The do’s and the don’ts of policy mixes 
One of the transversal lessons of this PhD study is that environmental taxation alone will not 
offer the solutions to all complex environmental problems. As environmental problems are 
increasingly complex in nature (Bennear & Stavins, 2007; Rogge & Reichardt, 2016), solving them 
will require long-lasting and complex policy interventions, involving multiple instruments, 
strategies, target actors and policy processes. Among these integrated strategies, effective and 
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efficient policy mixes constitute the most central challenge, comprising a combination of 
instruments and policy processes.  
Policy mixes can be designed for different reasons: 
- As an answer to the complexity of the societal problem, for example climate change 
mitigation;  
- When multiple externalities or policy goals exist, for example reducing carbon emissions 
and unemployment at the same time; 
- To increase acceptability, for example an ETR with an environmental subsidy as a 
revenue-recycling measure; 
- To compensate stakeholders for any losses caused by the main policy instrument, for 
example an ETR with repayment to the sectors that pay the tax; 
- To reduce negative side effects of the main policy instrument, for example an ETR that 
includes measures to reduce regressivity or competitiveness losses; 
- To reduce economic distortions that may be caused by the main policy instrument, for 
example an ETR with increased environmental taxation and reduced labour taxation. 
The policy mix that is mentioned most often in this PhD study is an environmental tax reform 
(ETR), but various other combinations with an environmental tax are possible. An interesting 
option that is rarely referred to in the literature is the environmental subsidy reform (ESR), which 
is the mirror image of an ETR. Firms get a subsidy for environmental improvement, but at the 
same time they are required to make lump-sum repayments to the government, which aims at 
revenue-neutrality (Perman et al., 2003, p. 236). Because of the compulsory repayments, this 
policy mix is a de facto bonus-malus scheme (see table 1 of the introductory chapter), with the 
most environmentally-friendly firms ending up with a net subsidy, and other firms ending up as 
net tax payers. ESR is an interesting theoretical policy mix, but we did not find any applications 
in practice. Presumably, ESR is not popular as the budgetary impact for both the government 
and the target group may be hard to predict. Moreover, ESR may face serious acceptability 
problems, as because of the endowment effect (see paper 4), the net payers may feel robbed 
more than the net receivers feel blessed. 
In most cases, policy mixes consist of independently operating instruments, for example a 
carbon tax and innovation subsidies for companies. In some cases, however, the instruments 
are integrated into one ‘hybrid’ instrument. A good example is an ETS with a price floor, which 
is currently implemented in the UK. Some policy mixes come about by policy packaging, which 
means that first any previously existing policies are removed at the outset and a new custom-
made policy mix is designed. But in most cases, removing existing policies is not easy, and new 
policies are often built upon existing policy tools. This process is called layering or policy patching 
(Howlett & Rayner, 2013).  
It is important to note that policy mixes are not a panacea for solving the problem of complexity 
in environmental taxation. On the contrary, poorly designed policy mixes run the risk of ending 
in policy failure or at least in poor efficiency. The three main conditions for a ‘smart’ policy mix 
(consistent instruments, coherent goals and congruency with policy style) have been discussed 
in section 3.2.5 of the introductory chapter. Furthermore, several risks and challenges should be 
considered before implementing a policy mix. First, unthoughtful layering of instruments poses 
the risk of overdesign: too many instruments are combined, which leads to an inconsistent policy 
portfolio (Howlett & Rio, 2015). Each instrument should have its own added value, and should 
not be decided just to please multiple stakeholders. Before implementing new ETs, it is more 
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efficient to first remove any environmentally harmful subsidies that may still be in place as these 
instruments counteract each other. Second, in some situations, combining certain instruments 
to cope with a single environmental problem should be avoided (Gunningham & Sinclair, 1999). 
A first example is the combination of an ETS and a carbon tax in the context of climate change 
mitigation. The effect of the tax erodes the effect of the ETS, leading to efficiency loss (Dias 
Soares, 2007). In a similar vein, implementing a tradable white certificate scheme to reduce 
emissions where an ETS is already implemented with the same goal, will not lead to additional 
emission reductions because the amount of allowances on the market does not change (Sorrell 
et al., 2009). Third, policy makers need to acknowledge that complex policy mixes require 
advanced policy coordination between different departments and government levels. For 
example, reforming Belgian company car subsidies for the benefit of the environment would 
require collaboration of at least eight policy actors:  
- Federal finance minister for the fiscal treatment; 
- Federal labour minister for salary regulations; 
- Three regional environmental ministers for the environmental aspects; 
- Three regional transport ministers for the mobility aspects. 
Additionally, for such governance reforms, several non-state actors should be consulted, 
including employers’ and employees’ organizations, sector federations, environmental 
movements, and drivers’ associations. In sum, this governance arrangement is immensely 
complex which increases the risk of policy layering and uncarefully designed policy mixes as a 
way of compromise. Moreover, empirical studies have emphasized that political cross-
departmental and multilevel government cooperation has so far been limited, ad hoc-based and 
not focused on the most central and politically-sensitive policy issues (Bachus & Spillemaeckers, 
2010). 
As a conclusion, in the context of complex environmental policy-making, policy mixes are an 
indispensable element in the toolbox of the government. However, policy mixes should be 
designed in a smart (=well-designed) way, which goes for each target, instrument and design 
element. If policy mixes are used as an easy solution or compromise for divergent political 
positions, they may end up being even less efficient than the ‘old-fashioned’ single instruments.  
2.2 The big trade-offs 
In paper 4 of this PhD study, I demonstrated the existence of a trade-off between efficiency and 
acceptability of an ETR. Using all the revenues from the ETR for environmental subsidies and 
investments will significantly improve its public acceptance (and its environmental 
effectiveness), but at the same time impair its efficiency. 
While this is an important conclusion, I feel it can be extended to more elements than just 
acceptability. After conducting this PhD study, I see three additional elements to the trade-off. 
First, a second trade-off exists between the efficiency and the equity of an ETR. We limit the 
notion of equity to the absence of regressive elements of the ETR. The most efficient ETR is the 
one that recycles the revenues to a reduction of the employers’ labour taxes or social security 
contributions. However, this adversely affects the situation of financially vulnerable households. 
Conversely, an ETR that hypothecates a significant part of the revenues to low-income families 
can be poverty-neutral or even progressive, but the lump-sum repayments to this target group 
inevitably affect the ETR’s efficiency. Second, a similar trade-off can be observed between 
efficiency and competitiveness: a lump-sum (or output-based) repayment to the sectors that 
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need to pay the environmental tax may minimize negative effects on competitiveness, but it will 
come at the cost of lower efficiency. Third, expanding our analysis to multiple evaluation and 
instrument choice criteria, I propose to introduce the notion of time into the trade-off 
discussion. It appears that the three trade-offs discussed in this section are at their highest in 
the short run, but gradually diminish over time. Some may even completely phase-out in the 
long run. I discuss this conclusion for the three trade-offs. 
First, for the acceptability trade-off, the fact that ET and ETR’s environmental effects are limited 
in the short run but strong in the long run (see paper 3) is a problem for the politics of ETR. 
Generally, people think about the future in terms of no more than ten years, and they find it 
hard to imagine effects or outlooks that go beyond that limit (Tonn et al., 2006). In most cases, 
they will simply ignore time changes in their assessment (Kunreuther et al., 1998). Thus, people 
find it hard to feel appreciation for a benefit (environmental improvement) that is – from their 
perspective - in the distant future. Likewise, political decision-making predominantly takes on a 
short-term perspective (Meadowcroft, 2009), as politicians’ rationality is equally bound by the 
temporal bias just as any other people’s. Moreover, politicians’ short-term bias or myopia is 
intensified by the political cycle of elections, which creates an additional incentive to focus on 
the short term (Bonfiglioli & Gancia, 2013). Sterner (2007, p. 3201) summarizes this problem as 
follows: 
“In the short run, there is little environmental effect but a big resistance that makes politicians 
hesitate. The important environmental effects come in the long-run but that is a limited 
consolation to politicians trying to get re-elected and therefore looking for visible progress in the 
short run.” 
Second, the regressivity trade-off is equally higher in the short run than in the long run. In the 
short run, many low-income families’ options to reduce their energy consumption after the 
introduction of an ETR will be limited. In the long run, the awareness of the higher cost will lead 
to some energy-saving behaviour, but a more important long run improvement can be expected 
from technology: the higher environment tax will improve environmental efficiency 
performance of new heating devices and the insulation of housing. However, the transition to a 
low-carbon society for low-income households faces more obstacles than for the average 
citizens. Consequently, repayments to this vulnerable group, particularly in the short run, are 
required, next to a policy mix to accelerate the transition for this societal group. This policy mix 
may contain, next to an ETR with targeted repayments, instruments such as minimal energy 
performance standards for rental housing and energy saving education for low-income families. 
Instruments that hollow-out the environmental effects of the ETR, such as rebates or 
exemptions for the ET part of the ETR, should be avoided in this policy process.  
Third, the competitiveness trade-off is often associated with reduced economic growth (S. 
Smith, 2003). In the short run, GDP loss on the meso and macro level is indeed possible in certain 
scenarios (Bassilière et al., 2009). After a couple of years, GDP loss declines or is even 
transformed in additional growth (Bossier & Vanhorebeek, 2003). The reason is that in the long 
run, the tax offers an incentive for improved technological development (see paper 3), which 
may lead to economic growth. In sum, compensating measures to sectors that pay the 
environmental tax can help to tackle short-term competitiveness losses. However, such support 
measures should be temporary and should be avoided in the cases where no sectoral losses 
occur as a result of an ETR.  
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2.3 Acceptability of sustainability transitions 
Paper 3 of this dissertation demonstrated that the policy makers face important limitations in 
their capacities to direct societal changes, including socio-technical transitions, in a desired 
(sustainable) direction. Government’s traditional top-down policy-making role, using decision-
making mechanisms and choosing policy instruments, seems insufficient to solve complex 
contemporary societal issues such as climate change. In addition, single instrument approaches, 
including the instrument of environmental taxation, face political and other challenges which 
prevents optimal instrument and design choices. 
While paper 3 demonstrates the challenges, paper 4 of this PhD offers several potential 
solutions coming from the field of behavioural economics. The first observation that can be 
made by combining the insights of paper 3 and paper 4 is related to the framing of a 
sustainability transition. Although ‘radical change’, ‘dominant regime’ actors and 
‘destabilization of incumbent regimes’ may be accurate terms to describe the normative 
elements of a socio-technical transition, they may not be the optimal labels to trigger a policy 
debate on the short term. While one of the policy recommendations in paper 4 was ‘do not call 
it a tax’, in this sense a new recommendation could be ‘do not call it a sustainability transition’, 
as the rather negative wording may deter both the large public and the policy maker. For 
example: ‘the implementation of a policy mix to accelerate the realization of a low-carbon 
economy’ may be a less threatening label than ‘a removal of all fossil-fuel subsidies to phase-
out coal’, while in practice the policy actions may be similar. An example of a policy label that 
has gained a lot of traction in and around policy subsystems is ‘circular economy’. While the 
traditional issues of ‘incinerating versus landfilling’ are still discussed under the new label, the 
much more positive term than the more traditional ‘waste management’ adds a positive 
association that is more capable of uniting radical environmental NGOs and conservative regime 
business actors behind the flag.  
2.4 The importance of instrument design and context conditions 
The design of an environmental tax is at least as important as the choice of the instrument. In 
this section, we give an overview of the most important design elements for an ET, divided into 
four groups: design elements related to the tax level, the tax base, the revenue recycling and 
other design elements.  
Design conclusions related to the tax level 
- The optimal tax rate is inversely proportional to the price elasticity of the tax base 
(Ramsey, 1927). In other words: in case of an inelastic demand, the tax rate can/should 
be higher. 
- The optimal environmental tax rate in a first-best world equals the marginal damage 
cost (or the marginal external cost) of the pollution (Perman et al., 2003). In a second-
best world, under imperfect competition, the tax should be lower than the marginal 
damage cost (Ebert & von dem Hagen, 1998). 
- A downside of a regulatory tax is that it is hard to determine the optimal tax rate from 
the outset. There is a risk of suboptimal efficiency when a tax rate is too low or too 
restrictive (Hepburn, 2006). In theory, the policy maker can follow a trial-and-error 
strategy, adjusting the tax rate one or multiple times, but politically this is difficult to 
push through. On the other hand, gradually increasing the tax rate in a pre-announced 
way will increase its efficiency, as the target groups have more time to adjust and 
anticipate (paper 1). 
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Design conclusions related to the tax base 
- The tax base should represent the objective of the policy intervention. For example, if a 
government wants to reduce NOx emissions of cars, an increase of both petrol and 
diesel excise taxes is not recommended, as a diesel car’s NOX exhaust is up to fifteen 
times higher than a petrol-powered car (Verbeek et al., 2014).  
- The tax should be linked to the emission as closely as possible. This means that if the 
objective is to reduce CO2 emissions, the tax should be the emission itself (Oates, 1995; 
Edenhofer et al., 2010). For example, raising car registration taxes will be a less efficient 
solution for diesel car CO2 emissions than a general CO2 tax. In practice, however, this 
general rule cannot always be followed because of problems related to measuring or 
enforcement, and proxies to the emissions are used (see introductory chapter, 3.3.2).  
Design conclusions related to ETR and revenue recycling 
- Part of the revenues from the ET should be dedicated to environmental purposes 
(earmarking) for reasons of public acceptability; 
- Conversely, the larger the part of the revenues that are used to cut back on distortionary 
taxation, the more efficient the ETR will be. This design condition can never fully be 
reconciled with the previous one. The only solution to this acceptability-efficiency trade-
off is a compromise, which is a typical feature of a policy mix.   
- Any ETR should be part of a broader policy mix, which includes a large communication 
campaign to explain to the public how it works, and convince people of its effectiveness 
and fairness.  
Other design conclusions 
- In case of a policy mix, the design of the tax should take into account consistency with 
the other instruments.  
- Exemptions to environmental taxation impair its effectiveness. It is therefore advisable 
to limit the exemptions and reduced rates as much as possible, and to tackle any side 
effects by compensating measures outside instead of inside the chosen environmental 
tax design. 
Next to the design, it is important to know the context conditions pertaining to the target group 
or sector, the cost curves and the policy environment. First, if the policy maker has limited 
information on the individual firms’ cost curves, a tax is a better instrument choice than an ETS 
(Perman et al., 2003). Second, in some cases where markets are absent and problems such as 
asymmetric information, moral hazard or other market failures are present, a tax may not be 
the best instrument choice (Perman et al., 2003). Third, when the marginal abatement cost 
curve is steeper than the slope of the marginal damage curve, taxes remain a strong instrument. 
However, when the marginal abatement cost curve is less steep than the marginal damage 
curve, other instruments such as command-and-control instruments may be more efficient than 
taxes (Baumol & Oates, 1988; Perman et al., 2003). 
2.5 Policy: leading or following public opinion?  
Do policy makers steer society in a certain direction by making policy, or do policy makers follow 
society by regulating new trends initiated by other actors? This question has been touched upon 
explicitly or implicitly on different occasions in this PhD study. It links to the policy-making 
models that were presented in the introductory chapter, where the rational model would 
support the second thesis, and the other models would take different positions in the spectre 
between the two opposing theses. This question equally links to the research question of 
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paper 3: the conclusion on the potential of government intervention in general or ET in specific 
to influence sustainability transitions will depend on the position one takes regarding the ‘role 
of the government’ question. The same can be said about paper 4: the perspective of a following 
government instead of a leading one would strongly increase the importance of public 
acceptability.  
As is the case with this sort of questions, in my view the truth lies somewhere between the two 
opposite positions. I agree with Geels (2012), who claims that “Policy makers have no privileged 
position outside the system (a ‘cockpit’) from which they can pull levers and change the transport 
system. Instead, they are part of the system and are constrained by their dependence on other 
actors.” According to Docherty and Shaw (2011), this dependence may have become stronger 
with macro-trends such as liberalization, privatization, deregulation, and devolution. Policy 
makers are dependent on industries for jobs, taxes, economic growth, and new technologies 
(Luger, 2000), and this makes them more receptive to industry wishes and lobbying, even when 
the public good is at stake. In a similar vein, policy makers need to consider the – often 
contradictory - expectations of many different actors, such as citizens (and voters), companies, 
sectors, NGOs, other government levels, administrations and agencies. On the other hand, I do 
not believe in a toothless and docile government as it is sometimes portrayed by sustainability 
transitions scholars. Past environmental successes have proven that government is sometimes 
capable of pushing through policies with or without the consent of all societal stakeholders. 
Examples include the ozone layer multilateral treaty on the international level and the sharp 
drop in dioxin emissions in Flanders. In sum, environmental taxes and other policy instruments 
can still play an important role in bringing about environmental change and encouraging a 
sustainability transition.  
3 |  Answering the research questions 
The eight level 3 research questions have been answered throughout this PhD study. In this 
section, a summarizing overview of all the answers is presented.  
[Q1] How can the (non-)use of ET be explained, departing from instrument choice theory?  
The origins of Pigouvian taxation can be positioned in the rational policy-making model. This 
model departs from rather unrealistic assumptions, which can also be said about the first-world 
theoretical model behind environmental regulatory taxation. However, even when the rational 
model is rejected for the more realistic mixed-scanning model, the policy maker whose 
rationality is bounded, can have sufficient information and skills to opt for a tax to solve an 
environmental problem. The actual instrument choice by the policy maker is based on both 
rational and political criteria, and policy subsystems can be identified as multi-stakeholder 
spaces where rational and political considerations lead to policy decisions in a dynamic process 
of discussion and bargaining.  
[Q2] How does ET compare to other policy instruments?  
ET can be positioned in the five-element taxonomy framework that is presented in the 
introductory chapter. First, ET is an economic instrument, based on the underlying mechanism 
of ‘exchange’. The target group has the choice to continue to pollute and pay the tax, or to abate 
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and exchange that effort with reduced tax payments. Second, ET is clearly a negative instrument, 
as the polluter who does not change his or her behaviour is ‘punished’ by having to pay the tax. 
However, when the ET is expanded to a revenue-neutral ETR (policy mix), positive and negative 
instruments are combined and some taxpayers will even end up paying less than in the situation 
before the ETR. Third, on the continuous scale of coercion from voluntary to compulsory, the tax 
is at the ‘compulsory’ side, indicating a high degree of coercion or intrusiveness. Again, by 
implement an ETR instead of a single ET, government can add multiple non-coercive instrument 
to the policy package, such as environmental subsidies, awareness campaigns, lump-sum 
compensations to poor families or repayments to economic sectors. Fourth, ET is a general 
measure, since the tax usually applies to a large target group and not to individual companies or 
citizens, although in specific cases the number of taxpayers can sometimes be limited. For 
example, if the Flemish government would introduce a tax on the extraction of quartz sand, the 
target group would be limited to just one company, Sibelco, as this is the only company 
extracting quartz sand in Belgium (Bachus & Van Eynde, 2013). Fifth, and finally, both an ET and 
an ETR are substantive instruments, which means that they are indirect regulatory policy 
instruments aimed at influencing the behaviour of certain societal actors.  
[Q3] How can the (under)use of ET in practice be explained?  
The fact that ET is an effective and efficient instrument in many situations can explain why this 
instrument is regularly used by many governments worldwide. However, other instruments, 
such as command-and-control instruments remain more popular, and the relatively recent 
breakthrough of climate change mitigation on most countries’ policy agendas has entailed a 
boom in the use of emissions trading schemes (ETS) but not of carbon taxation. In this PhD study, 
two explanations for the limited use of ET have surfaced. First, companies and economic sectors 
dislike (and will lobby against) negative instruments, as they raise their costs. If they cannot 
avoid them, they prefer grandfathered and even auctioned emissions trading to carbon and 
environmental taxation. Second, the public equally reject constraining policy instruments in 
general, and especially environmental taxes. An ETR with environmental earmarking is more 
acceptable to the public than a single tax, but a certain degree of reluctance towards any design 
involving an environmental tax will remain.   
[Q4] How can different types of indicators for measuring the greening of a tax system be 
evaluated?  
Revenue-based indicators are the most frequently-used type of indicators for measuring the 
greening of a tax system. They have the advantage of being readily available and comparable 
over time and between countries. However, they also have important downsides, with the most 
important being the validity problem: increased pollution or energy use can give a boost to rising 
revenues, which can lead to a ‘false-positive’ conclusion of greening. Aggregated tax rate-based 
indicators provide information that is complementary to the revenue-based indicators, as they 
are not linked to quantities. However, weighting choices to be made will always be somewhat 
arbitrary, which can equally affect validity. Individual tax rate-based indicators again provide 
complementary information, but only on a limited number of taxes and not on the whole tax 
system.  
[Q5] Which alternative aggregate indicator(s) can be developed to improve the existing set of 
indicators?  
Three new types of indicators are developed in this PhD study, none of which have been offered 
in the literature as alternatives to revenue-based indicators before. Especially the concept of 
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aggregate tax rate-based indicators is one of the innovative contributions of this PhD study. In 
paper 2, Laspeyres and Lowe types of index numbers are developed, next to individual tax rates 
and the OECD-developed implicit tax rate on energy as alternatives to revenue-based indicators. 
The three new types of indicators offer complementary insights on the greening of a tax system 
rather than making revenue-based indicators obsolete. This conclusion leads to the logical 
recommendation to use all four types of indicators together to come to a comprehensive 
conclusion on the greening of a tax system. 
[Q6] Given its policy context and comparing with the EU, is a carbon tax or an emissions trading 
scheme the optimal climate mitigation policy instrument for the case of China?  
Four perspectives are discussed to answer this question. First, from the perspective of 
administrative efficiency, a carbon tax is much easier to implement than a cap-and-trade system. 
Second, politically, China is no different from most other countries and political systems, in that 
a tax is the least popular policy instrument to regulate behaviour. Third, the distributional impact 
of a carbon tax may be more negative than an ETS, but this difference can fully be eliminated by 
recycling the revenues of an ETR with sufficient emphasis on avoiding a regressive impact. 
Fourth, the competitiveness impact of a tax and an ETS with full auctioning is expected to be 
similar. As a final observation, China’s choice to opt for an ETS with most allowances granted for 
free paves the way for the three trade-offs described in section 2.2 of this chapter. This choice 
affects effectiveness and efficiency, but improves political acceptability and alleviates 
regressivity and competitiveness concerns. 
[Q7] What is the potential of environmental taxation as a policy instrument for fostering 
sustainability transitions?  
The conclusion of paper 3 is that, although transitions are complex and the impact of 
government policy is often unpredictable, well-designed environmental taxes can contribute to 
a certain change in a desired direction. The highest impact of regulatory taxation lies in long-
term technological change and on influencing social practices and their underlying materials. In 
both cases, it is important to evaluate an environmental tax on its long-term effects, because 
elasticities tend to be larger in the long run than in the short run. In order for a tax to survive 
multiple government terms, it is advisable to take into account the recommendations of paper 4 
to increase political acceptability. The use of policy packages, environmental earmarking, 
communication instruments, and insights from behavioural economics will increase the chances 
of a well-designed ETR to survive more than one political term.  
[Q8] What are the factors determining public support for environmental tax reform and how 
can this support be increased? 
Two groups of determinants of public support for ET and ETR were derived from the literature 
and from our own survey analysis. The first group of determinants relates to the socio-
demographic and value-related background of citizens. They include education, ownership of a 
car and trust in government. The second group of determinants is related to the design of the 
tax or the tax reform. The fact that the largest number of determinants is in this group shows 
that it is possible for policy makers to improve the acceptability of an ETR. First, a significant part 
of the revenues should be hypothecated to the environment. Second, a large and transparent 
communication campaign is needed to convince the public of the environmental effectiveness 
of the policy mix and to raise people’s trust in government. Third, part of the revenues should 
be used for compensating financially vulnerable households. Fourth, insights from behavioural 
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economics should be integrated in the policy design, including salience and the endowment 
effect. And fifth, excessive complexity should be avoided as this will impair public support.  
4 |  Contribution to the literature 
This PhD study has contributed to the literature on theory, methodology and empirics. I see six 
theoretical contributions, one methodological and one empirical contribution.  
This PhD study combines various theoretical frameworks from political science and economics. 
On that account, the main original contribution of this study to theoretical literature does not 
lie in the in-depth treatment of one of those theoretical schools, but rather in the combination 
of different theoretical bodies, some of which have not been combined before. 
The first original contribution to theory is the mere theorization of the operationalization and 
the measurement of the greening of tax systems. This analysis is on the theoretical level of 
‘operationalization’, which, as I argued in section 3.1 of the introductory chapter, I see as a sixth 
level of theory on top of the five levels developed by Blaikie (2005). Before the publication of 
paper 2, the most frequently used indicators, based on tax revenues, were used and reproduced 
by both academics and policymakers, without any question on their underlying validity problem. 
A related second contribution is the combination of the theory behind indicator development 
for the greening of a tax system on the one hand, and index theory on the other hand (paper 2). 
This combination enabled the development of the new (tax rate-based) indicators, which are 
more valid for the measurement of the greening of tax system than revenue-based indicators. 
The third contribution of this PhD is the combination of the theory of environmental taxation 
and the theory of sustainability transitions (paper 3), aimed at explaining and predicting the 
impact of ET on sustainability transitions. Transition science has permeated economics literature 
much less than it has social science literature (van den Bergh & Kemp, 2006). As a result, there 
has not been much confrontation between those two theoretical schools, although both have 
their view on the role of government and policy instruments to reach long-term environmental 
goals. The combination of the two theoretical strands led to predictions of the potential of ET in 
policy mixes aimed at long-term sustainability transitions. These insights can be regarded as new 
hypotheses, which can be empirically tested in future research.  
The fourth contribution combines the literature on public support for policy instruments with 
the literature on environmental taxation (paper 4). I provided explanations for public support 
and willingness to pay by exploring possible relevant insights from instrument theory, economic 
theory and behavioural economics. Moreover, these theories are translated into three 
hypotheses, which are empirically tested, based on a large-scale survey. This exercise is level-
five theory use in Blaikie’s (2005) model (theoretical or explanatory systems).   
 
A fifth contribution lies in the combination of theoretical policy-making models and instrument 
theory with the economic policy instruments of carbon taxation and emission trading schemes 
(paper 1). This analysis contributed to explaining and predicting the impact of a choice for a 
carbon tax vs. an ETS, for the case of China, which can also be fit in Blaikie’s fifth level of theory 
use.  
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A sixth and final contribution is the fact that this PhD study links the literature on policy mixes 
with the literature strands of sustainability transitions and public support for policy instruments 
(Introduction and papers 3 and 4). This combination contributes to explaining the (non-)use of 
ET as an environmental policy instrument. For example, our empirical results on the ‘Ladder of 
Acceptability of Revenue Recycling Options (LARRO) offer significant refining on the existing 
knowledge on the determinants of support for ETR.  
On the methodological side, although some experts involved in the use of indicators for 
measuring the greening of a tax system were aware that the dominantly used indicators suffer 
from severe flaws, no efforts had been undertaken to improve the methodology. This PhD is the 
first effort to present alternatives for the dominant revenue-based indicators. Additionally, the 
choice to use index theory to improve the methodology for measuring the greening of a tax 
system was an original idea, first developed in this PhD study. The use of index theory enabled 
us to develop new types of aggregate tax rate-based indicators for the greening of the tax 
system, with higher validity than existing indicators. This contribution builds further on the 
theoretical first and second contributions listed above. In my view, the development of the 
indicators is a methodological contribution, while the use of index theory pertains to theory use. 
This analysis illustrates that methodological development can have a solid base in theory.  
Finally, what was also missing in the literature on environmental taxation was convincing 
empirical evidence on the determinants of support for environmental taxes from the public. The 
survey that was presented in this study (paper 4) adds to the knowledge on that behalf. We 
found empirical support for all three hypotheses: (1) support for ET is lower if taxes are specified 
in detail; (2) education, income and environmental concern are determinants for higher support 
for ET; and (3) our proposed ‘Ladder of Acceptability of Revenue Recycling Options (LARRO)’ 
offers a reliable ranking of revenue recycling options based on the preference on the public.  
5 |  Research limitations 
I see the combination of multiple theoretical bodies as one of the main original contributions of 
this PhD study. However, the downside of discussing a relatively large number of theoretical 
strands, is that their analysis is less profound than in most single-discipline PhD dissertations. 
The consequence is that readers who read this thesis with the perspective of one single 
discipline or theoretical strand, might feel unsatisfied with the depth of the theoretical analysis. 
However, I invite those readers to see the opportunity in learning more on the disciplines and 
literature strands that are new to them. In fact, the conviction that the confrontation of familiar 
literature with unexplored fields is an added value for any academic discipline was one of the 
main motivations for choosing a primarily political analysis of a primarily economic instrument 
as the topic of this PhD study.  
The second limitation relates to the case study carried out in paper 1. The Chinese case study 
was conducted based on desktop research and the experiences of my co-author in Chinese 
policy-making processes. In a similar research design in the future, interviews and other 
fieldwork could be added to further improve the empirical findings. Empirical evidence would 
decidedly make the claims made in paper 1 more credible. I give three examples. First, the claim 
that China’s institutional capacity to organize a new market is insufficient, deserves testing. At 
the time of writing of this concluding chapter (second half of 2017), the experience with the 
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Chinese pilot emission trading schemes could be empirically examined. Second, the claim that 
the chosen system of grandfathering would seriously limit the pilots’ efficiency should be tested. 
Finally, the question whether the design of any (efficiency-based) ETS in China is ambitious 
enough for realizing peak emissions followed by an absolute reduction should be answered 
empirically.  
In a similar vein, in paper 3, an empirical case on the impact of environmental taxation of 
technological development and behaviour change would have contributed to testing the 
hypotheses regarding the potential of ET for sustainability transitions. Although testing the 
impact of ET in the long run is a methodological challenge, empirical data could have provided 
indications in favour of (or against) the claim that ET can have a positive impact on a 
sustainability transition in the long run.  
A fourth limitation is the use of the newly developed indicator for measuring the greening of the 
tax system in paper 2. Although the indicator has a higher validity than the traditional indicators, 
it could further be improved. One improvement to focus on in the future is the development of 
a method for adding new environmental taxes and tax rate differentiation to the basket of 
environmental taxes. Another limitation of the new indicator is its complexity, which implies 
that only government administrations willing to learn and invest in the methodology will be able 
to use it.  
A fifth limitation is related to the survey in paper 4. Because of budget reasons, a separate survey 
could not be set up. I am thankful to my co-authors for adding a part on environmental taxes in 
their existing survey cycle, but obviously, the room for adding questions to the survey was 
limited. On the other hand, some of the variables used in the ‘general’ part of the survey, such 
as personal and socio-economic parameters, were also useful for my research. Furthermore, the 
use of quota sampling instead of a probability sampling technique could cause some bias and in 
a future edition more measures could be added to reduce the social desirability bias.  
6 |  Recommendations for further research  
The knowledge about the implications of the use of environmental taxation is still very 
incomplete, especially in the case of persistent and complex environmental problems, such as 
climate change. Policy impacts depend on many landscape elements, design choices and 
interactions with other policies and other trends, economic and geopolitical developments etc. 
In this section, a future research agenda is presented, based on the results of the PhD study, on 
its contributions and on its limitations. The research agenda is presented in a flowchart that is 
an extended version of figure 1 of the introducing chapter.  
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Figure 10. Future research agenda 
A first area where future research is needed is on the impact of policy mixes. Many merits and 
deficiencies of the use of various types of policy mixes have been identified, but the interference 
of policy goals, policy instruments, policy processes, stakeholder involvement and exogenous 
development makes for such a complex and unpredictable cocktail that many blind spots 
remain. A first example is how the difference between policy layering versus policy packaging 
affects the impact of a policy mix. A second example is how much of the efficiency of a policy 
mix is left if a new ET is allowed to co-exist with environmentally harmful subsidies (e.g. on the 
production or the use of fossil fuels). This research project could be exclusively focused on the 
place of ET in policy mixes, or could be a broader project with a perspective on all instruments, 
policy strategies and policy processes that can be part of a policy mix.  
A second area for future research relates to the development of indicators for the greening of a 
tax system. Although the index-type, aggregate tax rate-based indicator developed in this PhD 
study is a methodological step forward, further in-depth analyses on the issues of weighting and 
introduction of new taxes in the aggregate tax-rate based indicator is recommended. An 
ambitious study would aim at the development of an aggregated indicator measuring the 
greening of national tax systems in a comparative way. The real challenge there is to find a 
basket of environmentally related taxes that would (1) exist in a large number of countries, with 
available data on the tax rates and the revenues, and (2) be representative to all environmentally 
related taxes in each country (i.e. be important in monetary terms). That (set of) indicator(s) 
would be a full (and better) alternative for the dominant revenue-based indicators use by OECD 
and Eurostat today, and could replace them.   
 
A third area relates to the link between environmental taxation and sustainability transitions. 
Further research is needed on (at least) three outstanding questions. First, on the distinction 
between practices and culture within the transitions thinking school. Second, on the best policy 
mixes for fostering sustainability transitions. And third, the theoretical claims made in this PhD 
studies can be regarded as new hypotheses, which call for empirical evidence. In particular, the 
hypothesis that government, policy instruments and ET can make a positive and significant 
contribution to sustainability transitions, needs empirical testing. These research objectives can 
be combined with the research on policy mixes as described in the first area of research. The 
study of the effects of using ETR within a well-designed policy mixes are thus subdivided in a 
short-term research line and a research line on the long-run impact and on sustainability 
transitions. The proposed research programme should ideally combine quantitative research 
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methods to measure impacts and qualitative methods to identify the success and failure factors 
and to propose improvements in existing policy designs.  
 
A fourth area concerns the social acceptability of ET and ETR. Many potential determinants of 
acceptance are not sufficiently understood yet. There is a need for a better understanding of 
the acceptability conditions of an ETR. An experimental study on the effectiveness of measures 
or design choices that tackle the efficiency-acceptability trade-off could aim at transforming an 
‘efficient but unacceptable’ ETR into an ‘efficient and acceptable’ one. Furthermore, future 
empirical studies could shed a light on the role of co-benefits of a carbon tax, on ways to 
convince the public of the effectiveness of environmental taxation, and on the potential of 
innovative policy mixes, including threshold taxation, trial periods and bonus-malus systems. 
Theories from behavioural economics should be used in this project to find a policy mix that 
successfully combines effectiveness, efficiency and public acceptability. The acceptability 
question should be divided in acceptability for the public versus for policy makers, as these two 
groups’ support, although correlated, depends on different criteria.  
Finally, knowledge on the Ladder of Acceptability of Revenue Recycling Options (LARRO) could 
be expanded by adding smart policy mixes to the recycling options. A more extensive survey 
than we did focusing exclusively on ETS and its revenue recycling options would strongly 
enhance the knowledge on the most feasible policy options for the public and the policy makers.  
 
The four areas described could lead to four freestanding research projects or programmes. 
However, a larger and more integrated research project, containing elements of the four areas, 
could be designed based on the four trade-offs analysed in section 2.2 of this concluding 
chapter. The reconciliation between efficiency on the one hand, and acceptability, equity, 
competitiveness and long-term robustness on the other hand, would be an ambitious yet 
coherent research goal. A large research programme combining theoretical and empirical 
research would be a great contribution on the knowledge on the potential of ET and ETR as 
regulatory policy instruments.   
7 |   Recommendations for policy makers 
As the topic of this PhD study is highly policy-relevant, policy recommendations have been made 
at various occasions in this dissertation. In this section, the recommendations for policy makers 
are summarized.  
Regarding the instrument choice, the decision should consider the circumstances of the sector 
and policy field related to the environmental problem that is on the policy agenda. A tax seems 
to be the preferred option if the following conditions are met:  
- in case of limited information on the individual firms’ cost curves; 
- when markets are absent or problems such as asymmetric information, moral hazard or 
other market failures are present; 
- when the marginal abatement cost curve is steeper than the slope of the marginal 
damage curve. 
In the case of complex environmental problems such as climate change, a policy mix often has 
advantages a single instrument cannot provide. When considering a policy mix, it is important 
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for the policy maker to avoid incompatible instruments such as an ETS and an environmental tax 
to solve the same externality. Moreover, government should have the courage to implement 
regime destabilizing measures, such as an ET or an ETR. Moreover, before introducing a new ET, 
policy makers should aim at removing any existing subsidies that have the opposite effect of the 
new tax in order to increase consistency and efficiency and to avoid overdesign. Policy mixes 
increase the need for policy coordination, both between government levels (vertical 
coordination) and between departments (horizontal coordination). This requires an open 
attitude by both political actors and administrations.  
Regarding the optimal design of an ET and an ETR, first, the tax base should be as closely linked 
to the environmental problem as possible. Proxies can be used as a second-best solution as long 
as they are not too remotely linked to the externality. Second, the tax rates should heed 
elasticities: if demand elasticity is high, only a high regulatory tax will have an impact. Third, tax 
policies should be communicated well in advance, and with a future time horizon, including 
planned tax rate evolutions. On the other hand, some flexibility needs to be integrated into the 
design, allowing the policy maker to react to unforeseen developments or to review initial 
assumptions. Exemptions and reduced tax rates to compensate for financial losses should be 
kept to a strict minimum, or even to zero. Measures to compensate for undesirable side effects 
should be situated outside the environmental tax design, but inside the ETR-design. In other 
words, alleviating side effects should be done through revenue recycling design, as this avoids 
erosion of the environmental effectiveness of the ET. 
Public acceptability is important for an ETR to get approved on the political level, and to survive 
more than one political term. To raise acceptability, first, a significant part of the revenues 
should be hypothecated to the environment. Second, a large and transparent communication 
campaign is needed to convince the public of the environmental effectiveness of the policy mix 
and to raise people’s trust in government. The focus should be on long-term acceptance of the 
principles of an ETR, so it can be a topic of political consensus instead of divide. Third, part of 
the revenues should be used for compensating financially vulnerable households. Fourth, 
insights from behavioural economics should be integrated in the policy design, including 
salience, framing and the endowment effect. And fifth, excessive complexity should be avoided 
as this may impair public support. 
In sum, policy makers can lead society by implementing an ambitious policy mix to tackle 
persistent environmental problems such as climate change. In many cases, an ETR will be part 
of the optimal policy mix. To overcome some of the barriers of ETR, which are mostly related to 
real or perceived negative side effects, a hybrid instrument, consisting of an ETS with a built-in 
price floor that operates as a tax, supplemented with smart revenue recycling options, could 
offer a compromise. The policy maker’s task is to design a policy mix which balances out all the 
societal perspectives that are at stake without compromising the current and next generations 
entitlement to the public good that the environment is. 
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Appendix 1. Extended table of environmental policy 
instruments 
Table 12. Extended table of environmental policy instruments 
Negative positive 
Environmental permit/ licence legalization 
Performance standard, e.g. On the car fleet of 
one brand. 
Exception on regulation / low-regulation 
zone’1 
Emission standard 
- For an individual country; 
- For a new car; 
- For a car entering an urban zone2 
Labelling: 
- Product labelling (energy efficiency, 
organic food, ... 
- Process labelling 
Energy performance certificate for buildings 
Fuel efficiency standard Dissuasion campaign 
Energy efficiency standard: 
- For heating devices; 
- For other electrical devices; 
- For houses and buildings 
Awareness/information campaign 
Quota (= non-tradable permit):  
- Fishing quota 
- Vehicle quota 
Sensitisation campaign 
Ban or prohibition on production input or 
output. 
Voluntary agreement (co-regulation) 
Prescription or obligation Naming and faming 
Legislation  Early warning system 
National emission target Voluntary code for economic sectors (e.g. 
green buildings) 
Education attainment targets for schools Voluntary environmental standard (ISO 14001) 
Technology standard: BAT and BATNEEC Recommendation 
Litigation facilitation Leading by example: 
- Green procurement and tendering; 
- Greening of building stock; 
- Greening of transport  
- Divestment  
- Greening export credits, guarantees and 
insurance 
Zoning / location control Nudges3 
Naming and shaming Carbon offsets scheme 
Tax, charge, fee: 
- Emissions tax 
- Waste charge (collection, recycling, 
incineration, landfill) 
Subsidy: 
- Export credits 
- Energy subsidies 
- Purchase subsidies 
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- / wastewater/ effluent charges 
- User charges/ toll (e.g. road pricing) 
- Resource taxation 
- Input taxes (pesticides, energy) 
- Resource rent taxation (royalties) 
- Product / purchase / consumption taxes: 
includes excise taxes, but not VAT. 
- Production tax 
- Energy tax 
- Carbon tax 
- Fine / non-compliance fee, e.g. for noise 
standard violations 
- Pollution tax (e.g. air pollution) 
- Tax border adjustment 
- ETR 
- Noise charge 
- Deforestation charge 
- Access fee 
- Land use tax 
- Manufacturing subsidies 
- Public transport subsidies 
- R & D subsidies 
 
Tradable permit scheme (grandfathered or 
auctioned): 
- Emissions trading 
- Tradable emission reduction credits 
- Personal carbon budget 
- Tradable quotas (e.g. catch quotas) 
- Tradable performance standards4 
- Tradable land rights/ land permits 
(development quotas) 
- Tradable water shares 
- Tradable offsets 
- Tradable reforestation credits 
- Tradable conservation credits 
Government guarantees/insurance: 
- Credit guarantee for environmental 
business (revolving funds) 
- Green export credits 
Removal of EHS Tax expenditure: rebate, tax differentiation, 
exemption, tax deduction, accelerated write-
off 
Liability scheme5, compensation fund, 
environmental liability insurance 
Tax compensation scheme 
performance bond6 Feed-in tariff, green certificates scheme 
White certificates scheme 7 Concessional (soft) loan 
- Revolving green fund 
- Sector fund 
 Prize  
Deposit-refund scheme 
Bonus-malus scheme  
Sources: R. C. Anderson (2002), Bennear and Stavins (2007), Fischer (2001), Perman et al. (2003), 
Sorrell et al. (2009), UNDESA (2012), UNEP (2004) and Steuwer (2013). 
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Direct provision is not included, nor are organizational instruments. 
1. Nudging is information provision aimed at behavioural change that is not trying to make people 
more aware, but instead focuses on changing the environment in which a consumer decision is 
made, which may influence the choices made by people’s ‘automatic minds’. For example, 
changing the default option for electricity supply for a family in a form to ‘renewable energy’; 
only few people will take the effort to change the default option (Ölander & Thøgersen, 2014). 
2. Example: the objective to reduce the amount of airplane catering waste going to landfill and 
incineration is seriously hampered by the fact that, according to the Guardian, “At the moment 
EU animal health legislation, drawn up as a reaction to diseases like foot and mouth, dictates 
that all catering waste arriving from outside EU borders be treated as high-risk and incinerated 
or buried in deep landfill.” (https://www.theguardian.com/sustainable-
business/2017/apr/01/airline-food-waste-landfill-incineration-airports-recycling-iberia-qantas-
united-virgin, accessed April 29, 2017). 
3. Such as currently in the city of Antwerp. 
4. Example: the 1982 lead phase out programme in the US, which set an inter-refinery average (a 
‘cap’) on importers and refineries; trading between underusing and overusing firms was allowed 
(Fischer, 2001). 
5. Obligation to set-up financial mechanisms (compensation fund) in case of environmental damage 
or negligence in clean-up (in case of resource extraction), usually from the beginning of an 
activity.  
6. The only difference between a performance bond and a liability scheme, is that the latter is a 
fund that is set-up by the company, while in the former case the company needs to pay the fee 
to the government, in which case it is comparable to a deposit-refund scheme. Stavins (2001) 
regards a performance bond as a type of insurance premium tax. Both instruments are regularly 
used in the context of mining activities (R. C. Anderson, 2002).  
7. White certificates are certificates to certify energy savings by energy suppliers (Sorrell et al., 
2009; Steuwer, 2013).  
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Summary 
 
This PhD study makes an in-depth analysis of the use of environmental taxation as a regulatory 
policy instrument. It is based on insights from both social and political science and economics. 
The central research question is “How can the use of ET as a regulatory policy instrument be 
explained, measured and optimized?” This question harbours several underlying research 
questions, which are elaborated in an introductory chapter, four academic publications, and a 
concluding chapter.  
 
In the Introduction, an analysis is carried out of the most important policy-making models, which 
explain how policy decisions come about. The instrument of environmental taxation is fit into 
these models. Subsequently, a taxonomy of policy instruments is developed, based on different 
criteria such as the control model. Finally, instrument choice by policy makers is explained, both 
in theory and in practice.  
In Paper 1, the taxation instrument is compared with emissions trading in the context of climate 
policy, both in theory and in a case study on China. Although the theoretical potential of both 
instruments is similar, carbon taxation appears to be the better option for the case of China, 
taking into account design complexity and the limited institutional capacity and experience.  
In Paper 2, the existing indicators for measuring the greening of a tax system are evaluated and 
a new type of aggregated indicator is developed, based on index theory. Although the validity 
of the new aggregate indicator is higher than the dominantly used revenue-based indicators, a 
number of validity issues remain, and complexity can be a burden for its use by government 
agencies. Ideally, the greening of a tax system will be evaluated by by using a set of indicators, 
including the revenue-based indicators, single tax rates, the new aggregate tax rate-based 
indicator, and the implicit tax rate on energy. 
In Paper 3, the theory of environmental taxation is confronted with the theory of sustainable 
transitions thinking. Environmental taxation was found to have the highest potential for realizing 
long-term changes in technological development and social practices. Furthermore, the optimal 
impact is expected to occur when environmental taxation is used in a policy mix, along with 
other policy instruments, policy strategies and policy processes.  
In Paper 4, public support for environmental taxation is studied, both in theory and empirically, 
based on a survey in Flanders. Support is lower for taxes that are specified in detail. Education, 
income and environmental concern were found to be determinants of higher support. Revenue-
recycling options can be ranked in the ‘Ladder of Acceptability of Revenue Recycling Options’ 
(LARRO), with environmental expenditures receiving the highest support.  
In the concluding chapter, transversal conclusions for the use of environmental taxation as a 
regulatory instrument are presented. Trade-offs were found between efficiency on the one 
hand, and acceptability, equity, competitiveness, and long-term robustness on the other hand. 
The use of policy mixes and accurate policy design are crucial success factors for environmental 
taxation. A future research agenda could be constituted through a comprehensive and 
integrated research programme, in which all trade-offs are analysed and empirical evidence is 
  
160 
gathered for improved knowledge regarding the use of environmental taxation as a regulatory 
policy instrument.  
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Samenvatting 
Deze doctoraatsstudie maakt een diepteanalyse van het gebruik van milieubelastingen als een 
sturend beleidsinstrument. Het is gebaseerd op inzichten uit zowel sociale en politieke 
wetenschappen als uit economie. De centrale onderzoeksvraag is “Hoe kan het gebruik van 
milieubelastingen als sturend beleidsinstrument worden verklaard, gemeten en 
geoptimaliseerd?” Deze vraag herbergt meerdere onderliggende onderzoeksvragen, die 
worden uitgewerkt in een inleidend hoofdstuk, vier academische publicaties en een 
concluderend hoofdstuk.  
In de Inleiding wordt een analyse uitgevoerd van de belangrijkste beleidsmodellen, die verklaren 
hoe beleidsbeslissingen tot stand komen. Het instrument van milieubelastingen wordt ingepast 
in deze modellen. Vervolgens wordt een typologie van beleidsinstrumenten ontwikkeld, 
gebaseerd op verschillende criteria, zoals het sturingsmodel. Ten slotte wordt 
instrumentenkeuze door beleidsmakers verklaard, zowel in theorie als in praktijk.  
In Paper 1 wordt het belastingsinstrument vergeleken met verhandelbare emissierechten in de 
context van klimaatbeleid, zowel in theorie als in een casestudy over China. Hoewel het 
theoretische potentieel van beide instrumenten vergelijkbaar is, blijkt een koolstofbelasting de 
betere optie voor de case van China, rekening houdend met de complexiteit van het design en 
de beperkte institutionele capaciteit en ervaring.   
In Paper 2 worden de bestaande indicatoren voor het meten van de vergroening van het 
belastingsysteem geëvalueerd, en wordt een nieuw type van geaggregeerde indicator 
ontwikkeld, gebaseerd op indextheorie. Hoewel de validiteit van de nieuwe samengestelde 
indicator hoger is dan de meest gebruikte inkomstengebaseerde indicatoren, blijven een aantal 
validiteitsproblemen bestaan, en de complexiteit kan een last zijn bij het gebruik door 
overheidsactoren. Idealiter wordt de vergroening van het belastingstelsel beoordeeld aan de 
hand van een set van indicatoren, waaronder de inkomstengebaseerde indicatoren, individuele 
belastingtarieven, de nieuwe samengestelde indicator en het impliciete belastingtarief op 
energie.  
In Paper 3 wordt de theorie van milieubelastingen geconfronteerd met de theorie van 
duurzaamheidstransities. Milieubelastingen blijken het grootste potentieel te hebben in het 
realiseren van technologische ontwikkeling en sociale praktijken, beide op de lange termijn. 
Daarnaast wordt de optimale impact verwacht van het gebruik van milieubelastingen in een 
beleidsmix, in combinatie met andere beleidsinstrumenten, -strategieën en -processen.  
In Paper 4 wordt het maatschappelijk draagvlak voor milieubelastingen bestudeerd, zowel in 
theorie als empirisch, op basis van een enquête in Vlaanderen. Het draagvlak bij het publiek is 
kleiner wanneer de taksen met veel detail worden gespecificeerd. Scholingsgraad, inkomen en 
milieuattitude blijken determinanten te zijn voor hogere steun. De bestedingsopties voor de 
inkomsten kunnen in een rangschikking worden geplaatst, in de ‘Ladder of Acceptability of 
Revenue Recycling Options’ (LARRO), waarin uitgaven voor milieu de hoogste steun genieten.  
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In de conclusie worden transversale besluiten voor het gebruik van milieubelastingen als 
sturend beleidsinstrument voorgesteld. Trade-offs of afruilen werden gevonden tussen 
enerzijds efficiëntie, en anderzijds aanvaardbaarheid, rechtvaardige verdeling, competitiviteit 
en robuustheid op de lange termijn. Een onderzoeksagenda voor de toekomst zou de vorm 
kunnen krijgen van een uitgebreid en geïntegreerd onderzoeksprogramma, waarin alle trade-
offs worden geanalyseerd en empirische onderbouwing worden gezocht voor een betere kennis 
omtrent het gebruik van milieubelastingen als sturend beleidsinstrument.  
 
 
  
163 
Résumé 
Cette étude doctorale fait une analyse en profondeur de l’usage  des taxes environnementales 
en tant qu’instrument politique dirigiste. Elle est basée sur des notions tant sociales et politiques 
qu’économiques. La question étudiée est “Comment l’usage de taxes environnementales en 
tant qu’instrument politique dirigiste peut-il elle être expliqué, mesuré et optimalisé?” Cette 
question comprend plusieurs questions sous-jacentes, qui sont élaborées dans une introduction, 
quatre publications académiques et une conclusion. 
Dans l’introduction, une analyse des modèles politiques les plus importants est effectuée. Ces 
modèles expliquent comment les décisions politiques sont prises. L’instrument des taxes 
environnementales est cadré dans ces modèles. Ensuite, une typologie d’instruments politiques 
est développée, basée sur plusieurs critères, comme le modèle de commande. Enfin, le choix 
des instruments est expliqué, tant en théorie qu’en pratique. 
Dans le Papier 1, l’instrument des taxes est comparé avec un système d’échange des droits 
d’émissions dans le contexte des politiques en matière de climat, tant en théorie que dans le cas 
de la Chine. Bien que le potentiel théorique des deux instruments soit comparable, une taxe 
carbonne se trouve être la meilleure option pour le cas de la Chine, compte tenu de la 
complexité de l’élaboration des politiques et des capacités institutionnelles limitées. 
Dans le Papier 2, les indicateurs existants pour la mesure du verdissement du système fiscal sont 
évalués, et un nouveau type d’indicateur agrégé est développé, basé sur la théorie des indices. 
Bien que la validité du nouvel indicateur agrégé soit supérieure à celle des indicateurs de 
référence, un nombre de problèmes de validité restent pertinents, et la complexité peut être 
une charge importante auprès des utilisateurs. L’évaluation du verdissement du système fiscal 
sera faite idéalement sur base d’un ensemble d’indicateurs, dont les indicateurs de recettes, les 
taux d’imposition individuels, le nouvel indicateur agrégé et le taux d’imposition implicite sur 
l’énergie.  
Dans le Papier 3, la théorie des taxes environnementales est confrontée à la théorie des 
transitions durables. Les taxes environnementales semblent avoir le potentiel le plus important 
par rapport à la création de développements technologiques et au changement de pratiques 
sociales, au long terme. Par ailleurs, l’impact optimal est attendu de la mise en oeuvre des taxes 
environnementales au sein d’un ’policy-mix’, en combinaison avec d’autres instruments, 
stratégies et processus politiques.  
Dans le Papier 4, le soutien public envers les taxes environnementales est étudié, tant en théorie 
que de façon empirique, sur base d’un questionnaire en Flandre. Le soutien public est moins 
important si les taxes sont spécifiées en détail. Le niveau scolaire, le revenu et l’attitude 
environnementale s’avèrent être des déterminants importants pour le soutien. Les options de 
dépense pour les recettes peuvent être classées dans un classement (‘ranking’), dans ‘l’échelle 
d’acceptabilité des options de recyclage des recettes’ (LARRO), dans laquelle les dépenses pour 
l’environnement bénéficient du soutien le plus important.  
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Dans la Conclusion, des conclusions transversales pour l’utilisation des taxes environnementales 
en tant qu’instrument politique dirigiste sont présentées. Des compromis ont été trouvés entre 
– d’une part – l’efficacité, et – d’autre part – l’acceptabilité, l’équité, la compétitivité et la 
robustesse au long terme. Un programme de recherche futur pourrait se baser sur l’analyse de 
ces compromis et sur la justification empirique, afin d’obtenir une meilleure connaissance par 
rapport à l’usage des taxes environnementales en tant qu’instrument politique dirigiste.  
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